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BOSTON UNIVERSITY

GRADUATE SCHOOL

Dissertation

FREUD'S VIEW OF RELIGION

by

Herdis LeRoy Deabler

(A.B., North Central College, 1931;
S.T.B., Boston University, 1934)

submitted in partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

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CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

A. The Problem.....8
B. Aim of Investigation.....9
1. Statement of View.....9
2. Criticism of View.....10
3. Evaluation of View.....11
C. Survey of Work of Other Investigators.....11
1. Psycho-Analysts.....11
2. Other Psychologists.....14
D. Sources of Information.....15
1. Writings of Freud.....15
2. Writings of Recognized Psycho-Analysts....15
3. Writings of Other Psychologists.....16
4. References to Freud made by Religious Writers.....16
5. Personal Experience.....17
E. Definition of Subject and Plan of Procedure.18
1. Basic Elements of Religion.....18
2. General Outline of Investigation.....21

CHAPTER ONE
MAN

A. Theory of Psyche.....24
1. Physiological and Medical Background.....24
2. Experience with Breuer in Vienna.....25
3. Relation of Psyche and Soma.....26
4. Postivistic Account of Soma.....30
5. Psychological Method.....30
6. Definition of Psycho-Analysis as a Science.....30
7. The Psyche Includes 'Unconscious' as well as 'Conscious' Processes.....33

B. 'The Unconscious'.....38
1. 'The Conscious'.....38
2. 'The Pre-Conscious'.....39
3. 'The Unconscious'.....40
a. General Definition of 'Unconscious'....40
b. Specific Definition of 'The Unconscious'.....40
c. Evidence Cited for Justification of the Concept.....41
d. Methods of Investigating 'The Unconscious'.....45
C. Theory of Instincts.....48
1. 'Sexual Instincts'.....49
2. 'Death Instincts'.....57
D. 'Mental Mechanisms' or 'Dynamisms'.....63
E. 'Id,' 'Ego,' and 'Super-Ego'.....69
1. The 'Id'.....69
2. The 'Ego'.....70
3. The 'Super-Ego'.....72
F. Freedom and Determinism.....79
1. Psychological Determinism.....79
2. Analysis and Freedom.....80

CHAPTER TWO
THE BELIEF IN GOD

A. Psychological Origins of Belief in God.....84
1. Childhood Father 'Imago'.....84
2. Theory of the 'Primal Horde'.....92
3. The Need for Protection.....105
4. The Need for Moral Sanction.....107
B. Arguments for Rejection of Belief in God..111

CHAPTER THREE
MORALITY

A. Childhood Situation.....117
B. Origin of Taboos and Social Codes.....120

C. Morality and Neurosis.....122
D. Morality and Civilization.....124
E. Morality and Religion.....131

CHAPTER FOUR
GUILT

A. Analysis of Sense of Guilt.....145
1. Guilt and External Authority.....145
2. Guilt and Internal Authority.....146
3. Guilt and 'Aggressive Impulses'.....147
B. Neurotic Manifestations.....150
1. Self-Punishment.....150
2. Obsessions and Compulsions.....152
3. Paranoid 'Projection' of Guilt.....153
4. Crime from a Sense of Guilt.....155
C. Religious Manifestations of Guilt.....157
1. Obsessive Acts and Religious Practices..158
2. Guilt and the 'Primal Deed'.....161
a. Original Sin.....162
b. Guilt Basis of Social Laws.....162
c. Totem Feast.....163
d. Sacrificial Death of Christ.....165
e. Communion.....166
D. Therapy of Guilt.....168
1. Freud's Method.....168
2. Comparison with Jesus' Method.....171

CHAPTER FIVE
IMMORTALITY

A. Belief in Immortality.....182
1. Origin.....182
a. Psychological.....182
b. Moral.....184
2. Illusion.....185
B. Death.....188

CHAPTER SIX
WELTANSCHAUUNG

A. Influence of Inner Psychic States in Determining One's 'World-View'.....196
B. 'External Reality'.....199
C. 'The Scientific Weltanschauung'.....202

CHAPTER SEVEN
CRITICISM AND EVALUATION

A. Criticism.....209
1. From the Standpoint of Psychology of Religion.....210
a. Over-Emphasis on 'Unconscious' Factors.210
b. Over-Emphasis on Sexual Nature of Man..213
c. Theory of the 'Primal Horde' Overdrawn.215
d. Fallaciousness of Freud's Characterization of Religion of a 'Universal Obsessional Neurosis'.....216
e. The 'Super-Ego' Cannot be Regarded as the Seat of Morality Within the Personality.....217
f. Data Obtained from Abnormal Cases.....218
g. Failure to Appreciate 'Immament Reason' in Social Laws.....220
2. From the Standpoint of Philosophy of Religion.....221
a. Origin does not Determine Validity of Beliefs.....221
b. Freud Not Qualified as Philosopher of Religion.....223
c. His Metaphysics Not Consistent with His Psychology.....227
d. Reason and Religion not Incompatible...230
3. Personal Factors Involved.....232
a. Judaistic Heritage.....232
b. Semitic Conflict.....234
c. Schism with Jung.....236
B. Contributions.....238
1. To Psychology of Religion.....240

a. Analysis of Affective Factors in Religious Beliefs and Practices...240
b. Importance of Family Situation.....242
c. Analysis of Sense of Guilt.....243
d. The Nature of the Religious Subject.244
2. To Pastoral Psychology.....246
a. Insight into One's Own Personality..246
b. Religious Education.....247
c. Treatment of Guilt Feelings.....248
d. Correct Unhealthy Views and Practices.....249
e. Insight into Family Conflicts.....250
f. Recognition of Cases that Need Psychiatric Attention.....250
g. Preventive Mental Hygiene.....251
h. Increased Capacity for Religious Experience.....253

CONCLUSIONS.....256

SUMMARY.....258

BIBLIOGRAPHY.....263
A. Sigmund Freud.....263
B. Others.....275

AUTOBIOGRAPHY.....283

INTRODUCTION

A. The Problem.

The problem for investigation is an outgrowth of contact with the teachings of Freud in two summers of clinical training in mental hospitals.[1] There it was noted how the interpretation and treatment of patients by the trained psychiatrists of the hospital staffs followed Freudian principles. One found individuals who were broken in spirit, who were haunted by demons, who were sick of soul, and it appeared as though Freud had the key to the healing of their condition.

On the other hand, Freud was known for his rejection of religious beliefs. A problem arose and the issues became acute: How could one relate psycho-analysis and religion? How does psycho-analytic therapy compare with religious "cure of souls"? How does it happen that one who ministers to inner soul conditions should renounce religion when religious leaders traditionally regarded their work as ministration to the souls of men? Why is Freud so hostile to religion? Could he be taken as an authority on religious beliefs? These questions were of vital importance and were seen to have far reaching implications not only for the student of the psychology and philosophy of religion, but also for the clergy and pastor who were daily dealing with the inner problems of parishioners

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and who were socially recognized as representatives of religion. Inasmuch as very little literature could be found on the subject, the problem, Freud's view of religion, presented itself as a dissertation project worthy of investigation.

B. Aim of Investigation.

1. Statement of View.

In our treatment of Freud's view of religion, three definite ends will be pursued. In the first place, an attempt will be made to determine what Freud's view of religion actually is. He himself has written no thorough and systematic work on the subject, nor is his view of religion adequately treated by any of his followers or by any other writer. His ideas on religious beliefs and practices are most concisely expressed in his two works: Totem und Tabu and Die Zukunft einer Illusion.[2] Our first task will be to discover what he states concerning religious beliefs, to relate these statements together in the formulation of general propositions which may be thought to adequately characterize his view of religion. In this way, we shall try to come to some understanding of what his views are concerning important beliefs historically known as religious.

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2. Criticism of View.

The second task will be one of criticising his view. Criticism will be made from two different standpoints. In the first place, criticism of his view will be made from the standpoint of psychology of religion. Freud has written about the psychological origins of religious beliefs. He has sought to describe the mental processes involved in religious practices and beliefs. Such work falls within the realm of the psychology of religion. His work must be tested on the basis of the adequacy of his observations and upon the basis of the accuracy of his descriptions. Such criticism will attempt to ascertain the scientific worth of his work as it falls within the realm of the psychology of religion.

In addition, criticism of Freud's view will be made from the standpoint of the philosophy of religion. Freud has not contented himself with the task of the psychologist of religion. He has ventured further and has attempted to pass judgment upon the truth of religious beliefs. The determination of the objective validity of religious beliefs is a task which falls within the realm of the philosophy of religion. His statements concerning the validity of religious beliefs must be weighed and considered in the light of all the knowledge we have concerning the philosophy of religion. In criticising Freud from this point of view, it must be determined whether he is sufficiently acquainted with the

data and methods of the philosophy of religion to qualify him as one who is able to speak with authority on the truth of religious beliefs. The second task, thus, will be one of criticism.

3. Evaluation of View.

The third task will be more constructive in nature. We shall seek to ascertain the positive values that are to be found in psycho-analytic conclusions and therapy. An attempt will be made to determine the contributions that Freud has to offer to the psychology and philosophy of religion.

C. Survey of Work of Other Investigators.

1. Psycho-Analysts.

Most of the research on the subject chosen for investigation has been done by immediate followers of Freud, by recognized psycho-analysts. Theodor Reik aims to elaborate the essential teachings of Freud from the point of view of psychology of religion. His first work in the field is entitled Ritual: Psycho-Analytical Studies, in which he has taken Freud's teaching concerning the 'Oedipus-complex' and the 'primal horde' as the basis for understanding primitive and early religious rituals. He considers such rituals as the 'Couvade' ritual in which the father retires for a period of a month or more immediately after the birth of his male child;

the puberty and initiation rites of savages; the Kol Nidre, a Jewish prayer and song of absolution in which the individual gains freedom from all vows and guilt; and the symbolic significance of the Jewish Shofar or ram's horn. Reik's work is scholarly, but it is not a comprehensive treatment of Freud's view of religion. He merely elaborates two or three of Freud's basic principles by showing their application in the understanding of primitive religious rituals. His work cannot be looked upon as a comprehensive treatment of Freud's view of religion. In his introduction, he admits that he is only considering Freud's view of religion from the point of view of the psychology of religion. He does not deal in any way with the philosophical aspects of Freud's view.

Similar comments may be mentioned concerning the work of Géza Róheim and R. Money-Kyrle. Géza Róheim is an anthropologist who has used Freudian principles in interpreting the life of savage and primitive peoples. His three works, Australian Totemism, Animism, Magic, and the Divine King, and The Riddle of the Sphinx or Human Origins, are attempts to portray the life of primitive peoples in terms of the 'Oedipus-complex' and other psycho-analytic theories concerning the development of human personality. His work contains much factual material. However, from the standpoint of gaining a comprehensive knowledge of Freud's view of religion, it can

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The one most capable of treating Freud's view of religion is Oskar Pfister. Oskar Pfister is a Pastor in Zurich. He has had theological training and pastoral experience, on the one hand, and, on the other, has worked with Freud and has had many years of analytical experience. Unfortunately, he has not treated the subject in any systematic manner. In his two more noted books, The Psycho-Analytic Method and Some Applications of Psycho-Analysis, sections are given over to a discussion of Freud's view of religion and the relationship of psycho-analysis and religion. These discussions are popular in nature. In addition, Pfister wrote these works before Freud published his books that touch more directly upon religious and philosophical problems. Although we have no systematic treatment of the subject from Pfister, we shall find that his comments on the subject are pertinent and of value.

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2. Other Psychologists.

Outside of the psycho-analytic school, there is little that has been contributed to the subject. First must be mentioned Carl G. Jung. Jung was a disciple of Freud, but separated from Freud due to various theoretical and personal differences. One of the theoretical differences was his view of the religious life of man. Jung's view of religion is best expressed in his two works: The Psychology of the Unconscious and Modern Man in Search of a Soul. Perhaps the most scholarly book that appeared outside the Freudian school which treats of Freud's view of religion is Edwin B. Holt's book: The Freudian Wish and Its Place in Ethics. This book, however, is not adequate. It treats only of the special subject of the theoretical foundation of the wish in mental and moral life, and it appeared at the early date of 1915. Knight Dunlap has written on the subject in Mysticism, Freudianism and Scientific Psychology. This book, too, was written at an early date, and it is popular in nature. Other books such as Barbour's Sin and the New Psychology, Tansley's The New Psychology and Its Relation to Life, Povah's The New Psychology and Hebrew Prophets, Hadfield's Psychology and Morals, Everett Dean Martin's The Mystery of Religion, and Weatherhead's numerous publications[3] are books which are influenced by the

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D. Sources of Information.

1. Writings of Freud.

There are five sources of information from which data may be drawn. The first and most important of all sources of information are the writings of Freud. Throughout this study an attempt is made to keep close to the data as found in Freud himself.

2. Writings of Recognized Psycho-Analysts.

The second source of information is the writings of Freud's accepted followers. The most noteworthy among his followers who have developed his view of religion are such writers as Theodor Reik, Géza Róheim, H. Money-Kyrle, Otto Rank, Oskar Pfister, Ernest Jones, J. C. Flügel, M. K. Bradby, many of whom we have already mentioned in the preceding section. These writers not only aid one in clarifying one's understanding of Freud's ideas, but they are also useful in showing to what extent Freud's ideas can be applied and developed. For the most part, Freud's disciples do not alter his teachings. Their work is largely that of elaboration and application.

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4. References to Freud made by Religious Writers.

A fourth source of information is to be found in the writings of religious leaders, philosophers of religion, psychologists of religion, and the clergy, who have expressed themselves either directly or indirectly concerning Freud's view of religion. There are few such writings that have appeared. Either they have not taken Freud's antagonism towards religion seriously, or they do not yet know what to make of it. W. S. Swisher, Clifford E. Barbour, John Rathbone Oliver and Leslie D. Weatherhead have written either directly or indirectly on the subject. With the exception of W. S. Swisher, most of the comments concerning Freud has been indirect and has followed along the line of pointing out how "The New Psychology" might aid the minister in dealing with

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the problems of his parishioners. Only here and there does one find paragraphs given over to a criticism of Freud's view of religion.

5. Personal Experience.

The fifth source of information is less tangible. Its data cannot be put within quotation marks nor be referred to in footnotes. Such a source is that of personal experience. This experience has been of two kinds. Mention has already been made concerning two summers of clinical training in mental hospitals. There one comes into living contact with patients who have suffered mental breakdown and nervous disorder. It was on the basis of his observation of clinical cases that Freud formulated his theories. Personal contact with and knowledge about such individuals is almost indispensable for an understanding of Freud's views concerning human nature and views concerning religious beliefs which are related to his view of human nature. The second source of personal experience is that of analysis. Freud has repeatedly stated that no one is capable of fully appreciating the literature and theories of psycho-analysis who has not submitted himself to a personal analysis under a trained analyst.[4] In order to gain this practical, working knowledge

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4 GIP, 5; "Observations on 'Wild' Psycho-Analysis", CP, II, 303.

of and insight into the theory and technique of psycho-analysis, six weeks of analysis was had under a trained analyst, Dr. I. H. Coriat, of Boston, Mass.

E. Definition of Subject and Plan of Procedure.

1. Basic Elements of Religion.

We have heretofore spoken of Freud's view of religion as though religion were one object, or fact, and as though Freud had one view concerning it. As is well known, religion is a term that stands for a complexity of beliefs, practices, attitudes, feelings, behavior, etc. As a matter of fact, Freud continually uses the term religion as though it described some particular fact, and writes as though he has one consistent attitude towards it. As a typical statement, he says:

> Religion is illusion, and it derives its strength from the fact that it falls in with our instinctual desires.[5]

In this instance, as in most of his writings, he uses the term religion as having a very definite meaning, and he associates with it a certain definite attitude. For this reason we have previously spoken of Freud's view of religion in the same way as he speaks of religion, namely, as though we had something definite in mind when we used the term.

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5 - MIIP, 239.

As we go into our study, however, we must come to a clearer understanding of our subject. We must reveal what is included within the term "religion," and having defined it in terms of more particular ideas or entities, we must seek to describe what Freud thinks concerning these particular ideas or entities. Our subject must be particularized.

Freud makes two attempts at a definition of religion. The first one occurs in Die Zukunft einer Illusion. He writes:

> Welches ist also die psychologische Bedeutung der religiösen Vorstellungen, als was können wir sie klassifizieren? Die Frage ist zunächst gar nicht leicht zu beantworten. Nach Abweisung verschiedener Formulierungen wird man bei der einen stehen bleiben: Es sind Lehrsätze, Aussagen über Tatsachen und Verhältnisse der äusseren (oder inneren) Realität, die etwas mitteilen, was man ihnen nicht gefunden hat und die beanspruchen, dass man ihnen Glauben schenkt. [6]

Here he sets out to classify religious ideas, but that is as far as he goes. He states that religion consists of certain dogmas about reality, but he does not tell us what these dogmas are. He sees the need of defining and classifying religious ideas and dogmas, but fails to carry out the definition and classification.

The second attempt at definition of religion occurs in the last chapter of his most recent book. Here he writes:

> If one wishes to form a true estimate of the full grandeur of religion, one must keep in mind what it undertakes to do for men. It gives them inform-

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6 ZEI, 38.

> ation about the sources and origin of the universe, it assures them of protection and final happiness amid the changing vicissitudes of life, and it guides their thoughts and actions by means of precepts which are backed by the whole force of its authority. [7]

This definition has more content than the above one. It is what might be called a functional definition, for it tries to define religion in terms of what it does for mankind. The beliefs or elements which are thought to be essential, however, may be inferred from the statements given in this definition. The first element, we note, is "information about the sources and origin of the universe." He goes on to state that this information sets forth the doctrine of God as Creator:

> The doctrine is that the universe was created by a being similar to man, but greater in every respect, in power, wisdom, and strength of passion, in face by an idealized superman... This God-Creator is openly called Father. [8]

The first element, thus, is belief in a Creator-God. The second element is belief in God as protector and insurer of final happiness. Whether Freud includes the belief in immortality within the phrase "assures them of...final happiness" is not specifically stated. In other instances,[9] however, he specifically states that the belief in immortality is one of the essential religious beliefs, so we might look upon this

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7 NILP, 221.
8 Ibid., 223.
9 CP, IV, 18; ZEI, 29.

second element as a belief in God as protector and insurer of immortality. The third element is more definite. Religious beliefs include ethical "precepts."

There are important items which are not specifically included in Freud's definition of religion--such items as the religious view of guilt and sin, the religious plan of salvation. The philosophy of religion also has its theory of man. However, since Freud is fundamentally a psychologist, he provides in all of his writings a view of man, and such items as guilt, sin and salvation are implicit in the beliefs concerning God, morality and immortality.

2. General Outline of Investigation.

With these general ideas in mind, we are able to make more specific our treatment of Freud's view of religion. We shall, in general, consider his view of religion under the basic elements that he himself suggests. We shall begin with a consideration of his view of human nature. Not only does his view of man have significance for the psychology and philosophy of religion, but his view of man is absolutely fundamental for gaining an understanding of his views concerning the more distinctly religious beliefs. Our first chapter will deal with Freud's view of man. In the second chapter we shall discuss his view of the belief in God. Freud contends that this basic belief underlies other religious

beliefs.[10] It is advisable to have his attitude towards this basic belief before us as early as possible. In Chapter III we shall deal with his theory of the origin, development, and significance of morality in its relation to individuals on the one hand, and to culture or civilization on the other. In Chapter IV, we shall deal with the important problem of the sense of guilt. In Chapter V, Freud's views on immortality and death will be investigated. In Chapter VI, we shall consider Freud's comments concerning a general philosophy of life, or Weltanschauung, a German term which is rich in meaning, but which has no English equivalent. Chapter VII will be the more critical part of our study. In this last Chapter we shall attempt to ascertain the truth of his views and shall make a statement concerning the contributions that he has to make to the psychology and philosophy of religion.

With these words of introduction, we are ready to proceed to our task.

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10 NILP, 223.

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10 NILP, 228.

CHAPTER ONE

MAN

To deal exhaustively with Freud's[1] theory of man would involve all of his writings, for he is a psychologist whose major concern is the understanding of human nature. We shall concern ourselves only with the more important of his psychological theories. Our interest in setting forth his view of man arises from two motives. First of all, since the psychology and philosophy of religion always advances a theory concerning the religious subject or man, we must know what Freud's view of man is in order to have a complete picture of his views concerning religious beliefs. Secondly, we must thoroughly know Freud's psychology if we are to understand his views concerning other religious beliefs. Freud's views concerning belief in God, belief in immortality, his attitude toward morality, and other beliefs, are all built upon his view of the inner functioning of human personality. At the outset, thus, we must concern ourselves with the basic

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1 The main biographical facts about Freud are the following: Sigmund Freud was born May 6, 1856, in Freiberg, Moravia; since the age of three he has lived his life in Vienna; received his M.D. degree from University of Vienna, and was later appointed instructor in Neurology at that University; studied in the year 1885-86 under Charcot in Paris; married in 1886; father of six children; since 1893 he has spent most of his time in psychotherapy of neurosis; he is still living.

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principles of his psychology. We shall consider, first, his theory of the psyche; second, his theory of 'the unconscious'; third, his account of 'mental mechanisms' or 'dynamisms'; fourth, his theory of instincts; fifth, his meta-psychological construction of 'ego,' 'id,' and 'super-ego;' and lastly, his ideas concerning freedom and determinism.

A. Theory of Psyche.

1. Physiological and Medical Background.

Freud, in his academic training, had been taught to look upon man as a physiological organism. He had attended medical school and had received his medical degree. After receiving his medical degree, he studied in Vienna under two of the most noted physiologists of his day--Brücke and Maynert. Brücke was a physiologist and Maynert a cerebral anatomist. Both of these investigators were inclined to view man as merely a complex physiological, neurological organism.

In 1885, Freud made application and succeeded in gaining a traveling fellowship to Paris. In Paris he studied at the famous Sâlpêtrière under the noted hypnotist, Charcot. Charcot, at the time, was demonstrating how he was able to induce hysteria through hypnosis. While patients were under hypnosis, he would subject them to severe emotional crises and would suggest that parts of their bodies be paralyzed. After patients emerged from their hypnosis, it was noted that

parts of their bodies were paralyzed and were incapable of motion. When these same patients were placed again under hypnosis and were told what had happened in the previous states of hypnosis and were told that the parts of their bodies were not really paralyzed, they were freed from their bodily incapacitation.

Freud studied these experiments with interest. He even suggested to Charcot that hypnosis could be used in treating patients who already had hysterical symptoms. Charcot, however, appeared to be more interested in the experimental aspects of hypnosis than in the therapy of hysteria, and did not follow through with Freud's suggestion.

2. Experience with Breuer in Vienna.

When Freud returned to Vienna in the Spring of 1886, he was no longer primarily interested in physiological research, although he did continue to do work in this field--publishing a monograph on Aphasia in 1891 and an article entitled "Cerebral Diplegia of Childhood" in 1893.[2] He became greatly interested in a case of hysteria which was under treatment of the noted Josef Breuer, a practicing physician of Vienna. Breuer had been studying and treating the girl since 1890. Since this case-study contributed so much to the formulation of Freud's theories, it deserves special attention.

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2 Wittels, SF, 85.

> The girl, aged twenty-one, suffered from severe hysteria, the most important symptom of which consisted of paralysis and anesthesia of the limbs on the right (less often on the left) side of the body, of squinting, coughing and other physical troubles... The power of speech disappeared and for two weeks the patient was dumb. One day when she was sitting on her father's bed, she saw a snake which would bite her. In the attempt to ward off the reptile, she noticed that the fingers of her hand changed into snakes. From fear, she attempted to pray but could recall only an English child's prayer. From that hour, without noticing it, she spoke only English and no longer understood her mother tongue...
>
> Though this clinical history already affords enough of striking nature, another particularly important circumstance was added. When Breuer had dictated to the hysterical patient in hypnosis what she had whispered in her unconscious state, she gave an account of the whole phantasy from which these words came. It showed that the scattered words were like the flag appearing above a wall, behind which was marching a body of troops bearing it. If the events which had caused the symptom could be successfully drawn out, then the cessation of the pathological phenomenon followed the oral description... When the whole story of suffering had been traced back to its causes, her health had completely and permanently returned. [3]

Both Breuer and Freud saw the inability of treating or understanding this case from the standpoint of physiology, neurology or cerebral anatomy. Here was a clear-cut instance of psychogenic causation of paralysis of the limbs. The patient was suffering from a forgotten experience, which, when it was brought back to consciousness, relieved her of her symptoms.

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Freud and Breuer collaborated on the case and in 1893 published the epoch-making study "Über den Psychischen Mechanismus Hysterischer Phänomene."[4]

The publishing of this article definitely marked a radical change is Freud's view of man. He definitely relinquished the, then, widely accepted hypothesis that man was but a physiological organism and began formulating a theory of man as a psychical being. Freud did not deny the existence of the body, as Christian Science is inclined to do, but he saw the inadequacy of trying to explain the complexity of human life in materialistic, physiological terms. He developed the concept of psychic causation. With Breuer, he studied hysterical patients with the view to the discovery of hidden ideas and experiences, the 'reminiscences' that motivated their symptoms. He was no longer a physiologist-- he was a psychologist.

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4 SÜH, I, 1-15; it is to be noted that very shortly after Breuer and Freud published their article on the psychogenesis of hysteria, Sigmund Exner, another of Brücke's pupils, published a work entitled Entwurf zu einer physiologischen Erklärung der psychischen Erscheinungen in which he advanced a physiological explanation of hysteria.

3. Relation of Psyche and Soma.

In affirming psychic causes, Freud did not deny physical or somatic causes. Although the exact term is not used in his writings, his view of the relationship between psyche and soma is that of interaction. The main juncture of interaction is, for the most part, according to Freud far below the level of consciousness. The following quotation is one of the clearest to be found with reference to his view of the relationship between psychic and somatic processes:

> We suppose that it (the 'id' part of the psyche) is somewhere in direct contact with somatic processes, and takes over from them instinctual needs and gives them emotional expression, but we cannot say in what substratum this contact is made.[5]

The psychic becomes the spokesman of the needs of the physiological organism. The area of their contact is not clearly defined.

Freud's views concerning the relationship between psyche and soma are best expressed in his writings on hysteria.[6] In hysteria, the patient suffers from bodily ailments--paralysis, anaesthesia, tics, etc. As in the case already cited, the patient is instructed to speak out whatever comes to his mind. Freud discovered that their symptoms had some unknown meanings and that as soon as they came to see the meanings in the symp-

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5 NILP, 104.

6 "Some Points in a Comparative Study of Organic and Hysterical Paralysis", CP, I, III; "Hysterical Phantasies", CP, II, V.

toms, which was usually disclosed by uncovering ideas or experiences having great emotional significance, the symptoms disappeared. Freud came to call this 'conversion' hysteria:

> In this way such unconscious phantasies are the immediate precursors in the mind of a whole series of hysterical symptoms. The hysterical symptoms are nothing but the unconscious phantasies made manifest by 'conversion.' [7]

In hysteria, the psychic phantasies become 'converted' into somatic symptoms. Back of hysterical bodily ailments are ideas and memories.

In speaking of Freud's view of psychic causation, it will be well to point out here that Freud has been particularly devoted to the discovery of what he calls 'unconscious' ideas, memories, and wishes. He admits that there are ideas and memories which are accessible to the 'conscious' mind, but he does not treat of the influence of such ideas and memories upon somatic processes. Consciously controlled ideas and wishes are not the primary, determining factors in hysteria and other neuroses, and for this reason, Freud has not paid particular attention to them.

If it be asked to which he gives the primacy, it must be answered that he considers the somatic more basic than the psychic;

> Psycho-analysis never forgets that the mental is based on the physical, although it can only carry

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7 Ibid., 55.

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[7] Ibid., 83.

its work back to this foundation and no further.[8] There could be no mental life without a physiological organism. But in stating that the somatic is more basic than the psychic, Freud does not state that the psychic can be entirely reduced to the somatic. It is for this reason that Freud sees the need for a psychology that goes beyond physiology.

4. Postivistic Account of the Soma.

The question of the metaphysics of the body is not considered by Freud. He is content to stay close to the empirical data. With his 'libido' theory, he has taken one step beyond the purely physiological, materialistic account of the body. He might have gone a step farther and have suggested a more far-reaching psychic or idealistic metaphysics of the body. Such a step was taken by Bergson in his concept of élan vital.[9] Freud has not ventured this far, however. He can carry the mental back to the physiological "foundation and no further." His earlier physiological training has survived at this point. He is content with a positivistic account of the soma.

5. Psychological Method.

Freud's method is that of introspective observation. He contrasts his method with the method of sensory observation

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8 "Psychogenic Visual Disturbance According to Psycho-Analytical Conceptions," CP, II, III.
9 CE, 140.

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9 OP, 140.

of physiological processes used by his medical colleagues:

> In your medical instruction you have been accustomed to visual demonstration. You see the anatomical specimen, the precipitate in the chemical reaction, the contraction of the muscles as the result of the stimulation of its nerves... Unfortunately, everything is different in psycho-analysis.[10]

Psycho-analysts gain their data by having the objects of their study, called "analysands," talk themselves out to the analyst. The fundamental rule of psycho-analysis is made clear: the individual must speak out <u>everything</u> that comes to his mind. This fundamental rule is presented as follows:

> 'One thing more, before you begin. Your talk with me must differ in one respect from an ordinary conversation. Where as usually you rightly try to keep the threads of your story together and to exclude all intruding associations and side-issues, so as not to wander too far from the point, here you must proceed differently. You will notice that as you relate things various ideas will occur to you which you feel inclined to put aside with certain criticisms and objects. You will be tempted to say to yourself: "This or that has no connection here, or it cannot be necessary to mention it." Never give in to these objections, but mention it even if you feel a disinclination against it, or indeed just because of this. Later on you will perceive and learn to understand the reason for this injunction, which is really the only one that you have to follow. So say whatever goes through your mind. Act as if you were sitting at the window of a railway train and describing to some one behind you the changing views you see outside. Finally, never forget that you have promised absolute honesty, and never leave anything unsaid because for any reason it is unpleasant to say it.' [11]

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10 GIP, 2.
11 "Further Recommendations on the Beginning of the Treatment," CP, II, 255.

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This fundamental rule is presented as follows:

> 'One thing more, before you begin. Your talk with me must differ in one respect from an ordinary conversation. There as usually you rightly try to keep the threads of your story together and to exclude all disturbing associations and side-issues, so as not to wander too far from the point, here you must proceed differently. You will notice that as you relate things various ideas will occur to you which you feel inclined to put aside with certain criticisms and objects. You will be tempted to say to yourself: "This or that has no connection here, or it cannot be necessary to mention it." Never give in to these objections, but mention it even if you feel a disinclination against it, or indeed just because of this. Later on you will perceive and learn to understand the reason for this injunction, which is really the only one that you have to follow. So say whatever goes through your mind. Act as if you were sitting at the window of a railway train and describing to some one behind you the changing views you see outside. Finally, never forget that you have promised absolute honesty, and never leave anything unsaid because for any reason it is unpleasant to say it.'[11]

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The individual, thus, is encouraged to speak out everything that comes to his mind. From a therapeutic standpoint, the cure of the patient is gained through this 'cathartic' process of talking himself out[12] and of gaining insight into his inner nature. From a theoretical standpoint, the theories of psycho-analysis are based on the information that comes out of such analyses. The statements of the patients, which are gained through their own passive introspection, are used as the factual data upon which Freud has constructed his psycho-analytic theories. It is presupposed that the analyst himself has gone through personal analysis.[13] This enables him to utilize data from his own introspective observations as well as the data gained from the reports of the analysand. It is on the basis of data gained through these introspective periods that the conclusions and theories of psycho-analysts are advanced.

6. Definition of Psycho-Analysis as a Science.

At this point, we face the necessity of defining the field of psycho-analysis as a science. We have spoken of psycho-analysis as being a psychology, but we must now qualify this statement. Freud does class psycho-analysis as a psychology, but specifies it as a special psychology. He has

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13 "Future of Psycho-Analytic Therapy", CP, II, 289.

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13 "Future of Psycho-Analytic Therapy", OP, II, 389.

called it a "psychology of the depths"[14] or a "psychology of the unconscious."[15] We shall, in the following section of this chapter, deal with Freud's theory of 'the unconscious' in more detail. Here, we are interested in pointing out that in defining psycho-analysis as a science we must assign it to the special field of 'unconscious' psychic processes, and we do this according to Freud's own conception of his work. It will be well for us to keep this fact in mind, for it will help us in evaluating Freud's views concerning the objective validity of religious beliefs. Freud may, with authority, point out 'the unconscious' motives for religious beliefs and experiences, but we cannot explain beliefs and experiences entirely on the basis of 'unconscious' motives. One must give due consideration to 'conscious' motives and 'conscious' reasons in forming judgments on the truth and value of religious beliefs. We must bear in mind, throughout our study, that Freud's psychology is fundamentally a "psychology of the unconscious."

7. The Psyche Includes 'Unconscious' as well as 'Conscious' Processes.

We are now brought to the point where we are ready to consider what Freud includes within his use of the term psyche or psychic. We have used the term or terms without

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14 NILP, 15.
15 Ibid., 217.

specific definition, but we have already intimated their meaning. Freud includes within the term psyche not only the self but its 'conscious' processes, but also the personality with its 'unconscious' processes. Unlike behaviorists and many physiologists, he does not deny consciousness. Consciousness is affirmed and is used as the starting point for a knowledge of 'unconscious' processes.[16] The therapeutic and practical aim of psycho-analysis is the extension of the boundaries of consciousness.[17] We shall consider, later,[18] his treatment of the qualities and the characteristics of the 'conscious' part of the psyche. Here we want to consider especially his view that 'the conscious self' is not the entire psyche. This view is to be found throughout his writings.

> Normalerweise ist uns nichts gesicherter als das Gefühl unseres Selbst, unseres eigenen Ichs. Dies Ich erscheint uns selbständig, einheitlich, gegen alles andere gut abgesetzt. Dass dieser Anschein ein Trug ist, dass das Ich sich vielmehr nach innen ohne scharfe Grenze in ein unbewusst seelisches Wesen forsetzt, das wir als Es bezeichnen, dem es gleichsam als Fassade dient, das hat uns erst die psychoanalytische Forschung gelehrt.[19]

Here he tries to point out that 'the conscious self' finds no distinct inner boundary and that the 'ego' extends inward

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16 NILP, 99.
17 Healy, Bronner and Bowers, SMP, 26.
18 Section B, 1 and E, 2 of this chapter.
19 ZEI, 8.

to an 'unconscious' mental activity. "The psychic processes that are 'conscious' are merely isolated acts and parts of the total psychic life."[20] Psycho-analysis "cannot accept the identity of the conscious with the psychic."[21] "The identification of the conscious with the psychic is thoroughly impracticable."[22]

Thus, we see that Freud includes within the psyche more than 'the conscious self.' He includes within it what he terms 'the unconscious.' In the next section, we shall consider more specifically what he means by 'the unconscious,' the evidence upon which he bases the concept and his general description of its contents. At this point, we are interested in emphasizing the fact that in his psychology, the term psyche is used in the enlarged sense of including more than the 'conscious' mind.

His use of the term psyche in this enlarged sense bears some similarity to early Hebrew and Greek ideas concerning the soul of man. The Hebrew term for soul נֶפֶשׁ[23] is derived from נָפַשׁ which means "to breath." The Greek term for soul is ψυχή.[24] This term also refers to the soul as "breath." It is to be noted that our term "psyche" is derived directly

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20 GIP, 7.
21 Ibid.
22 "The Unconscious," CP, IV, 100.
23 Gen. 2:7.
24 Mat. 10:28; Plato, Apology, 24 D.

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21 Ibid.
22 "The Unconscious," CP, IV, 100.
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from the Greek, ψυχή. In both Hebrew and Greek thought, the soul was held to be something more basic than the waking life of the individual. The soul was thought to be the seat of the life of the living individual. It was active in sleeping states as well as in waking states. For this reason, it was likened to the breathing process, for even though a man were asleep his soul was still active. Failure to breath marked the departure of the soul.

Freud's view of the psyche shares in common with this earlier view of the soul the position that the soul or psyche cannot be identified with waking or conscious life. The early view of soul as "breath" has its more recent expression in Freud's view of the psyche as 'libido' or instinct activity.[25] 'Libido' or instinct activity functions even during sleep as is evidenced by the fact of dreams.[26] Psychology, according to Freud, cannot be limited in its area of investigation to 'conscious' life. It must study the 'depths' as well.[27] Psycho-analysis is that special branch of psychology which conceives of its purpose as the study of the deeper aspects of the psyche, the 'libido' in its various stages of development within the personality. It is these deeper aspects, according to Freud, that constitute the psyche or soul proper:

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25 PIA, 67.
26 NILP, 28.
27 "The Unconscious," in CP, IV, 100.

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25 PLP, 87.
26 NIIP, 29.
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> The 'id'...constitutes the soul proper, the essence of the soul, as it were.[28]

Now, there are many problems which arise with relation to Freud's broader conception of the psyche. What does he conceive to be the fundamental nature of the 'unconscious' aspect of the psyche? How can this deeper aspect of psychic life be known to exist if it is not in consciousness? Is Freud justified in using the term psychic to apply to other than conscious phenomena? We are ready to consider these and other related problems under a more specific elaboration and definition of Freud's theory of 'the unconscious.'

B. 'The Unconscious.'

Under a three-fold topographical division, psychic processes are divided into three more or less distinct systems: 'the conscious'; 'the pre-conscious,' formerly called 'the fore-conscious'; and 'the unconscious.'[29]

1. 'The Conscious.'

Freud uses the term 'conscious' in its popular usage. By 'consciousness' he means awareness.

> Now let us call 'conscious' the conception which is present to our consciousness and of which we are aware, and let this be the only meaning of the term 'conscious.'[30]

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28 PLA, 57.
29 Ibid., 106.
30 "The Unconscious in Psycho-Analysis," CP, IV, 22.

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30 "The Unconscious in Psycho-Analysis," CP, IV, 22.

'The conscious self,' besides having the quality of awareness, has the capacity of reason and observation.[31] Its major function is to aid adjustment to the external world.[32] Lest one should think that Freud completely dethrones 'the conscious' in favor of 'the unconscious,' he should keep in mind that Freud holds that consciousness is the essential pivotal point of all psychology.

> Without the light shed by the quality of consciousness we should be lost in the darkness of depth-psychology.[33]

Consciousness is a special characteristic of what Freud has more recently called 'the ego.' In Section E of this chapter, we shall have occasion to deal more specifically with consciousness as it is related to 'the ego.'

2. 'The Pre-Conscious.'

'The pre-conscious' is that part of the psyche which is easily accessible to the 'conscious' mind. Experiences and ideas which may easily be called to mind arise from 'the pre-conscious.' "It is not yet conscious, but is capable of entering into consciousness."[34] Memories that cannot be recalled at will are assigned to 'the unconscious.'

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31 NILP, 217.
32 Ibid., 105.
33 Ibid., 99.
34 "The Unconscious," CP, IV, 106.

'The conscious self,' besides having the quality of awareness, has the capacity of reason and observation.[31] Its major function is to aid adjustment to the external world.[32] Least one should think that Freud completely dethrones 'the conscious' in favor of 'the unconscious,' he should keep in mind that Freud holds that consciousness is the essential pivotal point of all psychology.

> Without the light shed by the quality of consciousness we should be lost in the darkness of depth-psychology.[33]

Consciousness is a special characteristic of what Freud has more recently called 'the ego.' In Section K of this chapter, we shall have occasion to deal more specifically with consciousness as it is related to 'the ego.'

2. 'The Pre-Conscious.'

'The pre-conscious' is that part of the psyche which is easily accessible to the 'conscious' mind. Experiences and ideas which may easily be called to mind arise from 'the pre-conscious.' "It is not yet conscious, but is capable of entering into consciousness."[34] Memories that cannot be recalled at will are assigned to 'the unconscious.'

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31 VIII, 27.
32 Ibid., 105.
33 Ibid., 99.
34 "The Unconscious," CP, IV, 108.

3. 'The Unconscious.'

a. General Definition.

The following definition is advanced by Freud to describe, in general, what he means by the term 'unconscious':

> The oldest and best meaning of the word 'unconscious' is the descriptive one; we call 'unconscious' any mental process the existence of which we are obliged to assume--because, for instance, we infer it in some way from its effects--but of which we are not directly aware... If we want to be more accurate, we should modify the statement by saying that we call a process 'unconscious' when we have to assume that it was active AT A CERTAIN TIME, although AT THAT TIME we knew nothing about it.[35]

There are two main points to note in this definition of 'the unconscious.' First, the existence of 'the unconscious' is postulated; second, it is considered to be 'mental' in nature. We shall consider, specifically, these two main aspects of Freud's theory of 'the unconscious.'

b. Evidence for the Concept.

'The unconscious' is a theoretical postulate which is constructed to explain certain data. The first phenomenon that directed Freud's thinking towards the postulation of 'the unconscious' was that of post-hypnotic thought and activity. Freud attempts to explain post-hypnotic acts by stating that the acts are motivated by the commands of the hypnotist which operate on the 'conscious' mind from outside it. Since the

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35 NILP, 100.

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35 MITP, 100.

command was at one time in the 'conscious' mind of the patient and since the command is carried out as though it were consciously entertained by the patient, the command is thought to exist in a state called 'the unconscious.'

> It seems impossible to give any other description of the phenomenon than to say that the order had been present in the mind of the person in a condition of latency, or had been present unconsciously.[36]

Another set of data suggesting the concept of 'the unconscious' was derived from the study of neurotic patients. We have already cited the case of the neurotic patient with whom Freud and Breuer worked in the early days of their investigation of neurotic cases.[37] We noted how the girl's left side was paralyzed and how the side ceased to be paralyzed when the experience of her relationship with her dying father was recalled. During her period of illness, she was said to have suffered from a 'reminiscence' of her early experience, yet she consciously remembered nothing of her early experience. The fact that it could be recalled to mind and the fact that her paralysis was motivated by feelings attached to this experience argued for the assumption that this experience still persisted. But since the experience did not exist in the 'conscious' mind, it must be thought to have existed outside the 'conscious' mind, or in the 'unconscious' mind.

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36 "The Unconscious in Psycho-Analysis," CP, IV, 23.
37 Cf. page 26.

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36 "The Unconscious in Psycho-Analysis," *op. cit.*, 23.
37 *Cf.* page 36.

Freud also finds dreams and hallucinations to be important evidence for the assumption of 'the unconscious.' Dreams and hallucinations appear without the 'conscious' volition of the individual. Images are flashed before the 'conscious' mind that appear to come from without. These images are not stimulated by sensory impressions from the outer world. They arise within the organism itself. They cannot be accounted for by the direct activities of 'the conscious self.' Freud states that they appear in consciousness by virtue of the fact that they are motivated by dynamic impulses which exist outside the 'conscious' mind, or which exist in 'the unconscious.'

Other evidence which is used by Freud to justify the existence of 'unconscious' processes are slips of speech, mistaken acts, forgetting of names, places, responsibilities, and other similar phenomena, phenomena which may appear to be chance phenomena upon first thought but which, upon further investigation, reveal the operation of hidden 'unconscious' factors.[38]

c. Content of 'The Unconscious.'

In the earlier stage of his investigation, Freud emphasized the theory that 'the unconscious' was the abode of 'the repressed.' In dealing with neurotic patients, he was

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38 PEL is concerned primarily with the interpretation of this type of phenomena.

primarily concerned with uncovering 'repressed' experiences which, because of their painful and traumatic nature, had been pushed out of the 'conscious' mind. It was the chief work of psycho-analytic therapy to release and bring back to consciousness 'repressed' experiences.

More recently, the concept of 'the unconscious' was expanded to include instincts and organic needs which were either kept out of the 'conscious' mind through 'repression' or which were not strong enough to demand 'conscious' recognition. All instincts were thought to originate in 'the unconscious' and were thought to work their way into 'conscious' expression as their tensions became increased.[39] In this sense, 'the unconscious' was thought to be more or less of an inner connecting link between conscious life and physiological activity.[40]

d. 'The Unconscious' as Psychic or Mental.

This leads us into a consideration of the central issue involved in the concept of 'the unconscious,' namely, whether 'the unconscious' is mental or not. Might not organic needs which are not strong enough to demand conscious recognition be conceived in terms of physiological tensions within the organism? Might not instincts which are consciously felt be thought

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39 "The Unconscious,' CP, IV, 116.
40 NILP, 104.

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39 "The Unconscious," CP, IV, 116.
40 MILC, 104.

of as finding their origin in physiological processes within the organism? Might not the dynamic character of so-called 'unconscious' processes be conceived in terms of physiological tensions seeking release? Further, might not memories and experiences which are not entertained by the 'conscious' self be conceived in terms of 'brain traces' or 'neurograms' as Morton Prince suggested?[41] If residues of experience do not exist in consciousness, they might be considered as existing in a state within the brain itself. Why, it might be contended, is it necessary to complicate matters by constructing the mystical concept of 'the unconscious' when the facts for which the concept was constructed might be explained in terms of physiological processes which are more tangible?

Freud attempts to maintain his concept in the light of this criticism by stating that psychology ought to be given an opportunity to account for the facts related to conscious life by use of its own concepts:

> At this very point we may be prepared to meet with the philosophical objection that the latent conception did not exist as an object of psychology, but as a physical disposition for the recurrence of the same psychical phenomenon, i.e., of the said conception. But we may reply that this is a theory far overstepping the domain of psychology proper; that it simply begs the question by asserting 'conscious' to be an identical term with 'mental', and that it is clearly at fault in deny-

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41 Uc, 118, 133.

> ing psychology the right to account for its most common facts, such as memory, by its own means.[42]

'The unconscious,' Freud maintains, is a psychological concept, while 'neurograms' or organic tensions are physiological concepts. From the standpoint of explaining the facts or data of conscious life, which is the primary purpose of psychology, Freud maintains that one is given greater understanding and control by assuming that forgotten or 'repressed' experiences exist as 'unconscious' mental deposits rather than by assuming that they exist as physiological deposits. Freud would not deny that all mental experience involves physiological changes within the brain and within the organism, but he believes that from the standpoint of accounting for memory and from the standpoint of reviving forgotten memories, one has the advantage of approaching the forgotten experiences from a psychological rather than from the physiological point of view.[43] What he terms 'unconscious' processes, such as instincts, urges, forgotten images, etc., may be better studied and may be better described by using psychological terminology and methods than by using physiological terminology and methods.

> All the categories which we employ to describe conscious mental acts, such as ideas, purposes, resolutions and so forth, can be applied to them (unconscious processes). Indeed, of many of these latent states we have to assert that the only point in which they differ from states

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42 "The Unconscious in Psycho-Analysis," CP, IV, 22.
43 "The Unconscious," CP, IV, 100.

> which are conscious is just in the lack of consciousness of them.[44]

Thus, Freud rejects the physiological explanations and advances the view that the so-called 'unconscious' processes are mental. Terminology concerning conscious life is believed to characterize best the way they function. 'Unconscious' processes function as though they were wishes, as though they had purposes, as though they had resolutions and specific ends. But Freud has taken only a partial step in making 'the unconscious' psychological. Instead of denying consciousness to these processes by virtue of the fact that such purposes, wishes, resolutions and ends are not entertained by the 'conscious' mind, Freud might have advanced the proposition that so-called 'unconscious' processes might be thought of as possessing a consciousness of their own, a consciousness which is not unified and integrated with the focal center of consciousness known as the self. In the case of dreams, hallucinations, compulsions, etc., the consciousness of the 'repressed' or so-called 'unconscious' impulses becomes united with the main center of consciousness within the organism. What Freud has heretofore called the 'unconscious' mind might be considered to be composed of unorganized, unrelated centers of consciousness with their own imagery and goals. He might have conceived

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44 Ibid., 101.

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44 Ibid., 101.

psycho-analytic therapy as a means of gaining greater unity and organization of the inner psychic centers within the organism, of extending the boundary of the self to include other minor, unrelated, centers of consciousness. Freud ascribes a mental nature to 'unconscious' processes, but his theory and his term denies them consciousness. Calling a process mental but 'unconscious' results in confusion, for it is difficult to conceive of mentality without consciousness. Inasmuch as there is evidence sufficient to postulate the characteristic of mentality to so-called 'unconscious' processes, the same evidence might be used to postulate the characteristic of consciousness. Freud would not sacrifice the basic, essential principles of his psycho-analytic therapy were he to drop the confusing and ambiguous term 'unconscious' from his description and conception of these inner, dynamic, purposive factors within the organism and were he to conceive of them as conscious as well as mental in nature. To call them mental but 'unconscious' is self-contradictory.

d. Methods of Investigating 'the Unconscious.'

There are, according to Freud, three main sources of knowledge concerning 'unconscious' processes. First is that of mental disturbances.[45] During periods of mental breakdown, an individual's thought and behavior differs markedly from that of normal periods. By studying the symptoms, reports, and

45 "The Unconscious," CP, IV, 120.

behavior of disturbed patients, one comes to a knowledge of inner, dynamic urges which are thought to have existed in the organism in 'the unconscious' before the breakdown.[46] The second source is that of dreams and dream interpretation. In dreams, so-called 'unconscious' impulses gain 'conscious' expression.

> Psycho-analysis is founded upon the analysis of dreams; the interpretation of dreams is the most complete piece of work the young science has done up to the present... We gather in detail what the peculiarities of the unconscious are, and we may hope to learn still more about them from a profounder investigation of dream formation.[47]

The third source is that of information gained through the technique of 'free-association' as employed in psycho-analytic therapy. The technique rests upon the assumption that 'unconscious' processes are dynamic in nature, that they will tend to manifest themselves in consciousness if an opportunity be afforded them.[48] Other methods have been suggested for use in investigating 'the unconscious,' such methods as automatic writing, crystal gazing, partial hypnosis, and word association.[49] Freud, however, recommends 'free-association' and dream interpretation in use with normal as well as disturbed people as the best methods.[50]

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46 "The Unconscious in Psycho-Analysis," CP, IV, 24.
47 Ibid., 28.
48 CF, 30f.
49 Moore, DP, Chapter V.
50 "The Unconscious in Psycho-Analysis," CP, IV, 29.

C. Theory of Instincts.

Freud's theory of instincts has been revised more than any other part of psycho-analysis. Freud began by postulating two basic instincts, 'sex instincts' and 'self-preservative instincts.'[51] This distinction was made primarily upon the interpretation of neuroses which appeared to be best understood in terms of conflicts between the sexual and the self interests of the individual. The self was thought to 'repress' the 'sexual instincts,' the 'sexual instincts' being forced to find substitute forms of expression in neurotic symptoms.

With the publishing of his article entitled "On Narcissism: An Introduction"[52] in 1914, Freud made the first marked change in his instinct theory. He fused the 'sexual instincts' and the 'self-preservative' or 'ego-instincts' together under the single concept of the 'sexual instincts.' He interpreted 'ego-instincts' in terms of love of self, in terms of narcissistic expression of the 'sexual instincts.'

The second marked change was made with the publishing of Beyond the Pleasure Principle which appeared in 1920. In this work he introduced the 'death instincts.' He has since referred to the instincts as being of two fundamental types,

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51 "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes," CP, IV, 67.
52 CP, IV, III.

'sexual instincts' and 'death instincts.' We shall consider each of these types briefly.

1. 'Sexual Instincts.'

Freud came to develop his theory of the 'sexual instincts' from the data he received through analyzing neurotic patients. When these patients talked themselves out to him, he invariably came to find the root of their troubles in some early, highly emotionalized experience.[53] We have seen that Breuer's patient suffered from strange feelings at the bedside of her father which she immediately disowned and pushed out of her conscious mind. Freud states that no especial attempt is made to have the patients confide their sexual life to him, but before the symptoms are adequately cured, the patients usually come to this area of their life.[54] Freud, consequently, developed the hypothesis that neuroses were the result of mishandled 'sexual impulses.'[55]

The next step in developing his theory of the 'sexual instincts' came in his postulation of 'infantile sexuality.'[56]

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53 PLA, 84.
54 Ibid.
55 "Sexuality in the Aetiology of the Neuroses," CP, I, XI.
56 Main articles on this theory are listed below:
"The Sexual Enlightenment of Children," CP, II, III;
"On the Sexual Theories of Children," CP, II, VI;
"Analysis of a Phobia in a Five Year Old Boy," CP, III, II;
"Infantile Mental Life," CP, II, XIII;
"From the History of an Infantile Neurosis," CP, V;
"The Infantile Genital Organization of the Libido," CP, II, XX.

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[53] PIA, 84.
[54] Ibid.
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XX.

His ideas concerning 'infantile sexuality' have provoked wide comment and criticism. It was generally thought that the sex instinct appeared at the time of puberty, that infants and children were entirely innocent of such interests and feelings. In connection with his theory of 'infantile sexuality,' he developed his theory of 'libido.' By 'libido' he has reference to an innate desire for pleasure, or in its wider sense, the desire to love.[57] His theory of 'infantile sexuality' is that even in early infancy the 'libido' was the important motivating drive within the individual. It was psychic energy which had pleasure seeking as its aim. Through the period of infancy and childhood, the 'libido' of the child was thought to pass through different stages, determined primarily by the objects chosen by the 'libido.'[58] In tracing out these various 'libido-objects,' his theory of psycho-sexual developmental stages was formed. The first stage was called 'the oral' stage. In this stage, the pleasure interests of the child centered about its mouth, the intaking of food. This stage was subdivided into two stages: first, the 'sucking' stage in which the child was interested primarily in gaining food and having the care and protection of the mother; and second, the 'biting' stage in which the

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57 "Contributions to the Psychology of Love," CP, IV, 205.
58 NILP, 135f.

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57 "Contributions to the Psychology of Love." CP, IV, 208.
58 NHLP, 1957.

child gained pleasure by using its newly acquired teeth. This latter stage is called by Freud 'the oral-sadistic' stage. Some of the most severe 'repressions' are thought to occur at this stage, since the child's biting often causes pain to others who are motivated to check or punish the child. Freud states that the second major stage of development is the 'anal-sadistic' stage in which the child gains pleasure either in the retention or expulsion of its faeces. After the 'anal-stage,' the child is thought to pass into a period of sexual disinterestedness. This period is called 'the latency' period and usually lasts from about the fifth year until puberty. Puberty ushers in 'the genital' period. The 'Oedipus-complex' comes to a sharp focus at the beginning of this period. With the oncoming of sexual maturity, the individual is driven towards his most loved object--which is usually, according to Freud, the parent of the opposite sex.

Pressure within the family and from society prohibits the expression of incestuous wishes. The 'Oedipus-complex' must be 'repressed' or resolved by 'identification' with the parent of the same sex. The adolescent boy and girl then begin to find interests outside the family circle. Psycho-[59] sexual maturity is gained in a satisfactory marital adjustment.

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59 Freud's theory of the developmental stages is best summarized in Healy, Bronner and Bowers, SMP, 80-111.

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We have merely mentioned the more outstanding topics in Freud's theory of the development of the sexual life of the individual, a development which is conceived as extending from early infancy to post-puberty maturity. Before leaving this summary statement of Freud's theory of the 'sexual instincts,' it will be well for us to consider his theory from a critical point of view. From the first, Freud had been criticized for his emphasis upon sexual factors. It was for this reason that Breuer and he parted company in the early part of Freud's career. Jung differed from Freud largely on the matter of the importance given to this instinct by Freud.[60] Freud has maintained that his theory of sexuality has grown out of a scientific study of neuroses, that he has merely described the facts as he has uncovered them in his treatment of patients. Many critics state that this may be true, that the cases he has treated have shown a preponderance of sexual difficulties, but that this is in no small measure due to the fact that he is practicing in Vienna, a city notorious for its sexual freedom. This is the viewpoint advanced by J. Laumonier.

> Vinne est effectivement une ville de plaisirs, où le libertinage et la prostitution atteignent toutes les classes de la société et s'étalent sans aucune retenue.[61]

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60 Jung, AP, 231.
61 FEC, 6.

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60 Jung, Ap. 321.
61 Psc, 6.

Freud attempts to answer this criticism by stating that if Vienna were more free in its expression of this impulse, there ought to be, according to his theory, less mental disorders in Vienna than other places. Just how much the life of Vienna does play in influencing Freud's interpretation is a difficult problem to solve.

A second criticism is more pertinent. Freud is to be criticized in his use of the term sex. He himself states that he has used it in a wide sense. He has, however, used it in such a wide sense that the term no longer represents what it commonly represents--namely, processes and organs related to the function of procreation. He has included within his use of the term all of these feelings and emotions which are usually represented by the terms pleasure and love. Our feelings of pleasure and of love are not to be identified entirely with the organs of reproduction. From a scientific use of terms, he would have been much more correct to use the terms 'love' or 'pleasure' instead of the term 'sex.' The term 'sex' is used usually in describing biological aspects of the bodily organs of reproduction--while the term 'love' is used to describe the psychic aspect of processes of reproduction as well as of other subjective mental states associated with phenomena that have no relation whatsoever to reproduction. Since Freud is interested primarily in the

study of the subjective aspect of man, of his physical makeup, it would have been much more appropriate for him to use the language and terminology of the science of subjective life, namely, the language of psychology. He has caused unlimited misunderstanding and undue criticism because he has persisted in using the biological rather than the psychological term. Note the broad, psychological connotation which he gives to the term 'sex' in the following quotation:

> I hope it will have been easy to gather the nature of my extension of the concept of sexuality. That extension is twofold. In the first place, sexuality is divorced from its too close connection with the genitals and is regarded as a more comprehensive bodily function having pleasure as its goal and only secondarily coming to serve the ends of reproduction. In the second place, the sexual impulses are regarded as including all of those merely affectionate and friendly impulses to which usage applies the exceedingly ambiguous word 'love.' [62]

Here is specifically stated that the term 'sex' is not to be limited to genital organs and functions, that it is not to be limited to the end of procreation, and further, that it is best understood in terms of the more common word 'love.' In another instance, Freud states that his use of the term 'sex' corresponds with Plato's use of the term 'Eros,' and he even goes so far as to state that his use of the term 'sex' is used in the wider sense in which the Apostle Paul used the term 'love' in his noted thirteenth chapter of I Corinthians.

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62 AAS, 249.

> Und doch hat die Psychoanalyse mit dieser "erweiterten" Auffassung der Liebe nichts Originelles geschaffen. Der "Eros" des Philosophen Plato zeigt in seiner Herkunft, Leistung und Beziehung zur Geschlechtsliebe eine vollkommene Deckung mit der Liebeskraft, der Libido der Psychoanalyse, wie Nachmansohn und Pfister im Einzelnen dargelegt haben, und wenn der Apostel Paulus in dem berühmten Brief an die Korinther die Liebe über alles andere preist, hat er sie gewiss im nämlichen "erweiterten" Sinn verstanden. [63]

Now it is a question as to whether Freud's use of the term 'sex' is similar to Plato's use of the term 'Eros' and Paul's use of the term 'love.' Both Plato and Paul had reference to purely psychical states when they used their respective terms. It is to be noted that while Freud may have reference, primarily, to the psychical reality when he uses the term 'sex' he does give the term a biological meaning which Plato and Paul do not give their terms. Freud conceives of the psychical 'libido' as associated with pleasure gained from bodily organs. It is a more sensual love than the love of which Paul spoke. Even though Freud did intend to refer to psychical states, he has not chosen well in selecting the word 'sex' to signify these psychical states more usually referred to under the term 'love.' He would have been truer to his own work as a psychologist had he chosen psychological rather than biological terminology.

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63 MAI, 43.

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63 Mal. 42.

There is still another important criticism which must be mentioned. This is a criticism which strikes at the heart of Freud's theory of the neuroses upon which his theory of the 'sexual instincts' is based. This criticism is brought forward by his most distinguished pupil, Carl G. Jung. This is what Jung says:

> The sexuality which Freud describes is unmistakably the sexual obsession which shows itself whenever a patient has reached the point where he needs to be forced or tempted out of a wrong attitude or situation. It is an over-emphasized sexuality piled up behind a dam; and it shrinks at once to normal proportions as soon as the way to development is opened. It is being caught in the old resentments against parents and relations and in the boring emotional tangles of the family situation which most often brings about the damming-up of the energies of life. And it is this stoppage which shows itself unfailingly in that kind of sexuality which is called "infantile." It is really not sexuality proper, but an unnatural discharge of tensions that belong to quite another province of life. [64]

The cause of the neurosis is found, not in some infantile backward tendency, but in the fact that the individual has no outlet for his energies in the world about him. Having no natural outlet in the objective world, he becomes preoccupied with his own self, his own biological functions. The basic drive is not, according to this account, sexual. The heightened sexual interest is merely a disease of psychic life. Freud has not only over-simplified neurotic disorders by reducing them to maladies of the sexual function, but he has mistaken the

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64 MMSS, 139.

real meaning of sexual excesses found in neurotic disorders. According to Jung, sexual excesses and preoccupations are not so much causes as symptoms. It is the failure to make adequate adjustment in one's social world that gives rise to inner disorders. Freud's teaching on the importance of sex grew out of his early study of neurotic patients. It must be kept in mind that there are other interpretations of the neuroses, such as we have just considered in Jung's quotation, and that Freud himself has seen the necessity of modifying his emphasis upon sex. Within the last decade and a half, he has come to emphasize the importance of the 'death instincts.' In 1900, he wrote that there was no class of ideas that did not have sexual meaning.[65] Such pansexualism is untenable. Even he has abandoned it.

2. 'Death Instincts.'

Freud's theory of 'death instincts' was the result of reflections on two types of psychic phenomena: first, on the 'repetition-compulsion' which is characteristic of the play-impulse and of the repetition of traumatic experiences in

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65 DT, 233f.

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65 Cf. ibid.

dreams and neurotic symptoms; second, on sadism and masochism. On the basis of facts taken from the first type of phenomena, he has formulated the definition of instinct as follows:

> An instinct would be a tendency innate in living organic matter impelling it towards the reinstatement of an earlier condition.[66]

Instincts, of this kind, are conservative in nature. They tend to encourage a return to former conditions. They see the golden age in the past. Most of life, Freud contends, is a re-enacting of former experiences--especially experiences of childhood and infancy. Wherever a man goes, he tries to find people who will take the place of his father and his mother, of brothers and sisters, and he is not happy until his original situation is found complete in his new environment. This conservative nature of life has led Freud to the following statement--a statement which is diametrically opposed to the thought and spirit of Western civilization.

> It would be counter to the conservative nature instinct if the goal of life were a state never hitherto reached. It must rather be an ancient starting point, which the living being left long ago, and to which it harks back again by all the circuitous paths of development. If we may assume as an experience admitting of no exception that everything living dies from causes within itself, and returns to the inorganic, we can only say 'THE GOAL OF ALL LIFE IS DEATH', and casting back, 'THE INANIMATE WAS THERE BEFORE THE ANIMATE.'[67]

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66 Ibid., 44.
67 BPP, 24.

This tendency to repetition, this tendency to reinstate earlier situations, this tendency to make the animate inanimate is what Freud has come to call the 'death instinct.'

> Ausgehend von Spekulationen über den Anfang des Lebens und von biologischen Parallelen zog ich den Schluss, es müsse ausser dem Trieb, die lebende Substanz zu erhalten und zu immer grösseren Einheiten zussammenzufassen, einen anderen, ihm gegensätzlichen, geben, der diese Einheiten aufzulösen und in den uranfänglichen anorganischen Zustand zurückzuführen strebe. Also ausser dem Eros einen Todestrieb.[68]

George Santayana, after reading the book Beyond the Pleasure Principle in which the idea of the 'death instinct' was first developed, wrote an essay about Freud's theory entitled "A Long Way Round to Nirvana."[69] Freud himself recognizes the similarity between his view of the 'death instincts' and Indian philosophy concerning Nirvana. He has even suggested that the 'death instinct' might be regarded as 'the Nirvana-principle'--thus placing it alongside of 'the pleasure-principle' of the 'sexual instincts' and 'the reality-principle' of the 'ego' with its aim of self-preservation.[70] Indeed, he places 'the Nirvana-principle' above or beyond these other principles.

> The theoretic significance of the instincts of self-preservation, power and self-assertion, shrinks to nothing, seen in this light (that the whole life of instinct serves the one end of bringing about death);

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68 DUK, 91, 92.
69 STTMP, Chapter IV.
70 "The Economic Problem of Masochism," CP, II, 257.

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68 GW, op. cit., 92.
69 SETW, Chapter IV.
70 "The Economic Problem of Masochism," op. cit., 357.

> they are part-instincts, designed to secure the path to death peculiar to the organism and to ward off possibilities of return to the inorganic other than the immanent ones. It remains to be added that the organism is resolved to die only in its own way; even these watchmen of life were originally the myrmidons of death.[71]

Freud's theory of 'death instincts' has led him to similar conclusions as advanced by Schopenhauer:

> And we cannot disguise another fact from ourselves, that we have steered unawares into the haven of Schopenhauer's philosophy for whom death is the 'real result' of life and therefore insofar its aim, while the sexual instinct is the incarnation of the will to live.[72]

The 'sexual instincts' and the 'death instincts,' according to Freud, appear to have two different ends in view--'death instincts' aim towards death while the 'sexual instincts' aim towards the creation and preservation of life.

Freud has not only associated the tendency to repetition and to a reinstatement of earlier conditions with the 'death instincts,' he has also associated the 'aggressive impulses' with the 'death instinct.'[73] The 'aggressive impulses' find their most distinct expression in sadism and masochism, when, according to Freud, the 'aggressive impulses' are directed outward onto others in the case of sadism and inwards onto one's self in the case of masochism.[74] 'Aggressive impulses'

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71 BPP, 48.
72 Ibid., 63.
73 NILP, 147.
74 Ibid., 143.

are destructive impulses. When directed outward, they tend to destroy objects and living beings in the environment. When directed inward, as in the case of masochism and self-punishment tendencies, they tend to the destruction of the self. Freud attempts to bring together these tendencies for reinstatement of early conditions and the 'aggressive impulses' under the head of the 'death impulses.' His attempt has not met with any too much clarity. The impulses of 'repetition-compulsion' and the 'aggressive impulses' differ in one important respect--namely, the method of achieving their end. Granted that both types of impulses are striving for the same end, death, the one type achieves its end by violent means, the other achieves its end through the quiet, prolonged method of 'regression.' From the standpoint of their functioning in psychic life 'repetition-compulsions' function more or less passively, while 'aggressive-impulses' are activistic in character. The two types of processes have little in common except their goal.

In summarizing Freud's theory of instincts, we may quote one of his own passages in which he attempts to relate what he regards to be the basic drives of life:

> And now the instincts in which we believe separate themselves into two groups; the erotic instincts, which are always trying to collect living substance together into ever larger unities, and the death instincts which act against that tendency, and try to bring living matter back into an inorganic condi-

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> tion. The cooperation and opposition of these two forces produce the phenomena of life to which death puts an end.[75]

His theory of the 'death instincts' has not met with near as much criticism as his theory of the 'sexual instincts.' The reason for this is to be found partly in the fact that he first published his views of the 'death instincts' shortly after the war. Beyond the Pleasure Principle appeared in 1920. The war brought with it so much destruction, so much aggressiveness, and so much death that the theory did not provoke much opposition. The aggressiveness of the primitive in man was commonly accepted. In addition, the resistance set up by society against discussion of subjects dealing with the expression of 'aggressive impulses' were not as great as the resistances set up against the discussion of sexual subjects. For these reasons, Freud's theory of 'death instincts' has not provoked as much attention and comment as his earlier theory of the 'sexual instincts.' Although he has not worked out the various expressions of 'death instincts' to such a great extent as he has worked out the developmental stages of the 'sexual instincts,' it is well for us to remember that of the two instincts he regards the 'death instinct' as the more primitive one. His theory of 'death instincts' has served to give his psychology a pessimistic and gloomy out-

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75 NILP, 147.

look. We shall consider its philosophical implications in Chapter Five when we consider his views on immortality.

D. 'Mental Mechanisms' or 'Dynamisms.'

In studying the nature of 'the unconscious,' Freud noted that although the 'unconscious' impulses could not gain direct expression on account of 'resistances' set up originally by the 'conscious' mind, that they found expression through indirect and circuitous routes. These circuitous routes and indirect methods of expression of 'unconscious' impulses were termed 'mental mechanisms.' The term 'dynamisms' is suggested as a more appropriate term by Healy, Bronner and Bowers[76] since it is more in keeping with psychological terminology. We shall, however, continue to use Freud's term in speaking of these processes.

By the help of various 'mechanisms,' inner tensions are released. The 'conscious' mind, while it rejects the direct expression of these impulses, does permit their expression in forms which are not detrimental to its interests and its contact with the external world. These 'mechanisms,' thus, tend to protect and defend the 'ego.' It was for this reason that they were first looked upon as and termed 'defense mechanisms.'[77]

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76 SMP, 192.
77 Ibid., 196.

It is now held, however, that not all 'mechanisms' find their function in defense of the 'conscious' mind, and, hence, this term is no longer used as a general term.

Freud has introduced many different 'mechanisms.' The most important and common are as follows: 'transference,' 'displacement,' 'condensation,' 'reaction-formation,' 'projection,' 'conversion,' 'introjection,' 'identification,' 'repression,' 'rationalization,' and 'sublimation.' The 'mechanism' of 'transference' is especially operative in the psycho-analytic situation where the analysand begins to carry over his feelings from his father, mother, brothers and sisters to the analyst. He treats the analyst as though he were his father; in other words, he 'transfers' the feelings he had towards his father to the analyst. This 'mechanism' is thought to be the essential underlying 'mechanism' operative in analytic treatment. At the end of the treatment, this 'unconscious mechanism' is brought into consciousness and henceforth ceases to function.

> We overcome transference by proving to the patient that his feelings do not originate in the present situation, and are not intended for the person of the physician, but merely repeat what happened to him at some former time.[78]

In 'displacement,' the individual 'unconsciously' suffers from mistaken associations. An obsessional neurotic may con-

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78 GIP, 383.

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78 GLP, 385.

tinually wash his hands as though they were in need of cleaning, when, as a matter of fact, it is some inner thought, motive, desire, or experience that needs cleansing. Jesus saw the operation of this 'mechanism' in the Pharisees when they 'displaced' the evil that was within them onto the pots and pans about which they were so scrupulous.

'Condensation' is best illustrated in dreams. There is a fusion of objects, persons, experiences into a single event or object which event or object stands as a representative of these wider realities. The whole event of the murder of the King was 'condensed,' for Lady Macbeth, into her experience of seeing blood on her hands.

In 'reaction-formation,' the individual 'unconsciously' compensates for some act or experience by trying to prove its opposite. Napolean was a small man. His life as a conqueror was a 'reaction-formation' which testified the fact that he was a man of all men.

'Projection' is a more commonly known 'mechanism.' In 'projection' an internal perception is recognized as an external perception. This 'mechanism' was known by Jesus as is illustrated by his pointing out the fact that man tends to find the beam in his brother's eye when he has a mote in his own eye.

We have already had occasion to speak of 'conversion'

in connection with hysteria in which it was pointed out that psychic fears may be 'converted' into physical symptoms which serve the purpose of defending the individual against the objects of his fears. In the world war, as is well known, many suffered from paralysis of arms and limbs due primarily to 'unconscious' fears associated with the demand that they should go to the front.

'Introjection' is the 'unconscious' process of incorporation of one's environment into one's personality. We shall have occasion to deal more specifically with this process when we come to a study of the 'super-ego,' which Freud maintains is the result of the 'introjection' of the parents within the personality of the maturing child.

'Identification' is a process which is commonly known. It is the modelling of one's self after some person who is considered as the ideal. We 'identify' ourselves with causes which we deem worthy of our personal devotion. Freud states that this process usually takes place 'unconsciously.' The growing boy 'unconsciously' tries to be like his father. The 'identifications' of a growing child determine to a great extent his character and personality.

'Repression' is a 'mechanism' of which much is written by Freud and other analysts. 'Repressions' are often referred to as 'resistances.'

> In what way shall we now account for the observation that the patient so energetically resists our attempts to rid him of his symptoms and to make his psychic processes function in a normal way? We tell ourselves that we have here come up against strong forces which oppose any change in the condition... Some violent antagonism must have been aroused to prevent the psychic process in question from reaching consciousness, and it therefore remained unconscious. As an unconscious thought it had the power to create a symptom. The same struggle during the analytic treatment opposes anew the efforts to carry this unconscious thought over into consciousness. This process we felt as a resistance. That pathogenic process which is made evident to us through the resistance, we will name REPRESSION. [79]

'Repression' is the 'resistance' which operates 'unconsciously' in keeping impulses from achieving 'conscious' expression. It is not to be confused with the conscious process of temporary disposition of impulses, although conscious suppression may become habitual and may develop into a 'resistance' or 'repression' that operates 'unconsciously.'

The 'mechanism' which is very often misunderstood is the mechanism of 'rationalization.' 'Rationalization' as a 'mechanism' of 'unconscious' processes is not to be confused with 'rationalization' as a process of the 'conscious' mind, which is used in building up a true picture of reality.[80] 'Rationalization' as an 'unconscious process' is a prostitution of the function of reason. The 'conscious' mind is given

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79 GIP, 255.
80 NILP, 234.

reasons which are acceptable to it but which are not the true reasons which lay back of the unwanted motives. A neurotic person who is driven by a compulsion for cleanliness may give as his reason for cleanliness the fact that dirt and filth make for the breeding of germs, that it is more healthy to be clean than unclean. Here the 'mechanism' of 'rationalization' is operative. The 'conscious' mind unwittingly accepts reasons which are not the true ones.

'Sublimation' is a process which has become familiar even to the layman. It is one of the few 'mechanisms' that is acceptable to the 'conscious ego' after it is brought to light through analysis. 'Sublimation' is the process of redirecting impulses from their innate aims which are found to conflict with the demands of society and one's higher interests to aims which are individually and socially acceptable.

'Mechanisms,' thus, are the tools or circuitous routes of 'unconscious' processes. Freud's theory of 'mental mechanisms' must always be understood in their relation to 'unconscious' processes. They are not meant to be a description of 'conscious' processes; they function without the individual being aware of them. A belief is not to be rejected merely on the grounds that 'mental mechanisms' have played a part in its origin or continue to play a part in its endurance. Facts, data, evidence, etc., that appeal to the 'conscious' mind must

also be taken into consideration in the judgments of beliefs. We shall have occasion to deal more specifically with this need for discrimination between the functioning of 'mental mechanisms' and data entertained by the 'conscious' mind when we come to a consideration of Freud's views concerning particular religious beliefs.

E. 'Id,' 'Ego,' and 'Super-Ego.'

Freud has evolved the concepts of 'id,' 'ego,' and 'super-ego' under which he is able to bring together in a summary way all of his previous findings and theories concerning human personality. In his most recent publication, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, he presents these three factors in a chapter entitled: "The Anatomy of the Mental Personality."[81] We shall consider each of these concepts briefly.

1. The 'Id.'

Under the term 'id,' Freud has come to summarize all that he had previously referred to as 'the unconscious.' The 'id' is the deeper aspect of the psyche. It is the region of contact with the somatic processes. Organic needs are first taken over by the 'id'; if they are great enough, they find their way to the 'ego.' The 'id' is held to be the great

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81 Chapter 3. These concepts were first developed in his two earlier works, MAI and IE.

reservoir of the 'libido.' 'Id' processes are unorganized, chaotic, and tumultuous. Freud summarizes the nature and contents of the 'id' in the following passage:

> Instincts fill it with energy, but it has no organization and no unified will, only an impulsion to obtain satisfaction for the instinctual needs, in accordance with the pleasure-principle. The laws of logic--above all, the law of contradiction--do not hold for processes in the id... Conative impulses which have never got beyond the id, and even impressions which have been pushed down into the id by repression, are virtually immortal and are preserved for whole decades as though they had only recently occurred... Naturally, the id knows no values, no good and evil, no morality... The pleasure-principle dominates all of its processes. Instinctual cathexes seeking discharge,--that, in our view, is all that the id contains.[82]

All that we have previously considered under the term 'the unconscious' is included under the term 'id.'

2. The 'Ego.'

The 'ego' includes what we have previously called 'the conscious' and 'the pre-conscious.' It includes 'the conscious self' with its memory linkages. Its most distinctive characteristic is consciousness, although 'the pre-conscious' as well as 'the conscious' are included within it. That which is not conscious within it may be readily brought into consciousness.

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82 NILP, 104, 105.

> This system (the perceptual-conscious) is directed on to the external world, it mediates perceptions of it, and in it is generated, while it is functioning, the phenomenon of consciousness. It is the sense-organ of the whole apparatus, receptive, moreover, not only of excitations from without but also of such as proceed from the interior of the mind... It dethrones the pleasure-principle, which exerts undisputed sway over the processes in the id, and substitutes for it the reality-principle, which promises greater security and success... We may say that the ego stands for reason and circumspection, while the id stands for the untamed passions.[83]

The 'ego' must serve three masters--the 'id,' the 'super-ego,' and the outer world.

> The proverb tells us that one cannot serve too masters at once. The poor ego has a still harder time of it; it has to serve three harsh masters, and has to do its best to reconcile the claims and demands of all three. These demands are always divergent and often seem quite incompatible; no wonder that the ego so frequently gives way under its task. The three tyrants are the external world, the super-ego and the id.[84]

The 'ego' is the center of the conflict. Unresolved conflict between the 'ego' and the 'id' results in hysteria and 'transference' neuroses; unresolved conflict between the 'ego' and the 'super-ego' results in obsessions, compulsions, and narcissistic neuroses; and unresolved conflict between the 'ego' and the outer world results in psychoses.[85]

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83 Ibid., 105-107.
84 Ibid., 108.
85 Summary statement of Freud's given by A. A. Brill in Alexander, PTP, vi.

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83 Ibid., 108-107.
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3. The 'Super-Ego.'

Freud's conception of the 'super-ego' is of especial importance in our study of his view of religion, since, in general, he attempts to derive the religious life of the individual from the 'super-ego' function within the personality. The 'super-ego' is what is commonly spoken of as 'conscience,' but it involves much more than 'conscience,' which may be for the most part consciously understood and controlled. The 'super-ego,' in Freud's teaching, is mostly 'unconscious.' It is that deeper 'censor' which prohibits 'id' impulses from rising to consciousness.

In its origin, the 'super-ego' is conceived to be a special function of the 'ego'--the function of self-observation and self-judgment.

> The ego is the subject PAR EXCELLENCE, how can it become the object? There is no doubt, however, that it can. The ego can take itself as object, it can treat itself like any other object, observe itself, criticize itself, and do Heaven knows what besides with itself. In such a case one part of the ego stands over against the other.[86]

This capacity of the self to observe itself and to cast judgment upon the self is what has been referred to as 'reflective self-consciousness' in self-psychology.[87] The 'super-ego' finds its origin in this capacity for self-reflection.

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86 NILP, 84.
87 Brightman, ITP, 191.

> I formed the idea that the separating off of an observing function from the rest of the ego might be a normal feature of the ego's structure; this idea has never left me, and I was driven to investigate the further characteristics and relations of the function which had been separated off in this way... The observation is only a first step towards conviction and punishment, so that we may guess that another activity of this function must be what we call conscience... I might simply say that the function which I am beginning to distinguish within the ego is the conscience; but it is more prudent to keep that function as a separate entity and assume that conscience is one of its activities, and that the self-observation which is necessary as a preliminary to the judicial aspect of conscience is another. And since the process of recognizing a thing is a separate entity involves giving it a name of its own, I will henceforward call this function in the ego the 'super-ego.'[88]

Thus, the 'super-ego' originates within the 'ego' when the 'ego' passes judgment upon the self. The first judgments about the 'ego,' however, are not made by the 'ego' itself. The first judgments are made by parents and those in authority. The child is told that it is naughty, that it has disobeyed, that it must be punished. The forerunner of self-judgment within the child is judgment by parents. It is only as the judgments of parents are taken over by the child and accepted as part of his own personality that the 'super-ego' becomes operative and active.

> Small children are notoriously a-moral. They have no internal inhibitions against their pleasure-seeking impulses. The role, which the super-ego

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88 NILP, 86.

> undertakes later in life, is at first played by an external power, by parental authority. The influence of the parents dominates the child by granting proofs of affection and by threats of punishment, which, to the child, mean loss of love, and which must also be feared on their own account. This objective anxiety is the forerunner of later moral anxiety; so long as the former is dominant one need not speak of super-ego or of conscience. It is only later that the secondary situation arises, which we are far too ready to regard as the normal state of affairs; the external restrictions are introjected, so that the super-ego takes the place of the parental function, and thenceforward observes, guides and threatens the ego in just the same way as the parents acted to the child before. [89]

The 'super-ego,' thus, is an incorporation within the personality of the desires, commands, rules, regulations, prohibitions, etc., of parents as related to the growing child. Freud teaches that the 'super-ego' tends to take over the harshness and severity of the parents while the love of parents appears to influence other parts of the personality, such as the 'id' and the 'ego.' The process of incorporation of the parental authority within the personality is thought to take place through the 'mechanism' of 'identification.'

> The basis of the process is what we call an identification, that is to say, that one ego becomes like another, one which results in the first ego behaving itself in certain respects in the same way as the second; it imitates it, and as it were takes it into itself. [90]

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89 Ibid., 89.
90 Ibid., 90.

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89 Ibid., 89.
90 Ibid., 90.

What the individual incorporates within himself, through 'identification' is not so much what the parents are in themselves but what the parents appear to be to the child. The parents attempt to train and influence their children, not on the basis of their own 'id' or 'ego' desires, but on the basis of their own 'super-ego' functions. They act towards their children as their parents tried to train them.

> In general, parents and similar authorities follow the dictates of their own super-egos in the upbringing of children. Whatever terms their ego may be on with their super-ego, in the education of the child they are severe and exacting. They have forgotten the difficulties of their own childhood, and are glad to be able to identify themselves fully at last with their own parents, who in their day subjected them to such severe restraints. [91]

Freud goes on to point out, then, that the 'super-ego' is the carrier and the transmitter of social customs, group mores, traditions, and social ideals.

> The result is that the super-ego of the child is not really built up on the model of the parents, but on that of the parents' super-ego; it takes over the same content, it becomes the vehicle of tradition and of all the age-long values which have been handed down in this way from generation to generation. [92]

It is one of Freud's oft-repeated principles that the 'super-ego' is "the heir of the Oedipus-complex,"[93] that this 'identification' with the parents, particularly with the father,

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91 Ibid., 95.
92 Ibid.
93 "Character-Types in Psycho-Analytic Research," CP, IV, 343. The 'Oedipus-complex' is here defined in terms of a desire for incest and parricide.

What the individual incorporates within himself, through 'identification' is not so much what the parents are in themselves but what the parents appear to be to the child. The parents attempt to train and influence their children, not on the basis of their own 'id' or 'ego' desires, but on the basis of their own 'super-ego' functions. They act towards their children as their parents tried to train them.

> In general, parents and similar authorities follow the dictates of their own super-egos in the upbringing of children. Whatever terms their ego may be on with their super-ego, in the education of the child they are severe and exacting. They have forgotten the difficulties of their own childhood, and are glad to be able to identify themselves fully at last with their own parents, who in their day subjected them to such severe restraints.[91]

Freud goes on to point out, then, that the 'super-ego' is the carrier and the transmitter of social customs, group mores, traditions, and social ideals.

> The result is that the super-ego of the child is not really built up on the model of the parents, but on that of the parents' super-ego; it takes over the same content, it becomes the vehicle of tradition and of all the age-long values which have been handed down in this way from generation to generation.[92]

It is one of Freud's oft-repeated principles that the 'super-ego' is "the heir of the Oedipus-complex,"[93] that this 'identification' with the parents, particularly with the father,

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91 Ibid., 95.
92 Ibid.
93 "Character-Types in Psycho-Analytic Research," CP, IV, 343.
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gives rise to the 'super-ego.' With this 'identification' is the 'introjection' of all that the father has stood for in the life of the child--fear, awe, wonder, etc.

> The establishment of the super-ego can be described as a successful instance of identification with the parental function. The fact which is decisively in favor of this point of view is that this new creation of a superior function within the ego is extremely closely bound up with the fate of the Oedipus complex, so that the super-ego appears as the heir of that emotional tie, which is of such importance for childhood. When the Oedipus complex passes away the child must give up the intense object-cathexes which it has formed towards its parents, and to compensate for this loss of object, its identifications with its parents, which have probably long been present, become greatly intensified.[94]

There is one other aspect of Freud's theory of the 'super-ego' which must be considered, namely, the aspect that the 'super-ego' functions almost entirely 'unconsciously.' What has thus far been said about 'identification' with parents could be conceived of as taking place almost entirely on the 'conscious' plane. Freud points out, however, that deeper 'identification' with the parents takes place almost always without the growing individual's realizing what changes are taking place within him. The 'super-ego' becomes the 'censor,' the 'unconscious resistance,' that which inhibits the 'id' impulses.[95] The 'super-ego' is, in reality, the source of the

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94 NILP, 91.
95 Ibid., 97.

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94 WHIP, 91.
95 Ibid., 97.

'repressions' which protect the 'ego' from the infantile and powerful urges of the 'id.' The 'super-ego' is thought to be in close contact with the processes of the 'id,' for the 'super-ego' is set up within the personality when certain impulses of the 'id' strive for expression against the will of parents and those in authority. Excitation of 'id' impulses immediately gives rise to restraints of the 'super-ego.' This function of 'repression' and restraint goes on, for the most part, without the 'conscious' recognition of the individual. "The super-ego can operate unconsciously." [96]

The 'super-ego' is basic in Freud's psychology, and it is of especial interest to us, since Freud tends to derive the religious life and beliefs of individuals from the functioning of the 'super-ego.' His views on belief in God, his views on morality, his views on the problem of sin and guilt are directly related to his psychological doctrine of the 'super-ego.' To understand his views concerning religious beliefs, we must have a thorough understanding of his doctrine of the 'super-ego.' In drawing up a general statement which might be used to characterize his view of the 'super-ego,' we might say that the 'super-ego' is mainly the 'unconscious-conscience' of the individual. While 'super-ego' restraints and prohibitions may

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96 Ibid., 98.

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98 Ibid., 98.

have been 'consciously' entertained in the beginning, they have passed into habitual restraints and prohibitions and have accumulated emotions which were not associated with them in the beginning. The images that are at the nucleus of the 'super-ego,' the images of those in authority, particularly the image of the father, are no longer 'consciously' entertained. These images function without the 'conscious' awareness of the individual. It is one of the main aims of psycho-analytic therapy to bring these images into consciousness, to drain them of their excess emotion, and to modify their irrational demands. In our discussion of his views concerning belief in God, the nature of morality, and the problem of guilt, we shall have occasion to see how he interprets these beliefs and problems in the light of the 'super-ego' doctrine. If we keep in mind that the 'super-ego' is mainly the 'unconscious-conscience,' we shall be in a much better position to understand and to criticize his views. In the meantime, we shall venture the suggestion that the truest and highest seat of morality and religious belief is found within the 'conscious ego' rather than in the 'unconscious super-ego.' We shall have the opportunity to carry out this suggestion in succeeding chapters.

F. Freedom and Determinism.

1. Psychological Determinism.

Freud calls himself a psychological determinist. As a psycho-analyst, he has developed the concept of 'unconscious' psychic determinants. This concept was developed in his early publication, The Psycho-pathology of Everyday Life.

> By abandoning a part of our psychic capacity as unexplainable, we ignore the realms of determinism in our mental life. Here, as in still other spheres, determinism reaches farther than we suppose... For some time I have been aware that it is impossible to think of a number, or even of a name, of one's own free will. If one investigates this seeming voluntary formation, let us say, of a number of many digits uttered in unrestrained mirth, it always proves to be so strictly determined that the determination seems impossible.[97]

In this work, he pointed out that many of the events of 'conscious' life which appear as chance and undetermined are, in reality, determined by 'unconscious' factors. He carried out this interpretation in discussing the forgetting of proper names, the forgetting of foreign words, the forgetting of impressions and resolutions, mistakes of speech, reading and writing, and chance acts. From an abundance of illustrative case material, he pointed out that in these phenomena which are usually thought to be undetermined, 'unconscious' processes were to be discovered as the determining factors. Holt states Freud's work in this regard has resulted in the development of

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97 PEL, 278.

a 'causal category' of the mind:

> Now Freud's contribution to science is notable, and in my opinion epoch-making, for a reason which has hardly ever been mentioned. And this reason is that he has given to the science of mind a 'causal category.' [98]

Freud regards this part of his work as undermining the inherent 'narcissism' of man. He feels that he has shown that "the ego is not master in its own house." [99]

2. Analysis and Freedom.

In spite of the fact that 'conscious' life is to a great measure determined by 'unconscious' impulses, Freud points out that 'conscious' life may be freed from 'unconscious' determinants through knowledge and insight. This is the principle task of analysis. Through analysis, the neurotic patient, whose thought and behaviour is determined by blind factors, the nature of which he does not understand, becomes aware of the 'unconscious' determinants of his behaviour and thought. When the 'unconscious' determinants are brought into consciousness, they lose their compulsive power. The individual is no longer controlled by them; the individual exercises the control himself. In the therapeutic sense, thus, analysis brings freedom. Whereas the patient had previously been determined by 'unconscious' impulses, he, through analysis, is freed from their determining influence.

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98 FWPE, vi.
99 "A Difficulty of Psycho-Analysis," CP, IV, 353.

3. Self-Determinism.

The placing of control within the 'conscious' mind or within the 'ego' leads to a higher form of determinism, namely, to self-determinism. Self-determinism is achieved through a conscious realization of the forces that play upon and tend to exercise a determining force upon the self. In general, Freud finds three main types of forces that tend to determine the self: those 'unconscious' determinants classed under the concept 'id'; the demands of the 'super-ego'; and the 'reality' demands made upon the 'ego' by the 'external world.' [100] The 'ego' must serve these three masters. The severity of the demands made by these three masters tends to determine its choices. Arbitrary choices of the 'ego' are only possible when there are no severe demands placed upon it.

> It is in trivial and indifferent decisions that one feels sure that he could just as easily have acted differently, that he acted of his own free will, and without any motives. [101]

If, however, freedom be defined as Hans Driesch defines it as the power to say YES or NO,[102] freedom cannot be denied to the 'ego.' The power to say yes or no is very limited in weighty matters, but the fact that the 'ego' is the center of conflict for the various demands that are placed upon it, the fact that

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100 NILP, 108.
101 PEL, 302.
102 CIP, 246.

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[100] MILL, 106.
[101] PEL, 302.
[102] DRI, 246.

it must decide between the various factors, the fact that it must choose to side with one of the many demands that are made upon it, and the fact that in trivial matters, it is more or less free to choose as it wishes argue for the position that the 'ego' does possess a certain degree of freedom. From a practical standpoint, the goal is the increasing of freedom. Freedom or self-determination may be increased through analysis of the various factors that make demands upon it. This is especially true concerning the demands that are placed upon the 'ego' by the 'id' and by the 'super-ego,' although it may be said that the 'ego' is much more free to adjust to the 'external world' if it is thoroughly acquainted with its nature. Freedom and self-determination, thus, depends upon the degree of insight and knowledge which the 'ego' possesses. "Your will extends no further than your knowledge."[103] This view of freedom is paralleled with the classic statement taken from St. John's Gospel: "Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make ye free."[104] It is the primary purpose of psycho-analytic therapy to supply the necessary insight and knowledge concerning inner, psychic determinants and to increase the freedom and sovereignty of the 'ego.'

> It is quite simple to describe our therapeutic goal: We aim at restituting the "I" and liberating it from its restrictions, restoring to the

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103 Ibid., 355.
104 8:32.

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103 Ibid., 355.
104 8:32.

> "I" once more sovereignty over the "It" which it lost, on account of early repressions. Psycho-analysis, in general, aims at this goal; our whole technique strives for this end.[105]

Psycho-analytic therapy, thus, aims to make 'the ego master in its own house.'

Having surveyed Freud's essential doctrines concerning human nature, we are now ready to consider his attitude toward beliefs which are more distinctly religious in content. The first religious belief that we shall consider is the belief in God.

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105 PLA, 79.

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CHAPTER TWO

THE BELIEF IN GOD

In this chapter our primary concern will be to give an answer to the question: What is Freud's view concerning the belief in God? Our treatment of his view will fall into two parts. First, we shall consider his account of the psychological origin of belief in God. Second, we shall consider his rejection of the belief in God and the reasons he gives for such rejection.

A. Psychological Origins of Belief in God.

Freud traces the belief in God to four different sources: first, the persistence of childhood attitudes into adult life; second, the psychological attempt to replace the slain chieftain or father of the 'primal horde'; third, the need for protection in an indifferent if not hostile world; and fourth, the need for moral support. These will be considered in the order mentioned.

1. Childhood 'Father-Imago.'

Freud maintains that the belief in God finds its origin in the 'projection' of the individual's childhood relationship with his parents, particularly with his father, out onto the external world.[1] The adult individual acts towards the exter-

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1 PEL, 309; NILP, 220-226.

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nal world as though it were like his father. He behaves towards his environment in general as though it were parental in nature. The adult has failed to completely emancipate himself from his childhood dependence upon and attitudes towards his father. This vestigial bond of dependence forms the ground for belief in God.

Freud has called this persistence of the relationship with the father or this failure to gain emancipation from the father the 'father-complex' or 'father-imago.' The 'father-complex' forms during the period of prolonged infancy and childhood when the child is intimately associated with the father in the home. The child feels that his father is all-powerful, omnipotent, that he can do all things. He looks upon his father as though he were omniscient. His father knows the answer to his every question. He looks upon his father as the judge and rewarder or punisher of his conduct. It is his father who notices whether he does right or whether he does wrong. He comes to look upon his father with admiration, with awe, and also with fear. All of these experiences make a profound impression upon the child, and they are associated together under the image of the father. Thus, the 'father-complex' or 'father-imago' is formed.

As the child grows up, as he learns of the external world through his own experiences and reflections concerning it, he begins to gain greater freedom. He becomes more and

more independent of his father. His earlier impressions, however, may not be directly associated with his later impressions. He may fail to bring his childhood impressions up-to-date. In this case, the earlier impressions remain within the individual's mind as more or less a separate 'complex.' It may not be consciously entertained as a 'father-comples.' It may be operative only in the realm of memory, or in what Freud calls the 'unconscious.' Or this 'father-complex' might continue to persist due to the fact that at an early age the child might have lost his father through death. He may never have come to see his father's limitations. He continues to have the feelings of admiration, awe, fear. These deep seated feelings persist because the individual did not have opportunity to correct them by seeing his father in the light of his limitations. Or again, individuals often remain so much under the spell of their fathers' authority and control that they do not dare to look beyond them. Such are the individuals with whom Freud is mostly concerned. Freud states that they are under the domination of a 'father-complex' which controls their thought and behavior and which determines their attitude towards other persons and towards their environment in general.

It is one of Freud's major theses that the belief in God is derived from the 'father-complex.'

> Die Religion wäre die allgemeinmenschliche Zwangsneurose, wie die des Kindes stammte sie aus dem Ödipuskomplex, der Vaterbeziehung.[2]

Freud maintains that the individual's idea of God is modelled after his idea of his own father.

> Allein die psychoanalytische Erforschung des einzelnen Menschen lehrt mit einer ganz besonderen Nachdrücklichkeit, dass für jeden der Gott nach dem Vater gebildet ist, dass sein persönliches Verhältnis zu Gott von seinem Verhältnis zum leiblichen Vater abhängt, mit ihm schwankt und sich verwandelt, und dass Gott im Grunde nichts anderes ist als ein erhöhter Vater.[3]

God is thought to be a father-substitute:

> We know that God is a father-substitute, or, more correctly, an exalted father, or yet again, a reproduction of the father as seen and met with in childhood--as the individual sees him in his own childhood and as mankind saw him in prehistoric times in the father of the primal horde. Later on in life the individual acquired a different, a less exalted impression of him, but the childish image of him was preserved and it united with the inherited memory-traces of the primal father to form the idea of God.[4]

Jones, a close follower of Freud, summarizes Freud's theory in the following passage:

> Both militant atheism and devout belief in God can be equally traced to the child's earliest reactions to his earthly father. The attributes of omnipotence, omniscience, and moral perfection are invariably ascribed to the father at one stage or another during the young child's growth; they proceed at least as much from internal necessities as from any extenal example or suggestion. Various repressions to do with the idea of the father, together with his obvious

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2 ZEI, 70.
3 TT, 136.
4 "Neurosis of Demoniacal Possession," CP, IV, 449.

> short-comings when judged by so absolute a standard, lead to the attributes of perfection being abstracted from him and incorporated in an intangible figure. This, in a couple of words, is perhaps the gist of the mass of knowledge we possess about the development of the idea of Godhead.[5]

An attempt has been made to draw parallels between the child's fluctuating attitude towards his father as shown by fear and hate on the one hand and admiration and love on the other, and fluctuating attitudes taken towards God as expressed on the one hand by rebellion and fear, and on the other hand by the sincerest love and devotion.

> We know, too, from the inner life of individuals as disclosed in analysis, that the relation to this father was in all probability ambivalent from the outset, or at any rate, it soon became so; that is to say, it comprised two sets of emotional impulses, quite opposite in nature, not merely one of fondness and submission but another of hostility and defiance. We hold that this ambivalence governs the relations of mankind to its deities. From this unresolved conflict, on the one hand of longing for the father and on the other of dread and defiance, we have explained some of the important characteristics and most epoch-making vicissitudes of religion.[6]

Flügel has developed farther this comparison of ambivalence, so-called in psycho-analytic terminology, and has pointed out how Christianity has made notable advances in overcoming the ambivalent attitude towards God which was so characteristic in Hebrew religion.

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5 "Psycho-Analysis and the Psychology of Religion," in S. Lorard, PT, 330.

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> In the higher forms of religion the more directly hostile relations between child and parent are seldom openly manifested, the conception of the father as wicked or immoral tending to disappear with increasing culture, though the motion of obedience to a stern relentless authority may be maintained. This in its turn however frequently gives place to the idea of the kindly, helpful and forgiving father, according to a process of development. It is a change of this nature for instance that, more perhaps than all else, marks the step from Judaism to Christianity; the latter giving promise of a reign of kindliness and forgiveness in place of the harsh and uncompromising exercise of paternal authority so characteristic of the former. It is for this reason that Christianity especially appealed to and encouraged the poor, the weak, the helpless, those who were most in need of kindness and assistance.[7]

The case study in which this relationship between the childhood attitude towards the father and the adult attitude towards God is best brought out in Freud's analysis of Dr. Schreber.[8] Dr. Schreber was formerly Senatspräsident in Dresden, Germany, a man from a noted family and a man with a wide reputation in social and judicial circles. He suffered from two breakdowns, the second much more serious than the first. Upon making a somewhat satisfactory adjustment after his second breakdown, he wrote an autobiography giving special attention to his experiences during the periods of his mental disturbance. The book was entitled Denkwürdigkeiten eines Nervenkranken and appeared in 1903. Freud has given a detailed

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7 PSF, 141.
8 "Psycho-Analytic Notes upon an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia," CP, III, 387-470.

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analysis of this autobiographical account and an analysis of Dr. Schreber's religious ideas and beliefs. The conclusion at which Freud arrives is that Dr. Schreber's early relationship with his father had become the prototype for his relationship with what he conceived to be God. In this detailed analysis, Freud sums up Dr. Schreber's attitude toward God in the following way:

> It will be recalled that Schreber's God and his relations to him exhibited the most curious features; how they showed the strangest mixture of blasphemous criticism and mutinous insubordination on the one hand and of reverent devotion on the other. God, according to him...was incapable of learning anything by experience, and did not understand living man because he only knew how to deal with corpses; and he manifested his power in a succession of miracles.[9]

Here we have a summary statement, based upon his own statements in his autobiography, of Dr. Schreber's beliefs about God. Freud then gives a statement concerning Dr. Schreber's father.

> Now the father of Senatspräsident Dr. Schreber was no insignificant person. He was the Dr. Daniel Gottlieb Moritz Schreber whose memory is kept green to this day by the numerous Schreber Associations which flourish especially in Saxony; and, moreover, he was a PHYSICIAN.[10]

Freud then proceeds to point out how Schreber's ideas about God are related to his father, who is a physician.

> Such a father as this was by no means unsuitable for transfiguration into a God in the affectionate memory of the son from whom he had been so early separated by death... We are perfectly familiar

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9 Ibid., 435.
10 Ibid.

> with the infantile attitude of boys towards their father; it is composed of the same mixture of reverent submission and mutinous insubordination that we have found in Schreber's relation with his God, and is the unmistakable prototype of that relation, which is faithfully copied from it. [11]

He thus explains Schreber's ambivalent attitude towards God on the basis of his ambivalent relationship with his father. The explanation proceeds further and attempts to explain Dr. Schreber's ideas about God as one who only understands corpses, one who cannot learn anything, and one who is a worker of miracles on the basis of his relationship with his father as a physician:

> But the circumstance that Schreber's father was a physician, and a most eminent physician, and one who was no doubt highly respected by his patients, is what explains the most striking characteristics of his God and those upon which he dwells in such a critical fashion. Could more bitter scorn be shown for a physician such as this than by declaring that he understands nothing about living men and only knows how to deal with corpses? No doubt it is an attribute of God to perform miracles; but a physician performs miracles too, effects miraculous cures--or so his enthusiastic clients proclaim. [12]

Freud then proceeds to explain many other religious ideas, hitherto unexplained and unintelligible, on the basis of Schreber's relationship with his father.

> Emboldened by the discovery that his father's profession helps to explain the peculiarities of Schreber's God, we shall now venture upon an interpretation which may throw some light upon the remarkable structure of that Being. [13]

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11 Ibid., 436.
12 Ibid., 437.
13 Ibid.

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Thus we see how Freud has developed his thesis that the fundamental origin of the belief in God is to be found in the individual's relationship with his father. Before we go into a criticism of this view, let us consider the second source of which he writes, since it is closely associated with the one we have just considered.

2. Theory of the 'Primal Horde.'

In 1912 Freud published his Totem und Tabu. He constantly refers back to the theories presented in this book, stating that he thinks:

> Es ist ehrenvoll für eine solche Hypothese, wenn sie sich geeignet zeigt, Zusammenhang und Verständnis auf immer neuen Gebieten zu schaffen.[14]

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> Meine Arbeit (Totem und Tabu) ist ein gutes Beispiel... den die psychoanalytische Betrachtung zur Lösung des religiösen Problems kann.[15]
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The hypothesis set forth in this work has greatly influenced Theodor Reik in his studies in the psychology of religion[16] and has become the central hypothesis in Géza Róheim's work in the field of anthropology.[17] While Freud insists in Totem und Tabu that it was not his "die Entstehung der Religionen erklärt werden, sondern nur die des Totemismus,"[18] he does attempt to

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14 MAI, 101.
15 ZEI, 35.
16 RPS, 10.
17 SA, AMDK, ROS.
18 ZEI, 34.

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His central hypothesis is that primitive society was organized as a 'primal horde,' the term 'horde' being used to designate a social group about the size of what is usually called a clan. The idea of the 'primal horde' was taken over from Charles Darwin.[19] The theory is that the 'primal horde' was headed by a very authoritative, tyrannical, jealous male. The jealous male ruled his people with an iron hand. He kept all of the females in the tribe for himself. He drives away his growing sons from the tribe when they became possible competitors for his rule and property. Freud then describes an hypothetical event of the removal of the father by the sons:

> Eines Tages taten sich die ausgetriebenen Brüder zusammen, erschlugen und verzehrten den Vater und machten so der Vaterhorde ein Ende. Vereint wagten sie und brachten zustande, was dem einzelnen unmöglich geblieben wäre. Vielleicht hatte ein Kulturfortschritt, die Handhabung einer neuen Waffe ihnen das Gefühl der Überlegenheit gegeben. Dass sie den Getöteten auch verzehrten, is für den kannibalen Wilden selbstverständlich. Der gewalttätige Urvater war gewiss das beneidete und gefürchtete Vorbild eines jeden aus der Brüderschar gewesen. Nun setzten sie im Akte des Verzehrens die Identifizierung mit ihm durch, eigneten sich ein jeder ein Stück seiner Stärke an.[20]

After the deed was performed, a reaction followed. Who was going to possess the females? Who was going to be head of the

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19 DOM, ii, 395.
20 TT, 131.

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19 DOM, 11, 395.
20 TT, 181.

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It is in the reaction to the 'primal deed' that Freud traces the origin of the taboos against incest and murder, the origin of totemism, and indirectly, the origin of the belief in gods. The father's command that the sons were not to have relations with the females within the clan now became introcepted as an inner moral command which needed no exterior power for legislation or enforcement. As a 'reaction-formation' against the killing of the father, the taboo against parricide and fratricide arose. The longing for the father gave rise to totemism. A substitute for the father was gained in the totem animal. The connection between the 'father-imago' and animals was one which Freud had discovered in his dealing with neurotic patients. His "Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-year old Boy,"[22] published in 1909, resulted in the conclusion that the little boy's fear of being bitten by a horse was fear that he would

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21 Ibid., 131-135.
22 CP, III, Paper II.

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> Wir halten uns nach diesen Beobachtungen für berechtigt, in die Formel des Totemismus--für den Mann--den Vater an Stelle des Totemtieres einzusetzen. Wir merken dann, dass wir damit keinen neuen oder besonders kühnen Schritt getan haben. Die Primitiven sagen es ja selbst und bezeichnen, so weit noch heute das totemistische System in Kraft besteht, den Totem als ihren Ahnherrn und Urvater... Das erste Ergebnis unserer Ersetzung ist sehr merkwürdig. Wenn das Totemtier der Vater ist, dann fallen die beiden Hauptgebote des Totemismus, die beiden Tabuvorschriften die seinen Kern ausmachen, den Totem nicht zu töten und kein Weib, das dem Totem angehört, sexuell zu gebrauchen, inhaltlich zusammen mit den beiden Verbrechen des Ödipus. [23]

Concerning the origin of belief in gods, Freud states that the belief in gods evolved out of totemism. Totemism was a forerunner of belief in gods.

> Wir wissen, dass mehrfache Beziehungen zwischen dem Gott und dem heiligen Tier (Totem, Opfertier) bestehen:

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23 TT, 122.

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[25] TT, 122.

> 1. Jedem Gott is gewöhnlich ein Tier heilig, nicht selten selbst mehrere; 2. in gewissen, besonders heiligen Opfern, den "mystischen" wurde dem Gotte gerade das ihm geheiligte Tier zum Opfer dargebracht; 3. der Gott wurde häufig in der Gestalt eines Tieres verehrt oder, anders gesehen, Tiere genossen göttliche Verehrung lange nach dem Zeitalter des Totemismus; 4. in den Mythen verwandelt sich der Gott häufig in ein Tier, oft in das ihm geheiligte. So läge die Annahme nahe, dass der Gott selbst das Totemtier wäre, sich auf einer späteren Stufe des religiösen Fühlens aus dem Totemtier entwickelt hätte. Aller weiteren Diskussion überhebt uns aber die Erwägung, dass der Totem selbst nichts anderes ist als ein Vaterersatz. [24]

Whereas in totemism, the 'father-imago' is transferred or 'projected' to the very tangible object of a familiar animal, in religion, the 'father-imago' is projected outward to more intangible objects such as gods. In the further development, God becomes so far removed that priests are needed for mediation.

> In weiterer Folge verliert das Tier seine Heiligkeit und das Opfer die Beziehung zur Totemfeier; es wird zu einer einfachen Darbringung an die Gottheit, zu einer Selbstentäusserung zu Gunsten des Gottes. Gott selbst ist jetzt so hoch über den Menschen erhaben, dass man mit ihm nur durch die Vermittlung des Priesters verkehren kann. [25]

Thus, Freud's theory of the 'primal horde' is another attempt to trace the belief in God to the 'father-complex.' There is one additional item to note, however. Whereas in the analysis of individuals he had come to look upon an indi-

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24 Ibid., 136, 137.
25 Ibid., 138.

vidual's belief in God as arising from his own particular relationship with his father, in his theory which is set forth in Totem und Tabu, he attempts to show that the idea of God which is transmitted from one generation to the succeeding arises from an historic 'primal father.' Freud has not made these two ideas altogether consistent. On the one hand, he speaks as though the individual's idea of God is purely his individual matter, being determined by his own relationship with his own father. On the other hand, when he talks about the transmission of moral codes, totemism, and the belief in gods from one generation to another, he talks as though the individuals within the various generations, with their own 'father-imagos,' play little or no part in determining the nature and character of the codes and beliefs that are transmitted.

Freud's theory of the 'primal horde,' from a critical standpoint, must be regarded as hypothetical. There is no evidence that such a 'primal horde' ever existed. Freud himself recognizes this fact.[26] There is no existing society that bears any direct traces of the existence of such a primal society. Darwin himself had no direct evidence for the theory; it was a speculative idea for him. The theory of the 'primal horde' has been referred to as a 'just-so-story.'[27] Even though Freud has admitted that it is merely an hypothesis, he

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26 Ibid., 131.
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has allowed the idea to take on the appearance of reality. He talks continually about the 'primal horde' as though it were a society that actually existed and about the 'primal deed' as though it were an actual event in history. He even goes so far as to state that the experience of the 'primal deed' has become part of the phylogenetic inheritance of every human being. He even speaks of "the inherited memory-traces of the primal father,"[28] as though each individual had in the deep regions of his 'unconscious' mind a memory of the 'primal father.' Freud has allowed his hypothesis to become fact when he had no evidence at hand to bring about such a grounding. He justifies himself on the grounds that the hypothesis has brought consistency and coherence among certain factors of history which had hitherto not been found in harmonious relationship.[29] But these factors might be brought together into coherent relationship by many different hypotheses. One might suggest an hypothesis different from that of the 'primal horde' which is even more in keeping with the findings of psycho-analysis. Instead of accounting for the taboos on incest and parricide and for the institution of totemism on the basis of reactions growing out of a particular 'primal deed' taking place within a particular 'primal society,' the taboos on incest and on parricide and the growth of the tendency for deification of

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28 "Neurosis of Demoniacal Possession," CP, IV, 449.
29 MAI, 101.

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28 "Neurosis of Demoniacal Possession," CP, IV, 445.
29 Ibid, 101.

animals could be accounted for by factors arising within each family group, in each generation. Freud points out the barriers to incest and to murder that arise within the family group and also points out how human beings tend to identify their fathers with animals. These different customs and institutions, thus, could have evolved from situations wherever there were human beings living together, especially in family form. There is no need to suppose that these customs and institutions arose from one particular society in a particular place at a particular time. To use Freud's own language, what Freud has done in his theory of the 'primal horde' is to 'project' a characteristic family situation into history. There is no known truth in such a 'projection' and there is no especial need for it. Freud could have chosen a different hypothesis to explain the phenomena of totemism and the taboos on incest and parricide.

From the standpoint of the psychology of religion, it sheds little more light on the problem of the origin of belief in God than does his earlier idea that God is modelled after the 'father-imago,' the point which we have already considered in the first part of this chapter. The only additional element to be found in it is the attempt to account for worshipping of one god by many people in many generations. If God, for the individual, were modelled only on the basis of

his individual 'father-imago,' then there would be as many gods as there are individuals. This is the fallacy and the falsehood in Freud's thesis that God is a 'projection' of the childhood 'imago.' This thesis leads to an extreme relativism. The theory of the 'primal father' does attempt to account for more or less uniformity of belief in the divine object. From this standpoint, it ties together the religious beliefs of people--making belief in God something social rather than individual. In this respect, thus, it goes beyond the view that belief in God is modelled upon the individual 'father-imago.'

The theory of God as father of the 'primal horde' however is but an extension of the basic idea of God as a 'projection' of the 'father-imago.' It merely reads into the life of our remote ancestors a father-son relationship which differs from father-son relationships in the present day in that an actual crisis occurred between father and sons and that the feelings centering around this relationship and crisis were so momentuous that they were passed down from one generation to another, being kept alive by the similarity of situations and feelings which people of succeeding generations entertained in their own lives.

We have stated that Freud's 'primal horde' theory is an attempt to account for the uniformity of belief among various

generations of people. But we must pause here a moment, for a word of criticism. We grant that parents, teachers, ministers and priests teach children about God. The uniformity of belief comes from the passing down from one generation to another various religious teachings. Our question now becomes this: What part of socially transmitted religious teachings corresponds to Freud's idea of the 'primal father-imago'? How much of our religious heritage is based either directly or, as Freud would have it, 'unconsciously' upon the idea of a 'primal father'? Instead of finding the key to our socially transmitted religious heritage in a single 'primal father,' we would be nearer the truth if we were to state that our social idea of God is the result of an evolutionary growth in which individual ideas of God gradually work themselves through to social acceptance. The idea of God in the Hebrew and Christian tradition has undergone many changes, due largely to the religious insights of such of its leaders as Moses, Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, and Jesus. Tracing, thus, our religious social heritage to a 'primal father-imago' does not satisfy the facts of the history of religion. Not only have we no facts to prove that such a 'primal father' ever existed, but the facts of the evolution of religious ideas discredit such an idea.

Concerning the origin of the idea of God in the individual 'father-imago,' there is much more to be said. Freud has

described a process that is real and that actually takes place. This process has been known among religious leaders for generations. Jesus himself saw the relationship and used the term 'our Father' to characterize God. Religious educators realize that the best place to begin in educating the child about God is to start with his attitude towards his own father.[30] The child's idea of his father is something tangible. It has perceptual and emotional qualities which are easily utilized. It lends itself easily to an expansion into a concept of God. Thus, when Freud tells us that the individual's idea of God is modelled after his image of his father, we must say that he has described an actual fact. Those whose work it is to train the oncoming generation in a religious outlook have known this fact for many centuries.

But religious educators differ from Freud in one important point. They admit that the child begins to think of God in terms of his own father, but they contend that the child must not stop with this tangible, but very inadequate, image. This image must be used merely as a starting point. Through the work of religious education and deeper insight into the nature of one's self and life in general, this childhood image must be expanded, revisualized, redefined, reconstructed in the light of his experience taken as a whole.[31]

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30 Strickland, PRE, 83.
31 Brightman, POG, 31.

The individual is brought into contact with the religious experiences, the religious insights, the religious teachings of the more outstanding religious leaders of the race. Isaiah's conception of God, Amos' conception of God, Hosea's conception of God, Jesus' conception of God are vital factors which play a part in the formation of the individual's larger view of God. Just as the growing individual changes his ideas of the objects and people around him through more and more contact with these objects and people and through instruction given concerning these objects and people by his teachers in school, so the growing individual comes to expand, alter, and reconstruct his idea of God through wider personal experience and through the teachings of others. Thus, Freud's thesis that the belief in God is modelled after the 'father-imago' is to be taken as true only at a certain stage of personal development. The child begins to think of God in terms of his physical father, but if the child grows in his religious ideas as well as he grows in body and in other ideas about himself and the world about him, then he begins to expand and reconstruct his childhood idea of God. It is often true that many individuals do not grow beyond this early stage. To use Freud's own phraseology, one might say that their religious life is 'fixated' at an 'infantile' level. Or again, one can easily conceive that individuals might go beyond this stage but return to it. To use Freud's terminology again, we might say that it is possible

to 'regress' to this early stage. And it is at this point of 'regression' that Freud collects much of his evidence for his theory. Consider specifically the case of Dr. Schreber again. If one would have asked Dr. Schreber before his nervous breakdowns, when he was at the height of his career as a judiciary, what he believed about God, Dr. Schreber would certainly not have answered that he believed God did not understand living men, only corpses, that God could not learn anything by experience. These ideas came out in a disturbed period. They represented a curious association of early experiences which occupied the center of attention when Dr. Schreber 'regressed' to an earlier stage of his life. One could hardly take Dr. Schreber's ideas of God which came out in his disturbed periods as representative of his belief about God any more than one could take any other ideas concerning the nature of the world around him which came out in the disturbed periods as representative of Schreber's ideas concerning the world. We shall, in a later section of our study, criticize Freud's use of evidence taken from disturbed patients. Here, at this point, we are only interested in showing that individual's idea of God as modelled closely after his physical father is characteristic of only an early stage in the religious development of the individual. As a psychologist of religion, thus, Freud portrays only part of the process of the individual's development of ideas about God. He has told the truth, but

only half the truth.

We shall now pass on to a discussion of his views concerning two other sources for belief in God. These sources, while they are related to the childhood situation, are to be found in dominant needs of adult life. The first of these needs is the need for God as a protector in an indifferent and hostile world, and the second is the need for God as a buttress of moral codes.

3. The Need for Protection.

Freud states that the adult man believes in God because he feels the need for protection in a world that thwarts his purposes and leaves him destitute and helpless.[32]

> Da sind die Elemente, die jedem menschlichen Zwang zu spotten scheinen, die Erde, die bebt, zerreisst, alles Menschliche und Menschenwerk begräbt, das Wasser, das im Aufruhr alles überflutet und ersäuft, der Sturm, der es wegbläst, da sind die Krankheiten.[33]

He states that the adult individual stands as a child in his relationship with the outer world. "in solcher Hilflosigkeit hatte man sich schon befunden, als kleines Kind einem Elternpaar gegenüber."[34] The difference between the childhood situation and the adult situation is that the adult finds no tangible parent to protect him. For this reason, he revives his early feelings towards his protecting father and creates

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32 NILP, 223.
33 ZEI, 22.
34 Ibid., 25.

for himself the belief in a God who will take care of him:

> Wenn nun der Heranwachsende merkt, dass es ihm bestimmt ist, immer ein Kind zu bleiben, dass er des Schutzes gegen fremde Übermächte nie entbehren kann, verleiht er diesen die Züge der Vatergestalt, er schafft sich die Götter, vor denen er sich fürchtet, die er zu gewinnen sucht und denen er doch einen Schutz überträgt. So ist das Motiv der Vatersehnsucht identisch mit dem Bedürfnis nach Schutz gegen die Folgen der menschlichen Ohnmacht; die Abwehr der kindlichen Hilflosigkeit verleiht der Reaktion auf die Hilflosigkeit, die der Erwachsene anerkennen muss, eben der Religionsbildung, ihre charakteristischen Züge. [35]

Freud's argument is summarized in the following passage which is taken from his latest book:

> The father (or, more correctly, the parental function which is composed of the father and the mother), has protected and watched over the weak and helpless child, exposed as it is to all the dangers which threaten in the external world; and in its father's care it has felt itself safe. Even the grown man, though he may know that he possesses greater strength, and though he has greater insight into the dangers of life, rightly feels that fundamentally he is just as helpless and unprotected as he was in childhood and that in relation to the external world he is still a child. Even now, therefore, he cannot give up the protection which he has enjoyed as a child. But he has long ago realized that his father is a being with strictly limited powers and by no means endowed with every desirable attribute. He therefore looks back to the memory-image of the overrated father of his childhood, exalts it into a Deity, and brings it into the present and into reality. The emotional strength of this memory-image and the lasting nature of his need for protection are the two supports of his belief in God. [36]

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35 Ibid., 36.
36 NILP, 223.

for himself the belief in a God who will take care of him:

> Wenn nun der Heranwachsende merkt, dass es ihm bestimmt ist, immer ein Kind zu bleiben, dass er des Schutzes gegen fremde Übermächte nie entbehren kann, verleiht er diesen die Züge der Vatergestalt, er schafft sich die Götter, vor denen er sich fürchtet, die er zu gewinnen sucht und denen er doch seinen Schutz überträgt. So ist das Motiv der Vaterschnsucht identisch mit dem Bedürfnis nach Schutz gegen die Folgen der menschlichen Ohnmacht; die Abwehr der kindlichen Hilflosigkeit verleiht der Reaktion auf die Hilflosigkeit, die der Erwachsene anerkennen muss, eben den Religionscharakter. Ihre charakteristische Note. [35]

Freud's argument is summarized in the following passage which is taken from his latest book:

> The father (or, more correctly, the parental function which is composed of the father and the mother), has protected and watched over the weak and helpless child, exposed as it is to all the dangers which threaten in the external world; and in its father's care it has felt itself safe. Even the grown man, though he may know that he possesses greater strength, and though he has greater insight into the dangers of life, rightly feels that fundamentally he is just as helpless and unprotected as he was in childhood and that in relation to the external world he is still a child. Even now, therefore, he cannot give up the protection which he has enjoyed as a child. But he has long ago realized that his father is a being with strictly limited powers and by no means endowed with every desirable attribute. He therefore looks back to the memory-image of the overrated father of his childhood, exalts it into a deity, and brings it into the present and into reality. The emotional strength of his memory-image and the lasting nature of his need for protection are the two supports of his belief in God. [36]

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35 Ibid., 36.
36 Ibid., 222.

Before we comment on this statement of Freud's concerning the origin of belief in God, we shall consider his other thesis which is closely related, namely, that belief in God arises out of the necessity of having support for moral codes.

4. The Need for Moral Sanction.

Freud points out that the individual's first moral teachings were given to him by his parents and that these teachings were accompanied by approval or punishment accordingly as they were carried out. He contends that the 'parent-imago,' and particularly, the 'father-imago' is vitally associated with one's moral code. He states that when man matures, his parents no longer stand over him to see that he obeys the moral teachings. Out of this need for someone to see that the moral codes are obeyed, the belief in God arises.

> The prohibitions and commands of his parents live on in his breast as his moral conscience; God rules the world of men with the help of the same system of rewards and punishments, and the degree of protection and happiness which each individual enjoys, depends on his fulfillment of the demands of morality.[37]

There are three different aspects that are brought out concerning this hypothesis. We have already touched on the first. The individual believes in God in order to have support for his own moral sense. If he does well, he feels he has the approval of God; if he disobeys or breaks codes

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37 Ibid., 224.

which he holds to be valid, he feels that he is subject to the disapproval and punishment of God. In this sense, the belief in God is vitally associated with the individual's own conscience.

The second aspect is that of moral justice. Man has been taught to believe that goodness is rewarded and evil doing is punished. But when mankind looks at conditions in the world about him, he sees that the wicked often prosper. So, Freud states, man, out of his sense of justice, comes to leave the matter with God who will see that evil is eventually punished.

> Dieselben Sittengesetze, die unsere Kulturen aufgestellt haben, beherrschen auch alles Weltgeschehen, nur werden sie von einer höchsten richterlichen Instanz mit ungleich mehr Macht und Konsequenz behütet. Alles Gute findet endlich seinen Lohn, alles Böse seine Strafe... Und die überlegene Weisheit, die diesen Ablauf lenkt, die Allgüte, die sich in ihm äussert, die Gerechtigkeit, die sich in ihn durchsetzt, das sind die Eigenschaften der göttlichen Wesen.[38]

Out of a sense of and a demand for justice, thus, mankind has come to believe in God.

The third aspect is more social. Freud looks upon the belief in God as arising out of the need to control and discipline the masses of people. While a so-called intelligent person does not need the belief in God to keep him from murder and other anti-social acts, the impulsive, uninformed masses

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38 ZEI, 28, 29.

can only be kept in order by the fear of the punishment of God.

> Von den gebildeten und geistigen Arbeitern ist für die Kultur wenig zu befürchten. Die Ersetzung der religiösen Motive für kulturelles Benehmen durch andere weltliche würde bei ihnen geräuschlos vor sich gehen, überdies sind sie zum guten Teil selbst Kulturtrager. Anders steht es um die grosse Masse der Ungebildeten, Unterdrückten, die allen Grund haben, Feinde der Kultur zu sein. Solange sie nicht erfahren, dass man nicht mehr an Gott glaubt, ist es gut. [39]

From a social standpoint, the belief in God arises out of the necessity of buttressing codes which give protection and order to social life.

Thus, Freud outlines four sources of the belief in Gods: first, the individual 'father-imago'; second, the 'primal father-imago'; third, the need for protection; and fourth, the need for moral sanction. With the exception of theory of the 'primal father-imago' which we have already criticised, we may state that we are prepared to take over and accept these theories of Freud concerning the origin of belief in God. We recognize that the individual's relationship with his earthly father plays an important part in the child's idea of God. We recognize that the vicissitudes, hardships, disappointments, frustrations of life greatly contribute to the 'will to believe' in God. The great religious leaders have especially emphasized the fact that belief in God is strengthened during time of trouble and difficulty. We also recognize that relig-

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39 ZEI, 63.

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ion and morality are very closely related and that adherence to moral codes is greatly strengthened by belief in God. Freud has, we believe, in these three respects, described real processes that take place in human life. But he is subject to one momentous error--namely, to the fallacy of generalization. He has picked a few facts relating to the phenomena of religion and has attempted to describe all of the phenomena in terms of these few facts. As a psychologist of religion, he has only partly completed his task. He has stopped with describing only the most elementary forms of religious life and has left us the impression that he has adequately dealt with the whole. We have already noted how this was done in the case of his assertion that the idea of God was modelled after the childhood 'father-imago.' We noted how the child starts with his image of his father, but how he progressively alters his view of God through greater experience, through instruction, and through a consideration of the thoughts and lives of religious leaders. The same may be said with reference to his theories of religion arising out of needs for protection and moral support. These needs do greatly contribute to the rise of belief in God. But there are many other needs, such as the need for redemption, the need for fellowship, that also give rise to belief in God. Thus, we would criticize Freud on the ground that he has failed to give an adequate and full

picture of the psychological origin and development of religious beliefs. His most grievous error is found in the fact that he has presented generalizations concerning the origins of religious life without including all of the facts that are available. He has made "half the truth stand for the whole truth."

B. Arguments for Rejection of Belief in God.

Freud has not only expressed himself on topics which fall within the realm of the psychology of religion. He rejects the belief in God. This part of his work falls within the realm of the philosophy of religion. In this section we shall set forth the reasons he gives for the rejection of belief in God. Inasmuch as the subject of the validity of belief in God is perhaps the most basic problem in Freud's view of religion, we shall deal with it specifically from a critical standpoint in Chapter VII. We shall there be in a better position to look at this basic issue as it stands in relation to his view of religious beliefs taken as a whole. At this point, we shall set forth a brief summary of the reasons he gives for rejection of belief in God.

Freud's arguments for the rejection of belief in God fall into two groups: those which he takes over from the general knowledge of science, and those which, although they have been intimated if not fully expressed by others, are more

particularly his own reflections and arguments. The first group are not dealt with in detail. He assumes that such knowledge is the common stock of everyone and, hence, is not concerned with its elaboration. The first argument in this group is that science has shown the impossibility of miracles.[40] Freud infers that this conclusion of science argues against the existence of God. As a second argument, Freud states that the religious idea of creation of the universe by God has been rejected.

> Its (the religious) account of the nature of the universe had to be rejected, because it showed evidence of a lack of knowledge which bore the stamp of earlier days, and because, owing to increasing familiarity with the laws of nature, it had lost its authority. The idea that the universe came into being through an act of generation or creation, analogous to that which produces an individual human being, no longer seems to be the most obvious and self-evident hypothesis.[41]

The inference here is that since the universe is not believed to be created by God, that there is less ground for religious belief. The third argument Freud cites is very vague and indefinite. It concerns conclusions arrived at through the study of comparative religions.

> Besides this, one must not overlook the influence of the comparative study of different religious systems, and the impression they give of mutual exclusiveness and intolerance.[42]

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40 NILP, 227.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid., 228.

The inference, here, is that since there are so many different religions with different ideas about the divine, and since each one claims to have the truth, that it is most likely that no religion has the truth.[43]

The second group of arguments are much more definite. They are dealt with in greater detail. In considering his own case against religion, we are able to single out six different arguments. First, he states that belief in God should be rejected because it has no authentic ground for acceptance.[44] He states that knowledge about God is gained either through revelation or through tradition. He takes it for granted that people no longer believe in revelation and that our knowledge gained through tradition comes to us from our forefathers who lived in an age of uncritical, unscientific thought. The traditional proofs for the existence of God are considered untrustworthy.[45] The argument states that there is no objective evidence for belief in God, that the belief in God has arisen out of subjective needs.

> Diese, die sich als Lehrsätze ausgeben, sind nicht Niederschläge der Erfahrung oder Endresultate des Denkens, es sind „Illusionen, Erfüllungen der Ältesten, stärksten, dringendsten Wünsche der Menschheit; das Geheimnis ihrer Stärke ist die Stärke dieser Wünsche. [46]

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43 Ibid., 229.
44 ZEI, 47.
45 Ibid., 40.
46 Ibid., 47.

He concludes that religious belief in God is illusory. All of his other arguments are developments of this basic thesis.

A second argument is that there is no evidence of a protecting power in the universe.

> It seems not to be true that there is a power in the universe, which watches over the well-being of every individual with parental care and brings all his concerns to a happy ending. [47]

A third argument is that there is no evidence of moral order and justice in the universe.

> The destinies of man are incompatible with a... universal principle of justice. Earthquakes, floods, and fires do not differentiate between the good and devout man, and the sinner and unbeliever... Dark, unfeeling and unloving powers determine human destiny; the system of rewards and punishments, which according to religion, governs the world, seems to have no existence. [48]

A fourth argument advances the thesis that belief in God is not necessary for moral living. One can live the moral life without belief in God.

> Es eine grössere Gefahr für die Kultur bedeutet, wenn man ihr gegenwärtiges Verhältnis zur Religion aufrecht hält, als wenn man es löst. [49]

A fifth argument is pragmatic in emphasis. It asserts that religion with its belief in God has had a chance. Since it has failed to make man happy, it deserves to be discarded.

> Es hatte Zeit zu zeigen, was sie leisten kann. Wenn es ihr gelungen wäre, die Mehrzahl der

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47 NILP, 228.
48 Ibid.
49 ZEI, 56.

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47 MILT, 229.
48 Ibid.
49 PFI, 56.

> Menschen zu beglücken, zu trösten, mit dem Leben auszusöhnen, sie zu Kulturträgern zu machen, so würde es niemand einfallen, nach einer Änderung der bestehenden Verhältnisse zu streben. [50]

Such an argument as this has so many fallacies that one is tempted to criticise it immediately. We shall do well, however, to gain a picture of the whole of Freud's view of religion before we go off on a tangent by taking too seriously points which might become trivial when seen in the light of all related facts.

The sixth argument is one which Freud believes is a direct outgrowth of the findings of psycho-analysis. It states that the experience of God or the belief in God does not come from a divine origin, but is traced to the 'projection' of childhood attitudes out onto the cosmos.[51]

> The last contribution to the criticism of the religious Weltanschauung has been made by psycho-analysis, which has traced the origin of religion to the helplessness of childhood, and its content to the persistence of the wishes and needs of childhood into maturity.[52]

Freud's arguments center, for the most part, around the view that the belief in God arises out of subjective needs which find their fulfillment in the reviving of the childhood 'parent-imago,' that since the belief in God cannot be substantiated by evidence taken from the objective world of

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50 Ibid., 60.
51 NILP, 229.
52 Ibid.

nature, it must be regarded as an illusion. We shall bear in mind this general statement concerning his view of belief in God as we consider the related problems of morality, guilt, salvation, immortality, and of world-view, and shall in our closing chapter subject it to critical examination.

CHAPTER THREE

MORALITY

A. Childhood Situation.

The problem of the moral nature of man is one which Freud and other psycho-analysts have sought to investigate and concerning which they have written widely. In the analysis of individuals suffering from neurotic symptoms and from mental breakdowns, it was discovered that the conscience and moral sensitivity of such individuals played no small part in giving rise to the conflicts which precipitated the symptoms and breakdowns.[1] In order to understand the nature and causes of mental disorders, it was necessary to give an account of conscience--its origin, development, demands, and function.

In his early writings, Freud emphasized the doctrine that the individual's conscience and moral feelings found their nucleus in the 'Oedipus-complex.'

> The Oedipus-complex proves itself to be the origin of morality in each one of us.[2]

The 'Oedipus-complex' was thought to have two aspects. On the one hand, there was the bond of love which existed between the child and the parent of the opposite sex. It was contended that by virtue of their differences, the boy was natur-

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1 Alexander, PTP, vi f.
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1 Alexander, FPP, vi f.
2 "The Economic Problem in Masochism," OP, II, 264.

ally drawn towards his mother and the girl towards her father. On the other hand, the child entertained different feelings towards the parent of the same sex. Especially was this thought to be true in the case of the son, where the son's relationship with his father was characterized more by feelings of awe and fear. The son was thought to have a greater moral sensitivity than the daughter. According to Freud, the growing son's moral feelings are centered more about the father than about the mother. The father's 'ego,' that is, the ends for which he stands and the principles and codes by which he lives and by which he has taught his son to live become incorporated within the personality of the son. The 'ego' of the father, as seen through the eyes of the son, becomes the 'super-ego' of the son.[3] The 'super-ego' is thought to be the moral agency within the personality.[4]

The 'super-ego' finds its main task in curbing anti-social impulses. It is the inner policeman, the inner judge within the personality. External authority and restraint is introcepted. The character of an individual may be thought of in similar terms as the 'super-ego' in the sense that it accomplishes the end of restraint and unwholesome impulses and anti-social behavior. When character is conceived of as

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3 Cf. Chapter One, 71-78.
4 "Character Types in Psycho-Analytic Research," CP, IV, 343.

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the habitual 'unconscious' inhibition of impulses, the two terms represent almost the same thing. The main difference is found in their origins; whereas the 'unconscious' inhibition of impulses may be the result of one's own repeated efforts at restraint which have passed into habit, the 'super-ego' is thought of more in terms of restraints made by others.

The 'super-ego' becomes the recipient of moral training given by parents, teachers, preachers, and others, who exercise a moral influence upon the growing individual. Anna Freud, Freud's own daughter, who has specialized in the analysis of children, gives the following statement which is a characteristic Freudian statement of how the 'super-ego' is formed within the child.

> Among psycho-analysts there exists no doubt as to the origin of the inner voice, or conscience, as it is generally designated. It is the continuation of the voice of the parents which is now operative from within, instead of, as formerly, from without. The child has absorbed, as it were, a part of his father or mother, or rather the orders and prohibitions which he has constantly received from them, and made these an essential part of his being. In the course of growth this intensified parental part of him assumes ever more and more the role of the parents in the material world, demanding and forbidding certain things. The child gives to this part of his being which has come originally from without a very special place of honor in his own ego, regards it as an ideal, and is prepared to submit to it, often indeed more slavishly, than in his younger days he had submitted to his parents. The poor ego of the child must henceforth strive to

> fulfill the demands of this ideal--the "super-ego," as psycho-analysis names it.[5]

B. Origin of Taboos and Social Codes.

In Totem and Tabu, Freud was interested in pointing out similarities between the lives of neurotic patients and the lives of primitive men.[6] One central problem with which he deals is the comparison of cases of compulsion neurosis and primitive taboos.

> Die nächste und auffälligste Übereinstimmung der Zwangsverbote (bei den Nervösen) mit dem Tabu besteht nun darin, dass diese Verbote ebenso unmotiviert und in Herkunft rätselhaft sind. Sie sind irgend einmal aufgetreten und müssen nun infolge einer unbezwingbaren Angst gehalten werden. Eine äussere Strafandrohung ist überflüssig, weil eine innere Sicherheit (ein Gewissen) besteht, die Übertretung werde zu einem unerträglichen Unheil führen.[7]

Freud suggests that the two phenomena are so similar that a compulsion neurosis might be called a taboo disease.[8]

Freud then proceeds to point out how the same things or acts are tabooed. In analyzing the compulsive neurotic, he finds that the root of his compulsion lies in a fear of the father as an outgrowth of a desire to possess his mother. His compulsive actions are attempts to disown the mother and to gain the approval of the father. In the case of the primitive man, the taboos are primarily of two types: taboo of

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5 PTP, 85.
6 Subtitle: Einige Übereinstimmungen im Seelenleben der Wilden und der Neurotiker.
7 Ibid., 25.
8 Ibid., 27.

incest and taboo of killing the totem animal. Freud points out that the totem animal is a substitute for the father.[9] So the taboos in each case find correspondence, namely, the mother must not be possessed and the father must not be killed. Freud then goes a step further and imagines the existence of a 'primal horde' or clan in which an attempt was made to remove the father and to possess the females of the tribe. He imagines that the taboos against killing the totem animal, the substitute of the father, and against incest, were guilt reactions that grew out of this early experience. He states that the social prohibitions that are passed down from generation to generation which prohibit incest and the killing of the totem animal, which later developed into prohibition of parricide and fratricide, find their origin in this early episode.

> Wir haben die ersten Moralvorschriften und sittlichen Beschränkungen der primitiven Gesellschaft als Reaktion auf eine Tat aufgefasst, welche ihren Urhebern den Begriff des Verbrechens gab. Sie bereuten diese Tat und beschlossen, dass sie nicht mehr wiederholt werden solle, und dass ihre Ausführung keinen Gewinn gebracht haben dürfe.[10]

The thesis that Freud advances here is in keeping with his main view, namely, that morality finds its origin in guilt feelings associated with the 'Oedipus-complex.'[11]

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9 Ibid., 122
10 Ibid., 147.
11 "The Economic Problem in Masochism," CP, II, 264.

> Mankind as a whole has, at the beginning of its history, come by its consciousness of guilt, the final source of religion and morality, through the Oedipus-complex.[12]

We are tempted to pause here and point out the inadequacies of this theory. But before we criticise his view of morality, we had better consider all relevant material that he has written on the subject, material concerning the relationship of morality and civilization, of morality and nervousness, and of morality and religion. We had better consider these first, and then we shall criticise his theory of the origin of morality.

C. Morality and Neurosis.

In his early writings[13] as well as in his recent book Das Unbehagen in der Kultur, Freud contends that one of the major causes of mental disorder is to be found in the privations which society places on its members. Freud, in his early investigations, found that neurotic symptoms were substitute expressions provided for 'repressed' impulses, specifically sexual impulses.[14] Inasmuch as the major incentives for 'repression' came from restrictions imposed by society and by moral restrictions accepted by the 'ego,' Freud came to the

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12 GIP, 287.
13 "'Civilized' Sexual Morality and Modern Nervousness, CP, II, VII; "Sexuality in the Aetiology of the Neuroses," CP, I, XI.
14 "Sexuality in the Aetiology of Neuroses," CP, I.

conclusion that morality was one of the major causes of neuroses.

In his early works, he presented the conclusion that when the 'repressed' impulse was brought into consciousness, it was usually found to be sexual in nature. He originally held that it was the curbing of the 'sex instinct' that was the immediate cause of nervous disorder.

> Sexual morality promotes modern nervousness, which under our present social conditions is rapidly spreading.[15]

> If one passes over the less definite forms of 'nervousness' and considers the actual forms of nervous disease, the injurious influence of culture reduces itself in all essentials to the undue suppression of the sexual life in civilized people (or classes) as a result of the 'civilized' sexual morality which prevails among them.[16]

He suggests that "we may thus well raise the question whether our 'civilized' sexual morality is worth the sacrifice which it imposes upon us."[17] He states that it is not the physician's business to introduce reforms, but that he "could support the urgency of such reform."[18]

While Freud laid a great deal of emphasis upon the conflict between morality and mental health in the early history of the psycho-analytic movement, his article "'Civilized'

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15 "'Civilized' Sexual Morality and Modern Nervousness," CP, II, 77.
16 Ibid., 80.
17 Ibid., 99.
18 Ibid.

Sexual Morality and Modern Nervousness" appearing in 1908, it is apparent by his more recent publication, Das Unbehagen in der Kultur, published in 1930, that he still sees conflict at this point. In this recent publication, he writes:

> Einen grossen Teil der Schuld an unserem Elend trage unsere sogenannte Kultur; wir wären viel glücklicher, wenn wir sie aufgeben und in primitive Verhältnisse zurückfinden würden. [19]

We are tempted to ask "But can we return to primitive conditions?" But we must reserve our remarks until later.

D. Morality and Civilization.

Freud's attitude toward civilization is ambivalent, to use a term which is commonly employed in psycho-analytic literature. He shifts from an attitude of hostility to an attitude of support. On the one hand, he states that civilization makes too heavy demands upon individuals. It makes momentous restrictions on the basic impulses of the individual. It not only deprives man of happiness but also of health. Life in primitive society is to be preferred to life in civilized society. On the other hand, Freud sees social conflict and destruction ahead. He sees the necessity of further curbing and control of 'aggressive impulses.' He has written:

> Wenn man es nur Zustande bringt, die kulturfeindliche Mehrheit von heute zu einer Minderheit herabzudrücken, hat man sehr viel erreicht, vielleicht alles, was sich erreichen lässt. [20]

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19 Ibid., 41.
20 ZEI, 12.

Thus, Freud expresses an ambivalent or inconsistent attitude towards civilization.

Freud uses the term 'civilization' synonimously with the term 'culture' and means by either of these terms the sum-total of the social differences between man and beast:

> Die menschliche Kultur--ich meine all das, worin sich das menschliche Leben über seine animalischen Bedingungen erhoben hat und worin es sich vom Leben der Tiere unterscheidet--und ich verschmähe es, Kultur und Zivilization zu trennen. [21]

Civilization is seen to have two distinct values; first, it enables man to master the forces of nature and win resources from her for the satisfaction of human needs;[22] and secondly, it makes communal existence possible.[23]

Freud's major thesis, with regard to civilization, is that civilization is built upon the instinctual privations and sublimations of individuals. We have already touched upon this conclusion in dealing with the above topic where we considered Freud's theory that neurosis is often the result of social restriction of impulses. In that connection, we were concerned primarily with the influence of morality upon the individual. At this point, we are interested in the problem of moral restrictions as it bears upon the process of building up culture and civilization. We are bringing to the fore

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21 ZEI, 6.
22 Ibid., 9.
23 Ibid.

Freud's thesis that culture and civilization is developed according to the degree of instinctual privation or 'sublimation.'

> Diese "Kulturversagung" beherrscht das grosse Gebiet der socialen Beziehungen der Menschen.[24]

> Our civilization is, generally speaking, founded on the suppression of instincts. Each individual has contributed some renunciation.[25]

He states that the energy which keeps social institutions and cultural movements in existence is derived from basic impulses.

> Dass die Kultur dabei dem Zwang der ökonomischen Notwendigkeit folgt, da sie der Sexualität einen grossen Betrag der psychischen Energie entziehen muss, die sie selbst verbraucht. Dabei benimmt sich die Kultur gegen die Sexualität wie ein Volksstamm oder eine Schichte der Bevölkerung, die eine andere ihrer Ausbeutung unterworfen hat.[26]

The building of cultural values upon energy derived from a redirection of instincts is a process known by the now familiar process of 'sublimation.'

> Die Triebsublimierung ist ein besonders hervorstechender Zug der Kulturentwicklung, sie macht möglich, dass höhere psychische Tätigkeiten, wissenschaftliche, künstlerische, ideologische, eine so bedeutsame Rolle im Kulturleben spielen.[27]

The poets, the artists, the philosophers, have made successful 'subliminations,' that is, they have achieved social ends,

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24 DUK
25 "Sexual Morality and Nervousness," CP, II, 82
26 DUK, 69.
27 Ibid., 59.

neurotic patients have failed in their attempts at 'sublimation.'

> We cannot get away from the impression that patients are making, in an asocial manner, the same attempts at a solution of their conflicts and an appeasement of their urgent desires which, when carried out in a manner a acceptable to a large number of persons, are called poetry, religion and philosophy.[28]

The motive for 'sublimation,' according to Freud, changes in the course of the development of the individual, from outer coercion to an inner compulsion or desire.

> Civilization is based upon the renunciation of impulse gratification and in turn demands the same renunciation of impulses from every newcomer. During the individual's life a constant change takes place from outer to inner compulsion. [29]

This process of internalization of the commands of culture has been noted before in connection with the subject of the development of the 'super-ego.'

> Es liegt in der Richtung unserer Entwicklung, dass äusserer Zwang allmählich verinnerlicht wird, indem eine besondere seelische Instanz, das Über-Ich des Menschen, ihn unter seine Gebote aufnimmt. Jedes Kind führt uns den Vorgang einer solchen Umwandlung vor, wird erst durch sie moralisch und sozial. Diese Erstarkung des Über-Ichs ist ein höchst wertvoller psychologischer Kulturbesitz. Die Personen, bei denen sie sich vollzogen hat, werden aus Kulturgegnern zu Kulturträgern. Je grösser ihre Anzahl in einem Kulturkreis ist, desto gesicherter ist diese Kultur, desto eher kann sie der äusseren Zwangsmittel entbehren. [30]

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28 Freud in Preface to Reik, RPS, 7.
29 RWD, 22.
30 ZEI, 15.

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28 Freud in Preface to Reik, PEP, 7.
29 IBID, 22.
30 ZEIT, 15.

The extent to which cultural rules have been internalized constitutes the moral level of the members.[31]

The relationship, thus, for Freud, between morality and civilization is best understood through his concept of the 'super-ego.' For Freud, the 'super-ego' is the moral spokesman within the personality. Insofar as the 'super-ego' has been developed to take over the codes and mores of the group, the individual gives his moral support to civilization and cultural adherence. But Freud goes further and attempts to identify morality with the codes and mores of society. In this regard he speaks of the group as having a 'super-ego.'

> Man darf nämlich behaupten, dass auch die Gemeinschaft ein Über-Ich ausbildet, unter dessen Einfluss sich die Kulturentwicklung vollzieht... Das Über-Ich einer Kulturespoche hat einen ähnlichen Ursprung wie das des Einzelmenschen, es ruht auf dem Eindruck, den grosse Führerpersönlichkeiten hinterlassen haben, Menschen von überwältigender Geisteskraft oder solche, in denen eine der menschlichen Strebungen die stärkste und reinste, darum oft auch einseitigste, Ausbildung gefunden hat.[32]

While morality is usually distinguished from social codes, laws, customs, etc., on the basis that morality is internal while codes and laws are more external, Freud tends to identify the two. He speaks of morality and civilization as being synonymous. We must criticise his concept of morality. We shall speak more about this point later.

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31 Ibid., 17.
32 DUK., 129.

In his later writings, especially in Das Unbehagen in der Kultur, Freud deals with the problem of 'aggressive impulses' and civilization. Whereas in his earlier writings Freud found a marked conflict between the demands of civilization and the demands of the 'sexual instinct,' in his more recent writings, he is finding a more marked conflict between the 'aggressive impulses' and civilization.

> Für alles Weitere stelle ich mich also auf den Standpunkt, dass die Aggressionsneigung eine ursprüngliche, selbständige Triebanlage des Menschen ist und komme darauf zurück, dass die Kultur ihr stärkstes Hindernis in ihr findet. [33]

The 'aggressive instinct' leads to social conflict and upheaval. Freud sees the need of greatly curbing, restricting and redirecting this destructive impulse.

> Die Existenz dieser Aggressionsneigung, die wir bei uns selbst verspüren können, beim anderen mit Recht voraussetzen, ist das Moment, das unser Verhältnis zum Nächsten stört und die Kultur zu ihrem Aufwand nötigt. Infolge dieser primären Feindseligkeit der Menschen für einander ist die Kulturgesellschaft beständig vom Zerfall bedroht. Das Interesse der Arbeitsgemeinschaft sind stärker als vernünftige Interessen. Die Kultur muss alles aufbieten, um den Aggressionstrieben der Menschen Schranken zu setzen, ihre Äusserungen durch psychische Reaktionsbildungen niederzuhalten. [34]

In order to protect and perpetuate cultural organizations and institutions, a moral barrier must be erected to prevent the

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33 Ibid., 96.
34 Ibid., 81.

expression of this anti-social impulse. This, Freud states, is the primary function of morality and ethics in our day.

> Die Ethik ist also als ein therapeutischer Versuch aufzufassen, als Bemühung, durch ein Gebot des Über-Ichs zu erreichen, was bisher durch sonstige Kulturarbeit nicht zu erreichen war. Wir wissen bereits, es fragt sich hier darum, wie das grösste Hindernis der Kultur, die konstitutionelle Neigung der Menschen zur Aggression gegen einander, wegzuräumen ist, und gerade darum wird uns das wahrscheinlich jüngste der kulturellen Über-Ich-Gebote besonders interessant, das Gebot: Liebe deinen Nächsten wie dich selbst. [35]

The best means, according to Freud, of handling the 'aggressive impulse,' that is, handling the 'aggressive impulse' from the point of view of value to culture, is through an internalization of this impulse. Instead of having the impulse freely expressed in destructive pursuits in social relationships, the impulse is lined up with the individual's conscience or 'super-ego.' Here it becomes an inner policeman and watchman whose force and energy is identified with socially accepted ends.

> Welcher Mittel bedient sich die Kultur, um die ihr entgegenstehende Aggression zu hemmen, unschädlich zu machen, vielleicht auszuschalten?... Die Aggression wird introjiziert, verinnerlicht, eigentlich aber dorthin zurückgeschickt, woher sie gekommen ist, also gegen das eigene Ich gewendet. Dort wird sie von einem Anteil des Ichs übernommen, das sich als Über-Ich dem übrigen entgegenstellt, und nun als "Gewissen" gegen das Ich dieselbe strenge Aggressionsbereitschaft ausübt, die das Ich gerne an anderen fremden Individuen befriedigt hätte. Die Spannung

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35 Ibid., 131.

> zwischen dem gestrengen Über-Ich und dem ihm unterworfenen Ich heissen wir Schuldbewusstsein; sie äussert sich als Strafbedürfnis. Die Kultur bewältigt also die gefährliche Aggressionslust des Individuums, indem sie es schwächt, entwaffnet und durch eine Besatzung in der eroberten Stadt überwachen lässt. [36]

Freud contends, however, that mankind has not yet reached such a level of moral development. It is for this reason that he believes that we are always in immediate danger of war in our present society. [37]

In general, Freud's social outlook is not hopeful. On the one hand he finds little happiness in our present society, and, on the other hand, he fears that civilization is not potent enough to prevent the group expression of 'aggressive impulses' which will mean certain destruction. Freud is a social pessimist.

E. Morality and Religion.

Freud's view of the relation of morality and religion has already been touched upon in the discussion of the origin of belief in God.[38] In that connection, it was pointed out that belief in God arose, partly, out of the need for moral support and moral sanction. In that connection, we were viewing morality from the standpoint of belief in God. Here, we are viewing the belief in God from the standpoint of morality.

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36 Ibid., 100.
37 RWD, 70; WW, 47.
38 Cf. 107-109.

The first point to be noted is Freud's view that morality and religion, with its belief in God, are usually united.

> Göttliche Aufgabe wird es nun, die Mängel und Schäden der Kultur auszugleichen, die Leiden in Acht zu nehmen, die Menschen im Zusammenleben einander zufügen, über die Ausführung der Kulturvorschriften zu wachen, die Menschen so schlecht befolgen. Den Kulturvorschriften selbst wird göttlicher Ursprung zugesprochen, sie werden über die menschliche Gesellschaft hinausgehoben, auf Natur und Weltgeschehen ausgedehnt. [39]

They are seen to be united, because they have a common origin, namely, in the experience of the child with its parents, particularly its father.

> The religious programme, its ethical precepts, can also be related without any difficulty to the situation of childhood... The same father (the parental function) who gave the child his life and preserved it from the dangers which that life involves, also taught it what it may or may not do, made it accept certain limitations of its instinctual wishes, and told it what consideration it would be expected to show towards its parents and brothers and sisters, if it wanted to be tolerated and liked as a member of the family circle, and later on of more extensive groups. The child is brought up to know its social duties by means of a system of love-rewards and punishments, and in this way it is taught that its security in life depends on its parents loving it and being able to believe in its love for them. This whole state of affairs is carried over by the grown man unaltered into his religion. The prohibitions and commands of his parents live on in his breast as his moral conscience; God rules the world of men with the help of the same system of rewards and punishments. [40]

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39 ZEI, 27.
40 NILP, 224.

Thus, religion and morality are seen to be closely linked together. Both find their origin in a common situation.

Freud stated that as the individual grows up and sees the world as it is, he comes to see that the outer world does not always favor the first. Earthquakes destroy the just as well as the unjust. As a partial attempt to bridge this gap, he finds the need to believe in immortality. In the life after death, in the end, man believes that God will reward the good and punish the evil.[41]

In the expression of impulses and desires, religion gives the final sanction. It tends to lay down the conditions under which impulses may be expressed. Freud cites the rite of marriage in this connection.

> From another point of view a ceremonial represents the sum of all the conditions under which something not yet absolutely forbidden becomes permissible, just as the marriage ceremony of the Church signifies a sanction of sexual enjoyment, which is otherwise sinful. [42]

Freud, thus, shows that in the past religion and morality have been closely associated. Belief in God has served to buttress moral obedience, it has helped the individual to do what he has been taught as right and wrong, and it has helped to keep in check the masses. Freud would agree that the voice of conscience is the voice of God. But he contends

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41 ZEI, 28.
42 "Obsessive Acts and Religious Practices," CP, II, 32.

that the union of morality and religion is an unhappy one. Whereas in the past religion has served mankind in giving support to morality, it is now time to see the truth of the situation, namely, that there is no religious force, no divine being, who gives support to moral codes and principles. Moral principles should be seen in their true light as having human and not divine origins:

> ...wäre es ein unzweifelhafter Vorteil, Gott überhaupt aus dem Spiele zu lassen und ehrlich den rein menschlichen Ursprung aller kulturellen Einrichtungen und Vorschriften einzugestehen. [43]

He pleas "für eine rein rationelle Begründung der Kulturvorschriften, also für ihre Zurückführung auf soziale Notwendigkeit."[44] "Von den Gebildeten und geistigen Arbeitern ist für die Kultur wenig zu befürchten."[45] "Nun haben wir aber kein anderes Mittel zur Beherrschung unserer Triebhaftigkeit als unsere Intelligenz."[46] "Es ist wahrscheinlich an der Zeit... die Erfolge der Verdrängung durch die Ergebnisse der rationellen Geistesarbeit zu ersetzen."[47] "Es sich der Mühe lohnt, den Versuch einer irreligiösen Erziehung zu unternehmen."[48] Thus Freud presents his case that morality should be freed from religion and that it should be based on rational principles.

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43 ZEI, 67.
44 Ibid., 68.
45 Ibid., 63.
46 Ibid., 77.
47 Ibid., 72.
48 Ibid., 79.

Freud's view of morality is to be criticized on seven different grounds. First, he is not consistent in his use of the term morality. On the one hand, he uses the term to signify the internal prohibitions and restraints which operate within the personality of the individual. He speaks of the moral level of a society being determined by the extent to which the laws of society are internalized within the members of that society.[49] In this sense, the morality of the individual is to be determined by the restraints and prohibitions which are operative in his own life. On the other hand, he uses the term morality in connection with social laws and social codes. He speaks about "'civilized' sexual morality"[50] meaning by the use of the term in this connection the restraints and prohibitions that society places on the individual, restraints that are often resented by the individual. The meaning given to the term 'moral' in these two instances is not identical, in fact, the meanings are contradictory. In the first instance, that is moral which needs no coercion or imposition by society; in the second instance, that is moral which society imposes upon the individual. His use of the term 'moral,' thus, is not consistent.

Secondly, his view of morality as restraint and prohibition is very narrow. To be sure, restraint and prohibition

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49 Ibid., 17.
50 "'Civilized' Sexuality and Modern Nervousness," CP, II, VII.

play an important part in the moral life of an individual, but restraint and prohibition are functions which are part of a more inclusive process which more truly may be regarded as the moral process. This process is that of valuation. Certain instincts are restrained and prohibited because they are seen to be evil, to be detrimental to the life of the organism and the larger interests of the individual and the group of which he is a member. A negative value is placed on instincts of such a character and they are thus kept from direct expression. Morality not only leads to restraint; it leads to action. Duties must be performed. Ideal ends must be pursued. Certain impulses are seen to be of value and their expression is encouraged. To use Freud's own terminology and concept, the 'super-ego' not only takes over the prohibitions of the parents, teachers, ministers, etc., but also takes over their ideals and their goals. The moral life is not only one of controlling impulses but is also a life of the realization of ends that are held to be worthy. Thus, Freud's view of morality in terms of restrains and prohibitions is narrow and inadequate.

Thirdly, Freud's hostility to morality as related to civilization is unwarranted. We have stated that he has an ambivalent attitude towards civilization, condemning it on the one hand and promoting it on the other. Of these two atti-

tudes, the hostile attitude usually gains the supremacy. He even suggests the possibility of return to conditions of primitive society.[51] The return to primitive conditions is absolutely impossible in our thickly populated world. In addition, there are too many values to be gained by social contacts and cooperation. If problems arise in the area of social relationships, the right way of procedure is to understand the problems and seek to resolve them as far as possible. The solution is not to be found by way of escape or 'regression,' ways in which neurotic patients often seek to solve their problems. From another point of view, Freud's hostility to the institutions and laws of civilization is unwarranted. He has failed to see the 'immanent reason' back of these institutions and laws. Civilization has evolved through the centuries as the result of experiments, carried out more or less 'unconsciously' to be sure, in social living. Freud conceives the 'Oedipus-complex' conflict within the individual to be the major problem which the individual faces in the course of his development. The institution of exogamy and the law against murder are attempts-- whether they are best possible attempts or not is another question for investigation-- to solve this basic problem. To discard the lessons given one in his social heritage is to mock in the face of reason. Granted that many

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51 ZEI, 41.

of the customs of civilization are crude and inadequate solutions, the intelligent procedure is to take them for what truth and value they contain and to use them for suggesting better solutions. If there is conflict between the demands of civilization and the health and happiness of individuals, the conflict is to be resolved, not by way of escape nor by 'regression,' but by actively facing the issues involved.

Fourthly, Freud's view of the origin of social codes is untenable. As we have noted, he states that the institution of exogamy and the laws against murder find their origin in guilt feelings arising out of the 'primal deed.' We have already criticised Freud's theory of the 'primal horde' in connection with his theory of the origin of belief in God. We pointed out that the theory of the 'primal horde' had no historical justification in fact and also that it did not do justice to Freud's fundamental theories of the endo-psychic origin of beliefs. The same criticisms hold true for Freud's theory of the 'primal horde' as related to the origin of social codes and institutions. Rather than tracing the institution of exogamy and the law against murder to a particular event, it is more in keeping with Freud's fundamental views to suppose that social laws arose through a process of evolution out of the experience of generations of men as they struggled with their own social problems. To contend that

there was one particular primal horde in which there was the deed of removing the father and that the institution of exogamy and the laws against murder date back to this one particular event in history is using the imaginative faculty of the mind beyond the realm where fact and data are primary determinants of thought. Freud's theory of the origin of social institutions and laws in the 'primal horde,' thus, is not tenable.

Fifthly, Freud's more general theory of the origin of morality in the 'Oedipus-complex' is an over-simplification of one's moral development. To state that the individual's character is greatly influenced by the solution he finds to his 'Oedipus-complex' is to bring forth an important fact which has hitherto escaped special observation. But to contend that the moral character of the child dates back to the 'Oedipus-complex' is not an adequate description of the origin of character. Even if one defined morality from the narrow standpoint of restrictions and prohibitions, one must admit that the individual's character begins to be formed shortly after birth. Parents begin teaching the child what is right and what is wrong. The child begins to learn how to live peaceably with his brothers and sisters. The child begins to see for himself what desires and ends are valuable and begins to differentiate for himself between good and evil. There are many factors that enter into the development of the child's

character. Feelings of guilt arising out of the 'Oedipus-complex' play a momentous role in developing the conscience of the individual, but it plays only a role. Thus, Freud's view of the 'Oedipus-complex' as the origin of the individual's conscience and moral sensitivity is an over-simplified description.

Sixthly, Freud tends to over-emphasize the social determinants of an individual's character. The restrictions that are placed upon impulses are seen to originate in restrictions imposed by parents and by the group. The 'super-ego' is made the seat of morality within the individual, and the 'super-ego' is conceived as being determined by the standards, restrictions, and principles held by the people who are 'introjected' within the personality. These standards, restrictions and principles are then thought to function more or less 'unconsciously.' The individual's moral character, thus, is conceived of as being the result of social conditioning. The social factor does play an important role in the formation of character. Religious and moral educators recognize that the social environment in which a child is placed exercises marked influence on the type of character the child develops. But Freud has overlooked the part that the individual plays, not only in developing his own character but in exercising an influence on his social environments. The individual's

decisions which he makes in the light of all the influences of the social environment are more primary facts than the social influences themselves. Freud has nothing to say about "choices" or "moral responsibility." One's moral character is determined by his social environment. This is a one-sided emphasis and does not do justice to ethics which is the science of the moral life and which takes as its primary data the possible ends, the possible alternatives, the possible "choices" which the individual may make.[52] In addition, it does not do justice to the fact of history that the individual determines the moral level of the group as well as the group determines the moral level of the individual. Freud's view of morality, thus, is one-sided in that it over-emphasizes social influences in the development of moral character.

Lastly, Freud's view that religion is incompatible with rational morality is untenable. Belief in God is not identified with any particular set of social codes or moral principles. Social codes may be changed without necessitating changes in the belief in God or in necessitating the rejection of belief in God. The moral codes of Jesus were different in many points from those held by the Scribes and Pharisees, but Jesus claimed to worship the same God. Everett has defined religion as follows:

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52 Everett, MV, 7.

> Religion is the experience constituted by those thoughts, feelings, and actions which spring from man's sense of dependence upon the power or powers controlling the universe, and which have as their centre of interest the cosmic fortune of values.[53]

As one gains higher and higher conceptions of moral values, he may, if he is a religious man, come to feel that the powers controlling the universe are supporting those higher values. Belief in God, thus, is not necessarily opposed to a rational determination of moral values. Freud is erroneous in setting the one against the other.

As a general conclusion which gathers up most of what we have said in the above seven criticisms, we might advance the following statement. Using Freud's own terminology, we might say that his view of morality is faulty in that he has identified morality with the 'super-ego' while the true seat of morality is to be found in the 'ego.' Morality, for Freud, is synonymous with compulsion. The 'super-ego' is the 'unconscious-conscience' which compels the individual to act in a certain way or which automatically restricts the expression of certain impulses. The 'ego,' with its capacity for reason, is the true moral seat. The aim of the moral life is, in essence, the end of achieving the greatest values in life.[54] The moral life is determined, not so much by what the individual does

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53 Ibid., 383.
54 Ibid., 8.

'unconsciously' as by the ends, the goals, the values he is aiming to realize. The 'unconscious conscience' usually lags behind the 'conscious' realization of valued ends. The true seat of morality within the personality is to be found, not in the 'super-ego,' but in the 'ego.'

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CHAPTER FOUR

GUILT

The problem of guilt is a central problem for both the representatives of religion and psycho-analysts. No matter what has been their metaphysical outlooks, most religions have had the common, practical end of "saving" men from evil, sin and guilt.[1] Psycho-analysis, in attempting to relieve their patients of neurotic symptoms, find one of their major tasks in bringing about a release of guilt tensions within the personality. Rank has gone so far as to speak of the "neuroses as a guilt problem."[2] Freud states that the most fruitful field for present day psycho-analytic investigation is the problem of guilt:

> The problems raised by the unconscious sense of guilt, its relation to morality, education, criminality and delinquency, is at the present moment the favorite field of investigation for psycho-analysts.[3]

We are not specifically concerned with the relation of guilt to crime and delinquency. Our primary concern is with what Freud has to say about the relation of the sense of guilt to religious beliefs and practices. We are, however, indirectly concerned with the relation of guilt to crime and delinquency

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1 Menzies, HOR, 11.
2 "Beyond Psycho-analysis," Psycho-analytic Review, XVI,11.
3 NILP, 151.

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1 Menzies, NOR, 11.
2 "Beyond Psycho-analysis," Psycho-analytic Review, XVI, 11.
3 NIP, 181.

and also to neurotic disorders, since religious leaders, like Jesus, have concerned themselves with redeeming such 'lost' and 'demon possessed' souls as the delinquent and the neurotic.

In our study of Freud's view of the problem of guilt, we shall consider first, his analysis of the sense of guilt; secondly, his observations concerning the manifestations of guilt in the neurotic and in the delinquent; thirdly, his observations and theories concerning the manifestations of guilt in religious beliefs and practices; lastly, we shall outline Freud's therapeutic method of relieving guilt tensions.

Before taking up these topics, it will be well for us to present a preliminary definition of what Freud means when he uses the term 'guilt.' When Freud uses this term, he has reference to an inner sense of self-condemnation. He does not use the term in a social or legal sense of 'being guilty.' A man may be guilty of a crime, and yet he may not have a sense of guilt. Freud's work deals entirely with the inner, psychic state of feeling guilty.[4]

A. Analysis of Sense of Guilt.

1. Guilt and External Authority.

The first sense of guilt that the individual suffers occurs, according to Freud, not as the result of the criticisms

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4 "Psycho-Analysis in Courts of Law," CP, II, 23.

of conscience. It is felt before conscience is formed within the individual. The first feelings of guilt that the individual senses is associated with persons in authority. A child, who has previously been told that the execution of a particular act was wrong, may perform the forbidden act. If the parents are not there at the time, the child may not feel guilty about his act. If the parents are present, however, the child will probably feel guilty. In this early stage, the sense of guilt is a tension resulting from social disapproval.

> Vom Schuldbewusstsein muss man zugeben, dass es früher besteht als das Über-Ich, also auch als das Gewissen. Es ist dann der unmittelbare Ausdruck der Angst vor der äusseren Autorität, die Anerkennung der Spannung zwischen dem Ich und dieser letzteren. [5]

2. Guilt and Internal Authority.

A second level of guilt feelings is experienced when the individual feels guilty before his own conscience. He stands convicted before an inner authority. He has failed to measure up to recognized obligations. His own conscience humiliates and condemns him.

We have already considered, in a general way, the factors that are thought to play a part in the formation of conscience. We have stated that the external authority in the child's environment becomes incorporated within the personality of the

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5 DUK, 121.

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5 SUK, 121.

growing child. This incorporation results in the formation of the 'super-ego' of the child. What the child formerly experienced as an external authority is experienced in his more mature personality as an internal authority.

3. Guilt and 'Aggressive Impulses.'

The guilt problems of neurotics presented perplexing difficulties for Freud and other analysts. Freud discovered that there were deeper factors involved in the formation of conscience and the 'super-ego' than the incorporation of parental authority within the personality. He discovered that the conscience of an individual did not always depend upon the severity of parents. In fact, he discovered that loving parents often had children who had overly severe 'super-egos.'

> Der "übermässig weiche und nachsichtige" Vater wird beim Kinde Anlass zur Bildung eines überstrengen Über-Ichs werden. [6]

This discrepancy became accounted for on the basis of the 'aggressive impulses.'

> Ich bin überzeugt, wir werden viele Vorgänge einfacher und durchsichtiger darstellen können, wenn wir den Fund der Psychoanalyse zur Ableitung des Schuldgefühls auf die aggressiven Triebe einschränken. [7]

Freud concluded that it is the 'aggressive instincts' that are greatly restricted by the parents. When the wishes of the

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6 Ibid., 111.
7 Ibid., 124.

growing child. This incorporation results in the formation of the 'super-ego' of the child. What the child formerly experienced as an external authority is experienced in his more mature personality as an internal authority.

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6 Ibid., III.
7 Ibid., 129.

child become thwarted, his 'aggressive impulses,' his 'temper,' seeks expression. It is the parents who must curb these 'aggressive impulses.' The expressions of 'aggressive impulses' necessitate greater and greater restraint. The restraint keeps the impulses from being expressed and turns the impulse backwards into the personality. When the parental authority gradually becomes incorporated within the personality, the 'aggressive impulses' align themselves with the internal authority to form the 'super-ego.'

> Notgedrungen musste das Kind auf die Befriedung dieser rachsüchtigen Aggression verzichten. Es hilft sich aus dieser schwierigen ökonomischen Situation auf dem Wege bekannter Mechanismen, indem es diese unangreifbare Autorität durch Identifizierung in sich aufnimmt, die nun das Über-Ich wird und in den Besitz all der Aggression gerät, die man gern als Kind gegen sie ausgeübt hätte. Das Ich des Kindes muss sich mit der traurigen Rolle der so erniedrigten Autorität--des Vaters--begnügen... Das Gewissen sei im Anfang entstanden durch die Unterdrückung einer Aggression.[8]

According to Freud's later views, it is held that a person's sense of guilt is determined not so much by the parents themselves as by the individual's own 'aggressive impulses.' An individual does unto himself as he would do unto others. He projects his aggressive motives onto others against whom they are directed; he comes to feel that others are going to do him

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8 Ibid., 109, 110.

harm; he becomes afraid of them; he develops feelings of inferiority and guilt feelings towards them; he comes to align his 'aggressive impulses' with their 'aggressive impulses;' the result is that he judges and punishes his own self. The drama, according to Freud, is carried on within the personality itself, for the most part without the realization of the actual motives and processes involved.

The most characteristic emotion in the sense of guilt, according to Freud, is fear. The 'ego' fears the 'super-ego.' The 'super-ego'--the upholder of restraints, prohibitions, standards, accepted goals--has the support of the 'aggressive impulses' which are utilized in seeing that the standards are properly obeyed. A sense of guilt arises when these standards are not obeyed, when the 'ego' sides with the impulses of the 'id' instead of with the commands of the 'super-ego.' Such a state brings about the experience of "pangs of conscience" which is called by Freud "moral anxiety."[9] In a word, Freud's analysis of the sense of guilt shows it to arise from a tension between the 'ego' and the 'super-ego,' a tension in which the 'aggressive impulses' are aligned with the 'super-ego,' in the conflict of which the 'ego' stands condemned, humiliated and tormented.

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9 NILP, 119.

B. Neurotic Manifestations.

Guilt in a well adjusted person is, for the most part, consciously understood. An individual does wrong; he knows that he has done wrong; he has tried to face his guilt; he makes restituiton with those whom he has wronged or has made the inner adjustment if the wrong was committed against his own higher principles. Such guilt is consciously recognized and atoned for.

In neurotics, however, Freud points out that there is a sense of guilt which is not consciously understood or even consciously recognized. He calls this 'an unconscious sense of guilt.'[10] He recognizes that this terminology is incongruous; indeed, it is hard to imagine a 'sense' of which one is not conscious. However, if one sees the meaning which is placed in this terminology, the incongruity vanishes.

1. Self-Punishment.

The mosr common neurotic manifestation of guilt is that of self-punishment. For no adequate conscious reason a patient is lead to take a piece of glass or a razor to inflict injury upon himself. Many times patients have sudden urges come over them to take their lives. They find no intelligible reasons for such action. If their 'egos' are not strong, they

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10 NILP, 150

yield to the impulse. Freud states that this impulse for self-punishment and self-destruction comes from the 'super-ego.' Self-punishing and suicidal tendencies are often found to be the directing unto one's self of 'aggressive impulses' and 'death wishes' which were originally directed towards some unwanted person in the environment.[11] One cannot explain the actions of such patients on the basis of motives rationally entertained by the 'conscious' self. Freud advances the theory of 'an unconscious sense of guilt' as a suitable explanation. Throughout his book, Psycho-Analysis of the Total Personality, Franz Alexander develops Freud's hypothesis, namely, that the self-punishing activities of patients are to be accounted for on the basis of a severe 'super-ego' which gains appeasement by way of motivating suffering. Suffering often brings release from inner guilt tensions. A positive value is, thus, placed upon suffering, and where this is the case, it is exceedingly difficult to treat and cure a patient of his symptoms. The

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11 A concrete illustration of the part that 'aggressive impulses' play in causing self-punishing activities is that of Harold B., age 35, who has been a patient at the Worcester State Hospital since June, 1933. Immediately preceding his commitment, he jumped out of a second story window and shortly after jumped off from steps, head first, onto a cement sidewalk below, causing injury to his skull. In the hospital, he tried to put out his eyes, chewed glass, and sought to hang himself. Analysis of Harold B.'s personality and background revealed that he had previously entertained hostile wishes towards his three-year older brother who excelled him in the home, in school, in college, and in business pursuits.

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suffering is necessary to satisfy the 'need for punishment,' and hence the individual does not deeply wish to be freed from suffering. He lacks a will to recovery.[12]

2. Obsessions and Compulsions.

The term 'obsession' is usually used to denote compulsive thinking while the term 'compulsion' is used to denote compulsive activity. Freud does not differentiate specifically between these two terms, the basic fact being emphasized, namely, the compulsive character of both phenomena.

While Freud has come to look upon hysteria as an indirect manifestation of 'libidinal' or 'erotic impulses,' he has come to look upon obsessions and compulsions as a manifestation of 'unconscious guilt feelings' arising from the 'super-ego.' Meaning can be found in obsessive symptoms if they be interpreted in terms of attempts at atonement or purification.[13] The most common compulsive act is that of washing of hands. The individual comes to 'displace' his guilt onto his hands. He believes he is washing away his guilt when he washes his hands. For the most part, these motives operate beneath the threshold of consciousness. The individual is unable fully to account for his strange actions, and "if one prevents a patient from carrying out his washing ceremonial, he is thrown into an

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12 NILP, 150.
13 TT, 26.

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12 MILP, 130.
13 TT, 38.

intolerable state of anxiety."[14] The sense of guilt motivates the compulsive, ritual behavior which is so commonly found among neurotic patients.[15] The neurotic patients pursue their atoning and purification activities without fully realizing the origin of the guilt feelings for which they are seeking appeasement.

> One may say that a sufferer from compulsions and prohibitions behaves as if he were dominated by a sense of guilt, of which, however, he is ignorant.[16]

3. Paranoid 'Projection' of Guilt.

Paranoid 'projection' of guilt is a means of gaining release from inner guilt tensions by shifting the responsibility and blame upon others, by picking the mote out of another's eye when the beam is in one's own eye. The paranoid who 'projects' his guilt out onto others accuses others of what

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14 NILP, 117.

15 Howard H., who was a patient at the Rhode Island State Hospital during the summer of 1933 under self-commitment, was a clinical instance of a patient who was governed by uncontrollable ritual activity. Howard H. could not begin eating his meal until his plate, knife, fork and spoon were placed in a certain position. He could not go to bed at night until his clothes and shoes were arranged in a particular order. He washed his hands, face and neck--especially his neck--before and after every meal. During meal time, he could not speak with anyone. In entering a room, he had to pass through the door twice. An analysis of his personality revealed that he was atoning for hostile wishes entertained towards his mother who had stood in the way of his marriage. His acts were attempts to obey minutely the commands of the mother that were imposed upon him in early childhood.

16 "Obsessive Acts and Religious Practices," CP, II, 31.

he himself has intended to do or of what he himself has actually done.[17]

A more serious disorder of the sense of guilt is to be found in the beliefs of persecution held by paranoid patients. A paranoid patient may be convinced that others, particularly those in authority--the police, the government--are accusing him of committing certain deeds and are searching for him with the purpose of inflicting punishment upon him. An analysis of such patients shows that they are 'projecting' their own conscience or 'super-ego' out onto others. They refuse to face the accusations and persecutions of their own conscience, for such accusations and persecutions are more painful than those imposed by others. 'Projection' of the accusing agency not only saves the 'ego' from pain, but it gives to the 'ego' a

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17 Willard P, who was a patient in the Worcester State Hospital during the summer of 1934, found his difficulty in a 'projection' of guilt feelings. He was committed by his brother-in-law who stated that Willard had awakened him the previous night and told him that if he would repent of his sins he would be forgiven. Willard made both his brother-in-law and sister kneel down and say The Lord's Prayer. Willard stated: "I am God's mouthpiece." "God has spoken to me." When Willard was brought to the hospital, he went through the wards shouting that the day of judgment had come, that men should repent of their sins, and he was Christ sent from God. He stated: "This is the end of the world. You shall not doubt me. Other people may doubt me, but you shall not doubt me." An analysis of his personality revealed that he had deep-seated feelings of guilt concerning intercourse with the girl with whom he was engaged which feelings he 'projected' outward onto his brother-in-law and onto others.

sense of importance to think that it is the object of attention of high officials.

4. Crime from a Sense of Guilt.

Freud's theory of 'crime from a sense of guilt' is one of the most revolutionary theories which he has advanced and has far reaching implications that extend into the fields of juvenile delinquency and jurisprudence. Freud does not place all criminal acts in this category, stating that "among adult criminals one must probably except those who transgress without any sense of guilt."[18]

Freud states that often-times individuals undergo inner release upon the execution of some crime. He asserts that vague guilt feelings exist before the crime is committed, that the crime itself is an attempt to account for the guilt feelings.

> He suffered from an oppressive feeling of guilt, of which he did not know the origin, and after he had committed a misdeed the oppression was mitigated. The sense of guilt was at least in some way accounted for. Paradoxical as it may sound, I must maintain that the sense of guilt was present prior to the transgression, that it did not arise from this, but contrariwise--the transgression from the sense of guilt. These persons we might justifiably describe as criminals from a sense of guilt.[19]

The sense of guilt with its 'need for punishment' motivates the committing of the crime, the committing of the crime bringing the desired punishment and chastisement. Such are "crim-

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18 "Criminality from a Sense of Guilt," CP, 17, 343.
19 Ibid., 342.

inals from a sense of guilt."

In discussing neurotic manifestations of guilt, we have been dealing almost entirely with what Freud calls an 'unconscious sense of guilt.' In all four instances, the conscious individual was led to act and to think, compulsively, without fully recognizing the meaning of his acts and thoughts. The guilt was described as being 'unconscious.'

Freud's view concerning 'unconscious guilt' follows the same pattern concerning his view of 'repressed impulses.' Guilt feelings are painful to the 'ego.' The conscious self does not like to see itself in its lower aspects. It shuns criticism. It tries to avoid humiliation. Guilt feelings are disowned, pushed out of the conscious mind in the same way as are unwanted impulses. They are 'repressed.'[20] This brings us to a point in Freud's psychology which is often overlooked--namely, the conscience as well as instincts may be 'repressed.' 'Repressed' guilt feelings, like 'repressed' impulses, do not cease to exist when they are excluded from consciousness. They seek to express themselves in indirect methods, through 'projection,' through 'displacement,' through substitutionary means and often, as in the case of mental breakdown, in possession of the conscious mind, leading to severe punishment of the self which may result in death. Whereas Freud in his earlier writ-

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20 "Repression," CP, IV, 86.

ings came to look upon neuroses as the result of too severe 'repression' of the 'sexual instincts,' in his more recent writings he has come to regard the repression of the demands of conscience with its alignment with 'aggressive impulses' as one of the primary, if not the primary, problem in neuroses.[21] Instances of neurotic manifestations of guilt are ones in which the 'ego' refuses to face the tension that has arisen between itself and inner moral standards only to find later that the tension has arisen at a weaker point, in a less noticeable, less disagreeable area of life. It is the task of the analyst to trace these distorted, twisted guilt feelings back to their true sources, a task which involves intense pain and suffering to the patient.

C. Religious Manifestations of Guilt.

Religious guilt is usually called 'sin.' Sin is a state of tension between God and man in which man feels that he has disobeyed the will of God. Freud has not undertaken the task of giving a complete analysis of the sense of sin, but he has made comments concerning the relation of the sense of sin to the sense of guilt and concerning the similarity of religious means of dealing with guilt as compared to neurotic means of

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21 See Brill's "Preface" to Alexander, PTP, vi, for specific statement concerning Freud's views of the relations of the 'id,' 'ego' and 'super-ego' in the neuroses and psychoses.

dealing with guilt. He himself states that his work in the field of psychology of religion "began in 1907 with the establishment of a remarkable similarity between obsessive acts and religious practices or ritual."[22] His book, Totem und Tabu contains his most relevant remarks concerning sin and religious manifestations of guilt. We shall consider, first, his comparison of religious ritual and obsessive acts and then, secondly, we shall take up his comments concerning sin and guilt.

1. Obsessive Acts and Religious Practices.

Freud, in his early writings on the subject of the relationship between religious practices and obsessive acts, attempted to point out that the two phenomena were similar in one basic fact, namely, both were attempts to atone for, to do penance for, to gain redemption from, inner guilt tensions.

> The protestations of the pious that they know they are miserable sinners in their hearts correspond to the sense of guilt of the obsessional neurotic; while the pious observance (prayers, invocations, etc.) with which they begin every act of the day, and especially every unusual undertaking, seem to have the significance of defensive and protective measures.[23]
>
> It is easy to see wherein lies the resemblance between neurotic ceremonial and religious rites; it is in the fear of pangs of conscience after their omission, in the complete isolation of

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22 AAS, 306.
33 "Obsessive Acts and Religious Practices," CP, II, 31.

> them from all other activities, and in the conscientiousness with which the details are carried out.[24]

Freud asserts that in each case, the meaning is not fully understood. The worshipper usually has some idea about the meaning of the ritual, but the meaning is usually clothed in symbolic terms, the full comprehension of which only the priest and trained clergy are aware.[25]

On the basis of this similarity between obsessive acts and religious practices, Freud came to look upon "this neurosis as a private religious system, and religion as a universal obsessional neurosis."[26] If the individual blindly works out his 'unconscious' guilt feelings on an individual plane, he will likely develop some form of a mild obsessional neurosis. If the individual works out his 'unconscious' guilt feelings on a group and on a cosmic plane, he will save himself from individual, private neurotic symptoms:

> Der Frommgläubige in hohem Grade gegen die Gefahr gewisser neurotischer Erkrankungen geschützt ist; die Annahme der allgemeinen Neurose überhebt ihn der Aufgabe, eine persönliche Neurose auszubilden.[27]

The next step in Freud's development of his hypothesis is to be readily guessed. He states that as the private obsessional neurosis is to be overcome, so is the universal

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24 Ibid., 27.
25 Ibid., 30.
26 Ibid., 34. Detailed elaboration of this view of Freud's is to be found in Reik, RPS, 16ff.
27 ZEI, 71.

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24 Ibid., 27.
25 Ibid., 30.
26 Ibid., 24. Detailed elaboration of this view of Freud's is to be found in Reik, Ritus, 107f.
27 GWI, 71.

obsessional neurosis to be outgrown. He asserts that we are, in the present, in the process of this development.

> Nach dieser Auffassung wäre vorauszusehen, dass sich die Abwendung von der Religion mit der schicksalsmässigen Unerbittlichkeit eines Wachstumsvorganges vollziehen muss, und dass wir uns gerade jetzt mitten in dieser Entwicklungsphase befinden. [28]

Freud has included a great deal in his assertion that religion is an obsessional neurosis of humanity. He started out by stating that religious practices such as one finds in highly ritualized churches are similar to the obsessive acts of neurotics. In stating that "religion" is an obsessional neurosis, he has expanded the comparison beyond reason. While religious practices in the form of ritual are an essential part of religion, one cannot say that they constitute all there is associated under the term religion. There are beliefs about divine persons, beliefs of the nature of God, beliefs about immortality and numerous other beliefs that can hardly fall directly under the category of religious practices which have as their psychological aim the releasing of guilt tensions. Here again we find Freud subject to the fallacy of generalization. He has found one fact concerning religion and has made this one fact stand for all phenomena previously associated under the term religion. Freud has made a contribu-

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28 Ibid., 70, 71.

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tion to the psychology of religion by bringing to the focus of attention the fact that ritual and religious rites may be attempts to bring release from an inner sense of guilt. Even here he did not make a discovery, for all who partake in religious rites and ritual vaguely feel, if not overtly understand, that they are seeking for purification, for penance, for forgiveness, for absolution. He has merely given emphasis to the guilt basis of religious rites. By exploring this fact he has made a contribution to the psychology of religion. But Freud cannot be said to have presented a conclusive case that all religious beliefs and practices can be reduced to guilt feelings, that religious beliefs and practices can be completely understood in terms of obsessional neurosis, and that all religious beliefs and practices will be outgrown with the release from the sense of guilt. His assertion is subject to the fallacy of generalization and is, therefore, untenable.

2. Guilt and the 'Primal Deed.'

We have already had two occasions to refer to Freud's theory of the 'primal horde,' first in connection with the origin of belief in God[29] and second in connection with the origin of social and moral codes.[30] In considering his view of sin and guilt, we find occasion to refer to his theory of

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29 Cf, Chapter Two, 92f.
30 CF, Chapter Three, 120f.

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the 'primal horde' again.

a. Original Sin.

Freud traces the sense and the doctrine of original sin back to the 'primal deed.'

> Im christlichen Mythus ist die Erbsünde des Menschen unzweifelhaft eine Versündigung gegen Gottvater. Wenn nun Christus die Menschen von dem Druck der Erbsünde erlöst, indem er sein eigenes Leben opfert, so zwingt er uns zu dem Schluss, dass diese Sünde eine Mordtat war.[31]

The sense of original sin is passed down from generation to generation. Freud traces it back to this event in early history when the band of brothers rose up and slew the father.[32]

b. Guilt Basis of Social Laws.

Freud states that the laws against murder were evolved from guilt feelings associated with 'primal deed.'

> Nachdem sie ihn beseitigt, ihren Hass befriedigt und ihren Wunsch nach Identifizierung mit ihm durchgesetzt hatten, mussten sich die dabei überwältigten zärtlichen Regungen zur Geltung bringen. Es geschah in der Form der Reue, es entstand ein Schuldbewusstsein, welches hier mit der gemeinsam empfundenen Reue zusammenfällt. Der Tote wurde nun stärker, als der Lebende gewessen war; all dies, wie wir es noch heute an Menschenschicksalen sehen... Sie widerriefen ihre Tat, indem sie die Tötung des Vaterersatzes, des Totem, für unerlaubt erklärten, und verzichteten auf deren Früchte, indem sie sich die freigewordenen Frauen versagten. So schufen sie aus dem Schuldbewusstsein des Sohnes die beiden fundamentalen Tabu des Totemismus.[33]

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31 TT, 142.
32 See also RWD, 51; DUK, 112.
33 TT, 132; DUK, 112.

Freud gives as the summary of his book the conclusion that the sense of guilt is the source and origin of morality and religion.

> In a study of the origin of religion and morality of mankind which I published in 1913, under the title of Totem and Taboo, the idea was brought home to me that perhaps mankind as a whole has, at the beginning of its history, come by its consciousness of guilt, the final source of religion and morality, through the Oedipus-complex.[34]

Freud thus asserts that it is out of the guilt feelings connected with the primal crime that the institution of exagomy and the law against murder originated. He calls this the 'schöpferische Schuldbewusstsein.'[35] These laws not only originate, according to Freud, out of the sense of guilt, but they are perpetuated from generation to generation by a sense of guilt.

> Wir lassen vor allem das Schuldbewusstsein wegen einer Tat über viele Jahrtausende fortleben und in Generationen wirksam bleiben, welche von dieser Tat nichts wissen konnten.[36]

c. Totem Feast.

Freud states that the totem animal came to be regarded as a father-substitute. The animal was reverenced with all of the fear and awe that had previously been directed towards the head of the 'horde.' Killing or injuring the totem animal was taboo and was punishable by death.

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34 GIP, 287.
35 TT, 147.
36 TT, 145.

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34 OIP, 289.
35 TT, 147.
36 TT, 145.

There were seasons, however, when the tribe celebrated what was called a totem feast. The totem animal, which had been tabooed at all other times, was now taken, slain, and eaten by the members of the totem tribe. Freud describes the totem feast as "die Wiederholung und die Gedenkfeier dieser denkwürdigen verbrecherischen Tat."[37] During the time of the totem feast, the restraints and guilt feelings were put aside. There was a repetition of the early crime.

R. Money-Kyrle agrees with Freud that the totem feast was motivated by parricidal impulse. He disagrees with Freud, however, in that he states that there are no grounds for Freud's assertion that the crime was a direct repetition and commemoration of the 'primal deed.'

> Those who are acquainted with psycho-analysis cannot doubt that in some sense sacrifice is related to parricide. But the words repetition and commemoration used by Freud either give no adequate explanation of the motive for this repetition, or they imply a racial mind and the inheritance of acquired memory. This assumption is dangerous, since it is not supported by biology.[38]

Both agree that the totem feast is a setting aside of taboos and restrictions by the group as a whole. Repressed parricide impulses are given directed group expression. There is release of guilt tension which is carried out on a group plane.

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37 Ibid., 131.
38 MOS, 259.

d. Sacrificial Death of Christ.

Freud interprets the death of Christ in terms of atonement for the 'primal deed.'

> Darf man aus den Darstellungen der Stiertötungen durch Mithras schliessen, dass er jenen Sohn vorstellte, der die Opferung des Vaters allein vollzog und somit die Brüder von der sie drückenden Mitschuld an der Tat erlöste. Es gab einen anderen Weg zur Beschwichtigung dieses Schuldbewusstseins und diesen beschritt erst Christus. Er ging hin und opferte sein eigenes Leben und dadurch erlöste er die Brüderschar von der Erbsünde.[39]

With the redemption brought to mankind through his sacrificial death, Christ becomes venerated and deified and is placed beside the father. "Die Sohnersreligion löst die Vaterreligion ab."[40] Christ, rather than Jahve, becomes the central figure of the new religious movement. J. C. Flügel summarizes Freud's view of the death and deification of Christ in the following words:

> Christ dies: in the first place, as a scapegoat, taking upon himself the guilt of his brothers and hence becoming the saviour of mankind, who are by his sacrifice freed from the consequences of their equal guilt; secondly, as one who suffers the talion punishment for the original sin of the son towards the father, the guilt attaching to the death of the father being wiped out by the death of the son; thirdly, by this very sacrifice manifesting his divine nature and raising himself to a place alongside the father, thus ultimately pointing the way to a reconciliation between father and son.[41]

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39 TT, 141.
40 TT, 142.
41 PSF, 148.

d. Sacrificial Death of Christ.

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ment for the 'primal deed.'

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39 TT, 141.
40 TT, 143.
41 PSP, 142.

e. Communion.

Freud regards the Christian Communion as patterned after the early totem feast. The blood and the body are represented by the wine and the bread. The main difference is to be found in the fact that it is the Son and not the Father that is consumed.

> Wird die alte Totemmahlzeit als Kommunion wieder belebt, in welcher nun die Brüderschar vom Fleisch und Blut des Sohnes, nicht mehr des Vaters, geniesst, sich durch diesen Genuss heiligt und mit ihm identifiziert.[42]

The communion is identified with the totem feast, with animal sacrifice, and human sacrifice all of which are interpreted as re-enactions of the 'primal deed.'

> Die christliche Kommunion ist aber im Grunde eine neuerliche Beseitigung des Vaters, eine Wiederholung der zu sühnenden Tat. Wir merken, wie berechtigt der Satz von Frazer ist, dass "the Christian communion has absorbed within itself a sacrament which is doubtless far older than Christianity."

These remarks made by Freud with reference to his theory of the 'primal horde' deserve criticism and evaluation. We have already pointed out the weakness of Freud's 'primal horde' theory.[44] It has no basis in historic fact and it, as a hypothesis, is not the best possible one which might be used to cover the data which it is constructed to explain. Freud's

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42 TT, 142.
43 Ibid., 143.
44 Cf. Chapter Two, 97-101.

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43 TT, 142.
44 Ibid., 143.
44 Cf. Chapter Two, 97-101.

views about Christ and his death are in harmony with traditional Christian doctrines insofar as he looks upon Christ as an atonement for the sins of mankind. Traditional Christianity never adequately defined the nature of the sin or sins for which Christ died. In this respect, Freud is free to postulate what he conceives the sin or sins of mankind to be. As pointed out, he conceives the sin to be the 'primal deed,' the removal of the father of the 'primal horde.' Such a postulation must ever remain a postulation, since the data which are necessary for adequate verification are not available. His argument that the sin must have been murder does not necessarily hold, since many crimes of minor offenses were punishable by death according to the Hebrew law.[45] Concerning Freud's view of the Christian Communion, it must be said that he has stretched the point to make the Christian Communion a "repetition of the primal deed." He has compared the Christian Communion with the totem feast in which the totem animal, the representative of the father, is eaten and consumed by the tribe. In the Christian Communion, however, it is Christ who is the central figure. It is his body and his blood of which the worshippers partake. The Christian Communion, as far as its significance for Christian worshippers extends, is a memorial for Christ. "This do in remembrance of me."[46] The Christian Communion is

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45 Leviticus 20.
46 Luke 22:19.

Christ-centered and not God-centered. In this important respect, it differs from the older totem feasts and rites of sacrifice. While Freud's view concerning the 'primal deed' as the "original sin" which has haunted mankind and for which Christ was thought to have died, is a view which is hypothetical and highly speculative, Freud has described the central motive in the Christian interpretation of Christ's death, namely, that Christ died for the sin or sins of mankind, that he has since been looked upon as redeemer and saviour because he has brought release to the burden of guilt among worshippers. His view of the Christian Communion is faulty in that he has failed to appreciate the Christo-centric emphasis which is actually found in the Communion. The Communion is not a new setting aside of the father; it is a memorial of the sacrificial death of Christ.

D. Therapy of Guilt.

1. Freud's Method.

In discussing Freud's method of treating guilt, we had better state that he specializes in treating 'unconscious guilt.' Guilt that is 'consciously' felt and 'consciously' understood does not present a problem to him; the individual has the power within his own 'conscious' mind to make some adjustment. He uses his psycho-analytic method in treating 'unconscious guilt' that manifests itself in distorted form

in neurotic symptoms and activity.

Freud treats guilt problems in the same way as he treats all neurotic problems, that is, by way of treating the personality as a whole. This is done through the psycho-analytic method. The analysand brings out into the open feelings which he had never shared with anyone previously. In addition, he talks out feelings that he had never shared with his own self. It is with these latter feelings that the analysis performs its major function. It is exceedingly painful for the patient to see these feelings in himself. As the relationship with and the 'transference' on the analyst becomes stronger, the patient comes to 'project' these deeper feelings and motives out onto the analyst, who, in the meantime, has played a passive part. The analyst becomes a mirror in which the deeper aspects of the analysand's personality become progressively reflected. The patient, in the early part of the treatment, is not aware of the fact that he is ascribing to the analyst motives, impulses and threats which belong to his own deeper personality. Through free association, the guilt feelings, which had previously been distorted and which had found expression in circuitous ways, come to be associated with the tension that truly gave rise to the feelings. This process of gaining the right associations, of tracing distorted feelings to their true source, is a process

that requires considerable time and considerable insight. Many 'resistances' have to be overcome, and it is the overcoming of these 'resistances,' which serve for the most part as protectors of the 'ego,' that constitutes the most difficult task of the analysis.[47] The 'ego' does not want to see itself as it actually is, and has progressively built up 'resistances' against guilt feelings which tend to expose its true nature. As these 'resistances' are overcome, other and deeper feelings come out.

In tracing down guilt feelings, the analysis finds its work largely in dealing with the 'super-ego' and with the individual's 'aggressive impulses.' Freud states that guilt feelings arise mainly in the area of the son's relationship with his father. Freud finds 'projected death wishes' to be the deeper source of guilt feelings. In the progress of the analysis, this deeper source is uncovered. The patient regards the analyst as a father-substitute; he feels guilty in the presence of the analyst; he comes to accuse the analyst of trying to destroy his character, to injure him. Through further insight, he comes to see that after all the analyst has played a most passive part in the relationship, that he has no evil motives towards the patient, that he has not even set himself up as a judge. The patient sees that his guilt

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47 GIP, 248f.

feelings and back of them his 'aggressive impulses' have for the most part arisen within himself. With this insight into his own deeper personality, his guilt feelings vanish. He is placed in conscious control of his 'aggressive impulses,' and his 'super-ego' becomes a vestigial organ of the larger 'ego.' This is the goal and aim of psycho-analytic therapy.

> Our therapeutic aim is to strengthen the ego, to remove the corrupt super-ego and its punishment mechanism from the control of the instinctual life, and to bring the re-enforced ego into direct relation with the id, with the instinctual urges. We must raise the level of the entire personality in the direction of the conscious ego.[48]

> Analysis is finished when we have the pure Ego-Ideal without any traces of the Super-Ego.[49]

2. Comparison with Jesus' Method.

There are many striking similarities between Jesus' teachings concerning sin and guilt and the methods he used in relieving men of their guilt and Freud's teachings concerning guilt and the psycho-analytic method of relieving guilt tensions. In the first place, both look upon intentions as being of equal value with overt acts when it comes to the matter of guilt. The wish or the desire is equal to the act itself. Jesus expressed himself concerning this truth in the following familiar words:

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48 Alexander, PTP, 39.
49 Róheim, AMDK, 202.

> Ye have heard that it was said by them of old time, Thou shalt not commit adultery. But I say unto you, That whosoever looketh on a woman to lust after her hath committed adultery with her already in his heart.[50]

Freud is very specific at this point. He states that neurotic patients suffer not so much from what they have actually committed, but from what they had at one time wished to commit.

> Das Schuldbewusstsein der Neurotiker würde man ebenso schlecht verstehen, wenn man es auf reale Missetaten zurückführen wollte. Ein Zwangsneurotiker kann von einem Schuldbewusstsein gedrückt sein, das einem Massenmörder wohl anstünde; er wird sich dabei gegen seine Mitmenschen als der rücksichtsvollste und skrupulöseste Genosse benehmen und seit seiner Kindheit so Schuldgefühl begründet; es fusst auf den intensiven und häufigen Todeswünschen, die sich in ihm unbewusst Gedanken und nicht absichtliche Taten in Betracht kommen. [51]

Freud and Jesus differ in the point that Jesus did not specifically differentiate between 'conscious' and 'unconscious' intentions, while Freud does make this differentiation. The 'unconscious' intentions are regarded by Freud as even more vicious than the 'conscious' intentions, for they do not lend themselves to 'conscious' control. The essential point to note, however, is that both Freud and Jesus look upon the inner intention and wish as of equal value to the overt act when it comes to the matter of understanding the origin of guilt feeling.

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50 Matt. 5:27, 28.
51 TT, 80.

Secondly, both Freud and Jesus recognize the tendency for 'projection' of guilt. Jesus said:

> Judge not, that ye be not judged. For with what judgment ye judge, ye shall be judged; and with what measure ye mete, it shall be measured to you again. And why beholdest thou the mote that is in thy brother's eye, but considerest not the beam that is in thine own eye? Or how wilt thou say to thy brother, Let me pull out the mote out of thine eye; and, behold, a beam is in thine own eye? Thou hypocrite, first cast out the beam out of thine own eye; and then shalt thou see clearly to cast out the mote out of thy brother's eye.[52]

Jesus has described the process that Freud has termed 'projection.' An individual is keen to find the evil in others of which he himself is guilty. One imputes to others motives that he himself would like to realize. One cannot truly see another person as he is until he has thoroughly seen himself. Jesus' words that one should not judge others, that when he does judge others he is actually judging himself, is a truth upon which Freud has based the psycho-analytic method. By getting the patient to talk, to express his ideas and judgments upon other people, the analyst is able to get the patient to the point where he has revealed his own personality. The patient comes to see that in judging others, he has judged his own self. While Jesus has said "Judge not," and has said this

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52 Matthew 7:1-6.

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58 Matthew 7:1-6.

for the sake of sparing social tension, Freud has said "Judge," but he has the patient speak out his judgments in a controlled social situation where no harm can be done. Freud utilizes the very judgments to good advantage. Both Freud and Jesus, however, are agreed that there is a natural tendency to 'project' one's guilt out onto others. Both are agreed that it is well to take the beam out of one's own eye so that one can better and more truthfully see his fellowmen as they actually are.

Thirdly, both Freud and Jesus attempt to modify the 'super-ego,' the conscience, the judging faculty within the personality. Jesus attempted to do this along the lines of religious insights. He taught that God was a loving, heavenly father--one who was kind, one who was mindful of his own, one who would forgive if only the individual would wish forgiveness. [53] He would accept the prodigal son if only the prodigal son would want to be accepted again. He taught that God was more interested in fulfilling human need than in maintaining strict obedience to set laws, codes, and commandments. He made the sabbath for man and not man for the sabbath. He was more interested in loving devotion than strict observance of purification rites. His teachings about God as kind, loving Father stand in marked contrast to the legalistic, strict, fearful Judaistic deity. His attempt to modify the Judaistic

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53 Luke 15:11-32.

image of God brought considerable opposition from the representatives of Judaism, an opposition which finally ended in his crucifixion and death--a clear-cut example an analyst might point out of the way in which the 'super-ego' resents change and of the way in which the 'super-ego' punishes by death.

We have noted how Freud attempts to modify the 'super-ego.'

> Wir sind daher in therapeutischer Absicht sehr oft genötigt, das Über-Ich zu bekämpfen und bemühen uns, seine Ansprüche zu erniedrigen.[54]

Though the manner in which Jesus and Freud go about the task of modifying the 'super-ego' differs somewhat, their aims are, however, the same. Both are interested in releasing the personality from bondage to a legalistic, over-exacting, wrathful judgment. Both assert that there is no such an external, tyrannical judge standing over one. Freud asserts that the image is of one's own creation. Jesus asserts that God is a kind, loving, forgiving Father. If men but believed this, they would be freed from their guilt. Their faith would make them whole.[55] Thus, both Freud and Jesus succeed in releasing guilt tensions by virtue of modification of the 'super-ego.' This similarity between Jesus and Freud is brought out clearly by Oskar Pfister:

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54 DUK, 132.
55 Matthew 5:34.

> Schon die Vereinigung der Befehls- und Verbotsinstanz (Gott oder Ich-Ideal) führt zur Auflockerung und Aufhebung mancher Selbstvorwürfe, und die Restitution der Liebe schwächt den Angstcharakter des Schuldgefühls ab; den völligen Ausgleich des Konfliktes zwischen der Befehlsinstanz und dem Ich oder der hinter ihm steckenden Macht (Dämon, Es) hat nach Auffassung Jesu der Mensch vorzubereiten durch reumütige Abkehr von schuldhaften Verhalten und vorbehaltlos liebende Hingabe an die absolute Liebe; entscheidend ist jedoch ein Gnadenakt Gottes; die übrigen neutestamentlichen Schriften verharren grossenteils bei einer modifizierten Opfertheorie. Der Analytiker überlasst es seinem Klienten, wie er die übrig bleibenden Schuldgefühle bearbeiten und sich mit seinem sublimierten Ich-Ideal abfinden soll. [56]

Fourthly, both Freud and Jesus recognize the influence of guilt feelings in causing bodily ailments. Jesus is reputed to have cured many people. His ability for cure of bodily ailments was attributed to his power to forgive men of their sins.[57] The man sick of the palsy took up his bed and walked after Jesus had spoken the words: "Son, be of good cheer; thy sins be forgiven thee."[58] Jesus was able to bring release from the sense of guilt; with the release of the sense of guilt came the release of many bodily ailments.

An almost universal religious idea is the belief that sickness and illness is the result of disobedience to the gods or to God. Illness was God's way of punishment. Job could not understand why he, a righteous man, should be the victim

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56 "Neutestamentliche Seelsorge und psycho-analytische Therapy," Imago, 1934, Heft 4,432.
57 Matthew 9:6
58 Ibid., 2.

of such severe suffering and disease.[59] The forgiveness of sins was thought to bring freedom from the punishment of God.[60]

Freud has discovered the connection between guilt and bodily suffering. An individual violates what he has come to accept as right and just; he feels guilty; he condemns himself; he punishes himself; he suffers; he has some affliction--this is the train of events which leads from a sense of guilt to a neurotic symptom. Paralysis of some part of the body is often traced to a sense of guilt--the man sick of the palsy was, no doubt, one who suffered from such a state. Freud has further pointed out that blindness and eye disorder in many cases is the result of an 'unconscious sense of guilt.'[61] An individual who has seen something that he ought not to have seen, something that his 'super-ego' forbids him from seeing may find that his eyesight is failing him. The sense of guilt works itself through different bodily ailments. When release of guilt tensions is gained, bodily ailments which are motivated by them cease to exist. Freud and Jesus, in this respect, recognize the influence of the sense of guilt in causing bodily ailments.

Fifthly, both Freud and Jesus agree in their evaluation of guilt feelings. While institutional religion has often

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59 Job 33:9.
60 Acts 9:14.
61 "Psychogenic Visual Disturbance according to Psycho-Analytical Conceptions," CP, II, Ix.

sought to increase the sense of guilt, Freud and Jesus look upon guilt as a malady of the personality or soul. Jesus did not conceive of his work as that of a moral judge who came to condemn men for their sins. He came to save men from their sins.[62] It is true that he did condemn the scribes and the pharisees, but he did this not so much to create a sense of guilt as to point out the harm they were inflicting on people and on religious worship in the temple. Jesus tried to release men from guilt and fear. It is needless to repeat that Freud looks upon guilt, at least, 'unconscious guilt' as a disorder of the personality. It is one of the principle tasks of psycho-analysis to free the individual from his guilt tensions.

Freud and Jesus differ on the following points: First, Jesus usually conceived of guilt and sin on a cosmic, religious plane, while Freud conceives of guilt on a psychological plane. For Jesus, the sense of guilt was usually a tension between the individual's own self and a reality outside of himself which he called Father. For Freud, guilt is primarily a psychological problem. The sense of sin is reduced to inner psychic tensions. Freud finds no need for the metaphysical concept of God in his analysis of guilt feelings. Jesus relates the sense of guilt to realities beyond the self, while Freud is inclined to study guilt from an individualistic, sub-

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62 John 8:11.

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62 John 8:11.

jective, psychic point of view.

Secondly, while Freud deals primarily with 'the unconscious sense of guilt,' Jesus dealt with guilt as it was to be found on a more conscious level. He encouraged the spirit of forgiveness among men. He dealt with guilt as it arose from daily contacts. He stated that men should go to those whom they have wronged or even go to those who "have ought against" them to be reconciled. Freud has little to say about social reconciliation. He deals almost entirely with 'the unconscious sense of guilt' which is to be traced usually to the individual's own motives rather than to social tensions.

Thirdly, Freud and Jesus differ concerning the final adjustment of the cause of the guilt. Jesus says:

> If thy right eye offend thee, pluck it out, and cast it from thee: for it is profitable for thee that one of thy members should perish, and not that thy whole body should be cast into hell.[63]

Freud would state that the cause of the evil, which is to be found in the instinctual impulses, should not be rejected, pushed out of the 'conscious' mind, but should be understood and controlled by the 'conscious' mind. Evil impulses are to be handled, not by 'repression,' but by 'sublimation' under the 'conscious' control of the self or 'ego.' While Jesus did say that the evil should be plucked out, it is not just to his

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63 Matthew 5:29.

total point of view to assert that he favored extreme 'repression' such as leads to neurotic symptoms. His primary concern was in keeping "thine eye"[64] single, which may be interpreted to be, keeping an integrated personality. Having as limited data as we do have, it is exceedingly difficult to formulate a complete and accurate statement of his exact teaching. One can hardly count this difference as a fundamental one in that Jesus' teachings as a whole hardly justify one in drawing the conclusion that he favored the sharp cutting out or 'repression' which the above passage relates.

The similarities between Freud and Jesus concerning the problem of guilt are more striking than the differences. Both find guilt feelings to be a malady of the soul and both minister to the practical necessity of releasing guilt tensions. New Testament "cure of souls" as well as psycho-analytic therapy are concerned with liberating and emancipating individuals from their burden of sin and guilt. Freud's great contribution to the psychology of religion and to pastoral psychology is to be found in the insight he gives into the problem of guilt. Freud recognizes that religion and psycho-analysis, in their practical aspects of treating or ministering to inner conflicts are closely related. When others in the medical profession have attempted to make psycho-analysis a technique and a theory that can be utilized only by medical

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64 Matthew 6:22.

men, Freud has come out with the statement that medical men often have far less insight into inner difficulties than pastors and educators.

> It may be asked whether the practice of psycho-analysis does not presuppose a medical education which must remain lacking to the educator and pastor, or whether other relations are not antagonistic to the purpose of the placing the psycho-analytical technique in other than medical hands. I confess that I see no such obstacles. The practice of psycho-analysis demands much less medical education than psychological preparation and free human insight... The educator and pastor, their being habitually associated with youth, makes them perhaps better suited to have a sympathetic insight into the mental life of this class of persons.[65]

Freud's insights into the problem of guilt may be related, by the psychologist of religion and by the pastor, to previous insights into guilt and may be utilized by the pastor for a more efficient ministry.

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65 "Preface" to Pfister, PM, vii.

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CHAPTER FIVE

IMMORTALITY

Freud does not give much attention to the belief in immortality. One must gain an idea of his belief in immortality by taking fragmentary statements concerning this belief and relating them together. His ideas on death are more specific. In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, he discusses death from the standpoint of instinct, the thesis being that there is a basic instinct within man that is driving him towards death, and that this basic instinct is even more fundamental than the instinct of Eros which drives man towards the fuller expression of life. We shall consider Freud's ideas about immortality first, and then, his ideas about death.

A. Belief in Immortality.

1. Origin.

a. Psychological.

Freud states that the 'unconscious' knows no extinction. An individual, freed from the knowledge given by conscious reflection and contact with death, behaves as though he would live forever. Freud states that we cannot imagine our own death--that when we do try to imagine our own death, we survive as spectators.

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> survive ourselves as spectators. The school

> of psycho-analysis could thus assert that at bottom no one believes in his own death, which amounts to saying: in the unconscious, everyone of us is convinced of his immortality.[1]

When the emotionally driven soldier goes to war, he believes that the enemy will be killed. He says, "Nothing can happen to me."[2] Freud thus states that the conviction of immortality finds its emotional basis in the 'unconscious.' "Our unconscious therefore does not believe in its own death; it acts as though it were immortal."[3]

The basis for another psychological belief in immortality is found in memory. Freud states that though one may bury his loved ones, they still play a part in his life. Their images remain real in his mind. "Contemplation of the corpse of the person loved gave birth...to the theory of the soul, the belief in immortality."[4] In dreams, the deceased often return.[5] To the uncritically minded, the dream is interpreted to mean that the loved person is still living. Among primitive peoples, this was one of the main grounds for believing in immortality.[6]

The fact that the "Unconscious does not believe in its own death" and the survival of deceased loved ones in memory constitutes, for Freud, the psychological origins of the belief in immortality.

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1 RWD, 41.
2 Ibid., 63.
3 Ibid., 62.
4 Ibid., 54, 57.
5 GIP, 133.
6 Frazer, GB, 182ff.

b. Moral.

We have already had occasion to speak about the relationship between immortality and moral demands. Freud states that the belief in immortality is related to morality in two respects. On the one hand, the belief in immortality is necessary in order to secure closer obedience to moral codes. If an individual does evil in this world, he must pay for it in the next world. The belief in immortality aids in controlling the masses.[7] On the other hand, the belief in immortality is an outgrowth of the demands of justice. In this life, the wicked often prosper. Nature makes no distinction between the good and the evil. Out of the demands of justice, man has evolved the belief in immortality, a life after death in which justice will be administered.

> Alles Gute findet endlich seinen Lohn, alles Böse seine Strafe, wenn nicht schon in dieser From des Lebens, so in den späteren Existenzen, die nach dem Tod. beginnen. Somit sind alle Schrecken, Leiden und Härten des Lebens zur Austilgung bestimmt; das Leben nach dem Tode, das unser irdisches Leben fortsetzt, wie das unsichtbare Stück des Spektrums dem sichtbaren angefügt ist, bringt all die Vollendung, die wir hier vielleicht vermisst haben.[8]

The belief in immortality, thus, finds its support on moral grounds, out of the demands for justice and out of the necessity of controlling the masses.

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7 ZEI, 61, 63.
8 Ibid., 28, 29.

b. Moral.

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7 Ibid., 81, 85.
8 Ibid., 89, 90.

2. Illusion.

Freud regards the belief in immortality as illusory. It cannot be justified on the basis of scientific observation, and it gains its strength, he states, from the subjective needs that motivate it.[9] He considers the work of psychical researchers, spiritualists, as an attempt to authenticate the belief in immortality in their attempt to demonstrate the immortality of the soul. He refutes their evidence and their arguments by saying:

> Es gelingt ihnen leider nicht zu widerlegen, dass die Erscheinungen und Äusserungen ihrer Geister nur Produktionen ihrer eigenen Seelentätigkeit sind.[10]

There is no answer to "das schmerzliche Rätsel des Todes."[11] He advances the proposition that mankind would profit much by taking their attention off from the future life and concentrating their attention and efforts on the problems of the present life.

> Dadurch, dass er seine Erwartungen vom Jenseits abzieht und alle freigewordenen Kräfte auf das irdische Leben konzentriert, wird er wahrscheinlich erreichen können, dass das Leben für alle erträglich wird und die Kultur keinen mehr erdrückt.[12]

Mankind should leave the heavens "Den Engeln und den Spatzen."[13]

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9 ZEI, 47, 48.
10 Ibid., 43.
11 Ibid., 23.
12 Ibid., 81.
13 Ibid.

Freud's view of the belief in immortality deserves comment on three grounds. In the first place it must be said the belief in immortality does not necessarily conflict with full living in this life, as Freud implies. One can make the most of this life and at the same time entertain the belief in a life after death. In fact, if we are to look at the evidence at hand, we come to see that belief in immortality is an incentive to make the most of this life. Most theories of immortality make the future life dependent upon this life. In this respect, the belief in immortality leads to greater incentives, to greater activity, to more concern for life as it is lived on earth. Those who are believers in a life after death are the greatest promoters of righteousness in this life. Thus Freud's statement that mankind would profit by withdrawing his attention from the other world and applying it to this world is a statement that is not substantiated by fact.

In the second place, Freud's classifying the belief in immortality as an illusion is not justified. The fact of immortality is not demonstrable--here Freud is right. But the other aspect of the problem must be mentioned, and that is that personal annihilation is equally not demonstrable. Immortality cannot be either proved or disproved by demonstration. There is evidence of indirect kind both against the belief and

for the belief. The intelligent attitude to take is at least that of leaving the matter an open question. One is not justified in calling either belief or unbelief illusion.

In the third place, it will be well to call to mind that Freud finds his heritage in a people who have never seriously entertained the belief in immortality. Freud is a Jew. Although the Jewish people did develop the idea of Sheol, their basic idea concerning death has been "dust thou art, and unto dust thou shalt return."[14]

Freud's Die Traumdeutung is the most autobiographical of all of his works. In Die Traumdeutung Freud relates of an incident that gives us much light on his view of the belief in immortality. He tells us that as a boy of six years of age his mother gave him his first instruction on this question. She told him that they came from the earth and that they must return to earth. Little Sigmund doubted. He was a natural believer in personal survival beyond death. But after his mother illustrated her teaching, he asked no more questions.

> Als ich sechs Jahre alt war und den ersten Unterricht bei meiner Mutter genoss, sollte ich glauben, dass wir aus Erde gemacht sind und darum zur Erde zurückkehren müssen. Es behagte mir aber nicht, und ich zweifelt die Lehre an. Da rieb die Mutter die Handflächen an einander--ganz ähnlich wie beim Knödelmachen, nur dass sich kein Teig zwischen ihnen befindet--und zeigte mir die schwärzlichen Epidermisschuppen, die sich dabei abreiben, als eine Probe der Erde, aus der wir

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14 Gen. 3:19b.

> gemacht sind, vor. Mein Erstaunen über diese Demonstration ad oculos war grenzenlos und ich ergab mich in das, was ich später in den Worten ausgedrückt hören sollte: Du bist der Natur einen Tod schuldig.[15]

This experience was so vivid that it appeared in dreams of later date.[16] Thus Freud's belief in immortality is in no small measure influenced by this early experience with his mother. His Jewish heritage has been a factor in determining his attitude toward this belief.

B. Death.

We have seen that Freud does not believe in personal survival after death. Death is the ultimate fact connected with human life. It is the ultimate debt that must be paid to nature. Death is "natural, undeniable, and inevitable."[17]

Freud's idea of death, however, is not confined to that final event when the body becomes a corpse. Freud sees death processes operative from the beginning of life itself. Death is for him a fact more basic, more fundamental, than life. Throughout the life of the organism, there are tendencies at work within it that tend towards its own death or destruction. Freud has characterized these tendencies under the term 'death instincts.' The death instincts work in opposition to the 'sexual' or 'erotic instincts.' Whereas the 'erotic instincts'

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15 DT, 141.
16 Ibid.
17 RWD, 41.

tend toward greater union of entities and the reproduction of life, the 'death instincts' tend towards separation and the withdrawal from life.[18] The 'erotic instincts' strive for novelty and new combinations; the 'death instincts' strive for repetition and the reinstatement of former conditions. In all living organisms, there are anabolic and katabolic processes. The functioning of these two instincts leads to "an oscillating rhythm in the life of organisms."[19]

The 'death instincts' are essentially conservative in nature. Freud conceives of the re-enaction of traumatic experiences in neuroses and the reliving of experiences in dreams as expressions of this basic tendency in life, namely, a return to former conditions. The 'death instincts' operate on the hypothesis that the "Golden Age" is in the past.

The final goal of the 'death instincts,' according to Freud, is a return to the inanimate.

> At one time or another, by some operation of force which still completely baffles conjecture, the properties of life were awakened in lifeless matter... The tension then aroused in the previously inanimate matter strove to attain an equilibrium; the first instinct was present--that to return to lifelessness. The living substance at that time had death within easy reach.[20]

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18 BPP, 18, Cf. 57-63.
19 Ibid., 19.
20 Ibid., 48.

Throughout the life of organisms, this tendency to return to the absolutely tensionless state of inanimate matter is operative. The higher the organism, the "more complicated and circuitous (are) the routes to the attainment of the goal of death."[21] These tendencies operate in a regressive manner. The extreme regressive states of schizophrenics in which they lose contact with the outer world and undergo extreme introversion to such an extent that they appear to be dead[22] might be cited as illustration of this regressive tendency about which Freud writes. In the end, "everything living dies from causes within itself, and returns to the inorganic."[23] If it be contended that suicide, then, is the shortest route to the inorganic, Freud states that it is the shortest, but it is not the route which nature has mapped out for the organism. Each organism must live out its own devious route to the final goal.

Freud's view of death and this theory of 'death instincts' have many points in common with the philosophy of Schopenhauer and with Indian philosophy, particularly that of Buddhism.[24] Freud's view that life arose as an accident of nature and that the goal of life is death is paralleled by such statements as the following from Schopenhauer's philosophy:

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21 Ibid.
22 Hock, BS, 198f
23 BPP, 46.
24 BPP, 62.

> Human life must be some kind of a mistake.[25]
>
> Brahma is said to have produced the world by a kind of fall or mistake; and in order to atone for his folly, he is bound to remain in it himself until he works out his redemption. As an account of the origin of things, that is admirable.[26]
>
> You may look upon life as an unprofitable episode, disturbing the blessed calm of non-existence.[27]

Even though these close similarities are to be found between Freud and Schopenhauer, Freud states that he has arrived at his conclusions independently.[28] Freud's view of death is very similar to the Buddhistic view of Nirvana. In fact, Santayana has noted the similarity and has sought to point out that Freud's view of death and the 'death instincts' is essentially the teaching of Buddhism on Nirvana.[29] The Buddhistic abandonment of desire operates on the principle that desire makes for excitement which leads further and further from the state of calm, which is Nirvana.[30] The Yogi discipline is a technique whereby sensory excitations from the outer world are evaded and a technique which, through extreme introversion and regression, the individual is able to attain closer and closer to that blissful state of calm and

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25 "The Vanity of Existence," in EAS, 397.
26 "On the Sufferings of the World," EAS, 389.
27 Ibid., 383.
28 AS, 294.
29 STTMP, IV.
30 Menzies, HOR, 373.

tranquility, which is considered to be the true goal of all life. Upon Barbara Low's suggestion, Freud has taken over the term Nirvana and has applied it to the 'death instincts.' He has called this tendency within living organisms to reduce their inner tensions and to return to earlier conditions "the Nirvana-principle."[31]

Freud's theory of 'death instincts' is to be criticised on several grounds. In the first place, it is built upon a materialistic metaphysics. It assumes that the 'real' and the 'ultimate' is inorganic matter. It looks upon the final event of death itself as a passing of the living organism over into inanimate matter. His theory of 'death instincts,' thus, is built upon a materialistic metaphysics, which, as we shall see in the next chapter, is out of harmony with his own belief in the psyche as a reality.

In the second place, his view of 'death instincts' over-emphasizes the backward pulling tendencies in human nature. He is in error in attempting to interpret adult life almost exclusively in terms of 'infantile' tendencies. Growth and the function of positive tendencies are as much facts of life as 'regression' and death tendencies. The growing individual, not only during infancy, childhood, and adolescence, but during the adult years of his life continually changes in body

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31 BPP, 71.

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31 Op. cit., 71.

as well as in conscious outlook, and these changes cannot be reduced to 'regressive' functioning of 'death instincts.' Poul Bjerre finds this negative emphasis of Freud's to be his outstanding weakness. This is what he writes:

> There is one feature in psycho-analytic literature which, being very conspicuous, ought to strike our attention. I refer to the negative attitude of psycho-analysis to the process of life.[32]

In the third place, Freud's theory of 'death instincts' undermines what might be called a healthy philosophy of life. If 'death instincts' actually are the basic driving forces within the organism, if it actually be the fundamental impulse, and if it be allowed to determine the goal of life, it is readily seen that life itself becomes a tremenduous burden. Suicide is the shortest way of realizing this end. It may not be the way mapped out by nature, but if nature be materialistic, nature cannot care how the process of life is ended. Freud is logically driven to the same conclusion that Schopenhauer was driven to in his development of this view of life, namely, to the enhancement of suicide.[33] There is no real basis for encouraging one to go on living. In this respect, his theory of the 'death instincts' undermines his whole therapeutic program. Why should early 'fixations' be uprooted if they serve the interests of the inner desire to reinstate

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32 "The Way to Grace," Psycho-Analytic Review, XIV, 255.
33 "On Suicide," in EAS, 399-404.

earlier conditions? Why should one free patients from traumatic situations which tend to have a 'regressive' effect on the personality? Why not let nature take her course? Thus, Freud's theory of 'death instincts' undermines his own therapeutic program. In addition, it undermines any healthy philosophy of life. No one who values life highly can seriously entertain Freud's theory of 'death instincts' and the conclusions which he draws and which may be drawn from such a theory.

The question of philosophy of life brings us to our next chapter. We shall now turn our attention to a consideration of Freud's general world-view or Weltanschauung.

CHAPTER SIX

WELTANSCHAUUNG

Freud states that psycho-analysis is unable to provide a Weltanschauung by itself.[1] Psycho-analysis is a technique for making known 'unconscious' processes. Its knowledge is theoretically limited to 'unconscious' processes. One's Weltanschauung includes much more than knowledge about his deeper self, although knowledge about his deeper self is an important part of his Weltanschauung. The term Weltanschauung is a German term which is rich in meaning but which has no equivalent in English. In general, the term 'world-view' approximates its meaning. In discussing Freud's remarks concerning his own 'world-view' and concerning the Weltanschauung which he recommends for adherence by the modern man, we center our attention around three topics: first, we shall consider his theories about the influence of inner psychic states in determining one's 'world-view'; second, we shall consider Freud's own view of the external world and of what he holds to be real; third, we shall consider his proposal of displacing 'the religious Weltanschauung' by 'the scientific Weltanschauung.'

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1 NILP, 217.

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1 NIP, 214.

A. Influence of Inner Psychic States in Determining one's 'World-View.

One of the conclusions of psycho-analysis which has developed is the conclusion that an individual's inner, psychic state has a great deal to do with the way that individual visualizes his environment and with the beliefs he entertains about the world and life in general.

> Let me here reiterate that to the normal person life seems good. Wherever a man or a woman is to be found who takes misanthropomorphic, pessimistic, cynical views of the world and its Creator, it may usually be concluded that that person is suffering from a vicious complex with its accompanying neurosis or hysteria.[2]

Freud's conclusions concerning the functioning of inner, psychic states with regards to the formation of 'world-views' were advanced in his study of Dr. Schreber, whom we already have had occasion to mention in connection with Freud's views of the origin of belief in God.[3] Dr. Schreber, in his second disturbed period, believed that the world was coming to an end, that there was to be a world catastrophe. Freud's comments on Schreber's belief as it is related to inner, psychic factors, is as follows:

> Ideas of this kind about a world-catastrophe are not infrequently reported as occurring during the agitated stage in other cases of

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2 Swisher, RNP, 113.
3 See Chapter Two, 89f.

> paranoia. If we take our stand upon the theory of libidinal cathexis, and if we follow the hint given by Schreber's view of other persons as being 'cursory contraptions,' we shall not find it difficult to explain these catastrophes. The patient has withdrawn from the persons in his environment and from the external world generally the libidinal cathexis which he has hitherto directed on to them... The end of the world is the projection of this internal catastrophe; for his subjective world has come to an end since he has withdrawn his love from it. [4]

Freud explains Dr. Schreber's ideas about cosmic catastrophe by showing their connection with his withdrawal of his attention and interests from the outer world. There is a 'regression' of what Freud calls 'libido,' a withdrawal of 'libido' from the outer world. For Schreber, his outer world was actually undergoing catastrophic changes. The world itself, Freud contends, was no different for all of the inner turmoil experienced by Dr. Schreber, but as far as Dr. Schreber himself was concerned, the world was crumbling before his very eyes.

This conclusion that psychic states influence one's 'world-view' is a subjectivist's principle of subjectivist's principles. It not only states that the world is seen through the 'conscious' mind and is interpreted through the 'conscious' mind, but it goes a step further and states that there are factors that determine, to varying degrees, the way in which

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4 "A Case of Paranoia," CP, III, 456.

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The 'conscious' mind itself sees and interprets the world. There are inner emotional factors that exercise a subtle influence. These emotional factors are often unrecognized by the person himself, but when they are brought to light, he sees how they have influenced him, and he admits that they had been active in shaping his outlook.

If it be admitted that there is truth in this conclusion, then it is likely that someone will contend that everything is illusory, that we can depend on nothing, that all of our 'conscious' states are influenced by 'unconscious' factors. This inference, however, is not held to be worthy of belief by Freud. He states that the 'conscious' mind with its rational faculty is the only avenue we have to truth,[5] that the way to increase this rational faculty is to purge the innermost aspects of ourselves through insight and understanding of the emotional factors that influence conscious life.[6] When these emotional factors are brought into the light of consciousness, they lose their demonic power. Impressions concerning the outer world are conveyed to the 'conscious' mind through the organs of the body. These data can only be evaluated as information concerning the external world when all of the internal factors within the organism are taken into consideration and understood.[7]

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5 NILP, 217.
6 NILP, 233.
7 Cf., Whitehead, PR, Chapter VII.

Freud shows how inner effective factors conditions subjective experience. Freud, thus, is a subjectivist of subjectivists.

B. 'External Reality.'

Leaving open the question of the origin of his ideas for the time being, let us consider what Freud himself thinks about 'the external world' or 'external reality.'[8] Concerning this topic, Freud has very marked opinions. In a word, Freud thinks that the outer world is not only not friendly to man, but that it is destructive of man's desires and interests.

> You will admit that a human being is a puny, helpless thing in comparison to that tremendous outer world, full of destructive agencies.[9]

The attitude toward the outer world which is advanced in his Die Zukunft einer Illusion is set forth clearly in the following passage:

> Da sind die Elemente, die jedem menschlichen Zwang zu spotten scheinen, die Erde, die bebt, zerreisst, alles Menschliche und Menschenwerk begräbt, das Wasser, das im Aufruhr alles überflutet und ersäuft, der Sturm, der es wegbläst, da sind die Krankheiten, die wir erst seit kurzem als die Angriffe anderer Lebewesen erkennen, endlich das schmerzliche Rätzel des Todes, gegen den bisher kein Kräutlein gefunden wurde und wahrscheinlich keines gefunden werden wird.[10]

Man, according to Freud, stands helpless before the overpowering forces of nature.[11]

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8 ZEI, 22f.
9 PLA, 72.
10 ZEI, 22.
11 Ibid., 30.

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8 ZEI, 227.
9 IKA, 73.
10 ZEI, 22.
11 Ibid., 50.

It is very evident that Freud has taken over his view of the physical world from nineteenth century physics and materialistic philosophy. The world is seen to be inanimate, inorganic, and impersonal. There are inner purposes determining psychic life, but, for Freud, there are to be found no purposes in nature taken as a whole. He states, "I believe in outer (real) chance."[12] His view was widely held a half a century ago, but it is at present being rapidly undermined by findings and conclusions advanced by physicists themselves. The world of nature, the so-called physical universe, is not held to be a blind, chaotic and chance intermingling of 'billiard ball' atoms. Professor Whitehead states that the so-called 'inorganic' can best be conceived of in terms of the organic,[13] and Professor Eddington states that we shall be better able to understand the nature of the physical world if we accept the proposition that "the stuff of the world is mind-stuff."[14] Freud's view of the physical world is fast becoming antiquated.

At this point, we venture to suggest a comment which has far-reaching significance for Freud's entire attitude towards religion. It is this: Freud was trained in science and in medicine during the last half of the nineteenth century when

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12 PEL, 308.
13 SMW, 55.
14 NPW, 276.

it was thought that all phenomena could be reduced to a physical basis. Freud was trained in this era, and he himself began his professional career as a physiologist and brain anatomist. He, however, saw the inadequacy of physiology and brain anatomy in matters concerning the higher aspects of human life. The phenomena of hysteria, of post-hypnotic influences could not be explained nor understood in these crude terms. He succeeded in emancipating himself from physiological theories and came to develop explanations on a psychological plane. Hysterical symptoms came to be explained and understood in terms of ideas and experiences which lay hidden in the minds of the patients. His success in psychology and his success as a psycho-therapist lies in the fact that he freed himself from his earlier physiological training.

Freud, however, only went part way in his emancipation. He rose above the physiological explanations of human life and behavior, but he did not rise above the materialistic view of the world. He did not bring his metaphysics up to date with his psychology. Inasmuch as he is not a physicist, one cannot expect him to advance the latest findings in this field. However, since he did make such a radical change as regards human life, he could easily have carried over his change of viewpoint into his view of the world and of life as a whole. At any rate, the fact remains that he did not make the change

in his larger outlook. He still remains a materialist in his view of the world.

C. 'The Scientific Weltanschauung.'

In rejecting 'the religious Weltanschauung,' Freud advances 'the scientific Weltanschauung' as the one that is worthy of adherence by the modern man.[15] He hails 'the scientific Weltanschauung' as the only one that is worthy of intellectual respect and devotion. What does he mean by 'the scientific Weltanschauung?'

By 'the scientific Weltanschauung' he means primarily a method of gaining knowledge. He does not have reference to any particular goals which are held to be authoritative for all mankind, nor does he have reference to any particular metaphysical view of reality, although he does infer materialistic metaphysics. He has reference to a method of gaining knowledge and asserts that one can only believe in such things or beliefs that have been approved by the use of this method.

The issue lies at the point of what Freud means by the scientific method. In general, he refers to the use of observation and reasoning[16] as means of gaining knowledge and truth.

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15 NILP, 231f.
16 ZEI, 54.

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15 NIKP, 231f.
16 NWI, 34.

> It asserts that there is no other source of knowledge of the universe, but the intellectual manipulation of carefully verified observations, in fact, what is called research, and that no knowledge can be obtained from revelation, intuition or inspiration.[17]

Here we have two very definite statements concerning what he means by the scientific method. By advancing 'the scientific Weltanschauung,' he means to assert that man should not give his consent and adherence to anything that cannot be verified by "the intellectual manipulation of carefully verified observations."

There are three important comments that must be made concerning Freud's view of 'the scientific Weltanschauung.' The first may be advanced in the form of a question, namely, in how broad a sense does he conceive of "reason" and "intellectual manipulation"? It is true that a scientist must use reason in his investigation. On the basis of facts which he has observed, he must use reason to arrive at various hypotheses which may explain the facts. Reason, in this function, is an absolute necessity of science. But reason in science functions in a more limited way than reason in philosophy. In science, reason deals with a definite area of data. In philosophy, reason deals with the data of experience taken as a whole.[18] Philosophy does not limit its data to a particular

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17 NILP, 217.
18 Brightman, ITP, 27f.

field; its field is reality taken as a whole. It suggests hypotheses about reality taken as a whole in a similar way in which science, through reason, suggests hypotheses concerning its limited area of data. Both science and philosophy are analytic and synoptic in the use of reason, but philosophy, with its aim at arriving at a view of the whole of reality, is more synoptic than science.[19]

Now the question is, does Freud recommend the use of reason in the strictly scientific sense, or does he have reference to the broader use of reason? If he conceives of reason in the very narrow sense, then his scientific '_Weltanschauung_' is a truly 'scientific _Weltanschauung_'; if, on the other hand, he allows to reason its function in the broader sense, he is in reality advocating a 'philosophic _Weltanschauung_.' The former _Weltanschauung_ would consist of positivistic bits of knowledge, well proven to be sure, but fragmentary and unrelated in the mind of the individual. 'The philosophic _Weltanschauung_' would be one in which there was some attempt to relate these fragments of knowledge together with the view to gaining some general notion of the whole of reality. Which of these two _Weltanschauungen_ does Freud actually advocate?

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19 Ibid.

There is evidence to believe that he is actually interested in 'the philosophic Weltanschauung.' He states that scientific work is like analytic work. The analyst, in the course of the treatment, discovers bits of truth about the personality of the analysand. At first, these bits of truth are meaningless and unrelated. As the analysis proceeds and new factors are uncovered, the analyst, through the use of reason, is able to find meaning in the various bits of truth. "The scattered discoveries fall into place and he obtains an understanding of a whole chain of mental events."[20] By use of reason in the philosophic sense, thus, an individual comes closer and closer to the truth about reality as a whole. When Freud speaks about 'the scientific Weltanschauung,' he is in fact suggesting that the verified conclusions of science be taken as data for the formulation of our view of the world and of life in general. Freud, thus, is actually recommending 'a philosophic Weltanschauung' under the term of 'scientific Weltanschauung.' As further proof that he uses reason in its broader sense of interpreting experience as a whole, we may cite the following passage which clearly defines the function of reason in its more philosophic sense:

> Scientific thought...endeavors to eliminate personal factors and emotional influences, it carefully examines the trustworthiness of the sense perceptions on which it bases its conclusions.[21]

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20 NILP, 238.
21 Ibid., 233.

The task of "examining the trustworthiness of the sense perceptions" is an epistemological task, one that traditionally and logically belongs in the field of philosophy. A criticism of the factors involved in experience can only be made on the basis of the consideration of experience taken as a whole. This task falls within the province of philosophy. Thus, Freud is, in fact, advancing the proposal of 'a philosophic Weltanschauung' under the uncritically used term 'scientific Weltanschauung.'

Secondly, it must be stated that a mere method does not meet the demands of a Weltanschauung. A Weltanschauung as mere method lacks content. One desires to have a view of the world, to have dominant goals, to know the meaning of life. One cannot gain satisfaction out of a mere technique or method. It is true that one can only gain a true picture of the world and arrive at some meaning in life through the use of observation and reason, but these are only instruments at the most. They only fulfill part of the requirements of a Weltanschauung. No man can be satisfied with mere adherence to a method. At any particular time, he must entertain ideas about the nature of reality. These ideas, it may be true, may be arrived at through the use of reason and observation, but it is these ideas which really satisfy the demand of a Weltanschauung. An individual must believe certain things

about the world about him, about his own self, and about the meaning of life. A Weltanschauung, thus, that is purely a method is an inadequate one. Freud himself is not satisfied only with the scientific method. We have noted how he assumes a materialistic metaphysics.

In the third place, Freud is not qualified to reject 'the religious Weltanschauung.' He is speaking out of his field when he does reject 'the religious Weltanschauung.' He is a psychologist of the 'unconscious,' and as such, he cannot speak with authority on any particular Weltanschauung. The task of determining the truth and value of the various Weltanschauungen falls within the field of philosophy. The task of determining the truth and value of 'the religious Weltanschauung' is assigned to a special field within philosophy, namely, the philosophy of religion. Freud cannot be looked upon as an authority in philosophy of religion. He has not had academic training in this field, he lacks sufficient acquaintance with the data of religious life, and he admits that he has had no religious experiences himself.[22] He insists that one is not qualified to speak about psycho-analysis unless he has had an experience of analysis.[23] In the same way, it may be insisted that one is really not qualified

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22 DUK, 6; "A Religious Experience," in Inter. Journal of Psycho-Analysis, X, 2.

23 "Observations on 'Wild' Psycho-Analysis," CP, II, 303.

to speak about religion unless he has had experience which he regards as religious, and unless he is acquainted with religious life as lived in history. This constitutes our major criticism of Freud's view of religion. We shall have more to say about it in our next Chapter, to which we are now ready to direct our attention.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CRITICISM AND EVALUATION

In the preceding chapters we have concerned ourselves primarily with a statement of what Freud's views are on religious beliefs and practices. We tried to determine the facts of his beliefs. Our major concern was to supply an answer to the question: What is Freud's view of religion? In connection with a statement of his views, we suggested certain relevant criticisms. Our major task thus far, however, has not been that of criticism. Now that we have his views before us, we are in a position to look at them critically in the light of all factors concerned. We shall first consider the shortcomings and the errors in his views, and then we shall seek to point out what values psycho-analysis as a science has to contribute to religion.

A. Criticism.

Our criticism of Freud's view of religion will be made from two different standpoints: First, we shall consider his views from the standpoint of the psychology of religion; second, we shall consider his views from the standpoint of the philosophy of religion. In addition, we shall consider personal factors in his own life that have a bearing on his attitude toward religion. While we do not rest our criticism of

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Freud on these personal factors, we consider them by virtue of the fact that they greatly aid us in understanding and explaining his attitude and views.

1. From the Standpoint of Psychology of Religion.

a. Over-Emphasis on 'Unconscious' Factors.

Freud is subject to what is commonly referred to as "the specialist's fallacy." As a psycho-analyst, his special field is that of uncovering 'unconscious' psychic processes. He has come to interpret the 'conscious' life of man with its religious beliefs and practices in terms of 'unconscious' psychic determinants. We have seen how he looks upon the belief in God as a 'projection' of the childhood 'father-imago' which is thought to have its existence in the 'unconscious.' We have seen how he attempts to found the seat of morality within the individual in the 'super-ego' which is thought to function 'unconsciously.' We have seen how he looks at guilt problems from the standpoint of 'the unconscious sense of guilt.' In each of these instances, he has tried to reduce much of 'conscious' religious life to 'unconscious' psychic processes.

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Such an emphasis is not warranted by scientific considerations. A belief can only be psychologically understood and described when all of the factors are taken into considera-

tion. Beliefs may arise from tensions which are not fully understood by the individual. The individual may continue in holding to certain beliefs because such beliefs have an affective basis of which he is not fully aware. That beliefs may have anffective basis which is not fully recognized by the individual is a fact which the psychologist of religion well recognizes. But a thorough-going psychologist of religion is not content to interpret beliefs in terms of one impulse or in terms of certain isolated processes. He must take into consideration all factors concerned.

We maintain that Freud, in setting forth his account of the psychological basis of religious beliefs, has not done justice to the beliefs. He has been content to determine the 'unconscious' factors that underlay such beliefs and has allowed his description of the 'unconscious' factors to stand for a complete description of the psychological nature of the beliefs. He has allowed such statements as

> Die psychoanalytische Erforschung des einzelnen Menschen lehrt mit einer ganz besonderen Nachdrücklichkeit dass für jeden der Gott nach dem Vater gebildet ist. [1]

to stand for the whole truth concerning the origin and development of the belief in God. He has not taken into consideration the influence of other factors, such as one's particular social group or one's particular reflective thinking, in the develop-

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1 TT, 136.

ment of the belief. He generalizes and states that in "every" case, the conception of god is modelled after the father. He sets forth only part of the process and then lets the part stand for the whole. This criticism of Freud is well summarized by Thouless:

> It is possible that the Freudians, who insist that it (infantile sexuality) is a factor of such importance, are in the position of botanists who, having dug round the roots of an oak tree, have discovered the remains of the acorn from which it grew, and insist that in this, and this alone, lies all the significance of the oak; and that the other scientists who spend their lives in the investigation of the structure of the tree itself, the artists who rejoice in its beauty, and the carpenters who use its wood, are all alike living in a fool's paradise, because they have not realized that the oak is a decayed acorn and nothing more. [2]

Theodor Reik has assigned himself the task of working out the implications of Freud's teachings for the psychology of religion. He has seen Freud's limitation in trying to explain religious beliefs entirely in terms of 'unconscious' motives. He has realized the fact that religious beliefs are complex in nature and that they must be considered from all points of view. The following statement taken from his book Ritual: Psycho-analytic Studies clearly defines the place that psychoanalysis must have in its relation to the psychology of religion:

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2 IPR, 138.

> We should not for one moment forget, even where it is not expressly stated, that there are other aspects, that religious phenomena are of a complicated nature, and that only the investigation of them from different points of view can lead to the full appreciation of them. This conscious limitation, whereby we renounce the claim to solve questions from all points of view, seems to us both necessary and desirable; the methods and purpose of psycho-analysis refer particularly to the sphere of unconscious processes, and it can only deal with psychological phenomena of this nature and their connection with consciousness.[3]

Freud has stepped over the bounds of his science and has allowed the findings of his science to stand for the whole truth. He has given an undue emphasis to 'unconscious' factors.

b. Over-Emphasis on Sexual Nature of Man.

In spite of the fact that Freud has seen the weakness of pansexualism and has modified his account of the 'unconscious' nature of man to include 'death instincts,' Freud's psychology still over-emphasizes the sexual instincts in man. 'The unconscious' is held to be dominated by 'the pleasure-principle' and 'the reality-principle' of the 'ego' is but a servant of 'the pleasure-principle.' For Freud, the main function of the 'ego' is to be found in its task of protecting the pleasure interests of the 'id' in the face of external dangers. 'The reality-principle,' by which he suggests that men live, is nothing more or less than an enlightened 'pleasure-principle.'

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3 14.

The 'ego' with the help of consciousness and reason is able to detect danger and possible pain. It designates when and how the pleasure interests of the organism may best be fulfilled. The pleasure of which he speaks is best regarded as sensual pleasure. Although he attempts to interpret the sexual instincts in terms of the 'Eros' of Plato and the 'love' of which Paul wrote in his letter to the Corinthians, his persistance in continuing to use the term 'sex' belies his interpretation. The term 'sex' is fundamentally a biological term. The impulses which he characterizes as 'sexual' have mainly biological ends, namely, the realization of pleasure from errogenous zones. That man has a sexual nature, no one will deny. But that the sexual instincts should be accepted as offering the key to the understanding of the complete nature of man is an hypothesis that cannot be accepted. Adler and Jung differed with Freud to such an extent on this basic point that they found it necessary to part company with him.[4] They found that such an emphasis did not do justice to the facts related to human thought and behavior. William McDougall holds the same criticism of Freud's psychology as is expressed in his characterization of it as a "one-sided psychology."[5] Freud has brought to the fore an aspect of man that had hitherto not occupied scientific consideration. His over-emphasis,

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4 Wittels, SF, 139.
5 RSL, 47.

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4 Wittels, SF, 139.
5 McD, 47.

however, is unwarranted.

c. Theory of the 'Primal Horde' Overdrawn.

Freud regards his theory of the 'primal horde' highly and has traced the social origin of belief in God, the institution of exogamy, the law against murder, the conviction of 'original sin', and numerous other beliefs, to this early social group. We have previously pointed out that his theory is imaginary and that it does not do justice to his own findings.[6] Such a society has never been observed, and there are not sufficient data to warrant its inference. We have suggested that the evidence used as a basis for the theory--namely, the institution of exogamy and the prohibition against parricide and against the killing of the totem animal--could be interpreted in terms of a theory which is more in keeping with the findings of psycho-analysis itself. It is not necessary to assume that the institution of exogamy and laws against murder originated at a particular time in history as the result of a single event. The 'Oedipus-complex' which Freud has postulated as the central problem of the 'primal horde' society is a problem which each family group must face. Freud could have accounted for the phenomena of totemism with its taboos by assuming that the solution of this basic problem

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6 See Chapter Two, 97-101; Chapter Three, 138.

becomes handed down from one generation to another as it becomes worked out by each generation. Exogamy, totemism and laws against murder are better conceived of in terms of gradual evolution over a period of many generations. Freud cites in support of his theory the observation made by Atkinson concerning the fact that herds of cattle and horses often kill the father animal. This observation shows the weakness of his theory of the 'primal horde.' Certainly he would not contend that horses and cattle are influenced by the early event. They do not kill their father animal out of "the repetition and commemoration of this memorable, criminal act."[8] This observation, on the contrary, goes to show that the motives which he attributes to the clan of the 'primal horde' are prevalent in every family group. There is no need, thus, to postulate the existence of a 'primal horde.'

d. Fallaciousness of Freud's Characterization of Religion as a 'Universal Obsessional Neurosis.'

Freud's contention that religion is but a group or 'universal obsessional neurosis' is subject to the fallacy of generalization. He has found one point of similarity between obsessional neuroses and religion, namely, the fact that cer-

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7 TT, 248.
8 Ibid.

tain religious rituals are attempts to appease guilt feelings. He has expanded and generalized this single similarity to include religious beliefs and practices as a whole. He has made a general statement about religion which is based upon one fact to the exclusion of other relevant facts. That religious beliefs and practices include more than purification rituals and prayers of penance is a fact that Freud has either avoided or overlooked. To be sure, Judaism has its rites of purification. Its pharisaic laws are similar to obsessional practices and prohibitions. Jesus was aware of the unhealthy nature of such rites. But the rites of purification do not constitute all there is of Judaistic religion. Further, Judaistic religion cannot be taken as typical of all religions. Freud, in stating that religion is a 'universal obsessional neurosis' has gone beyond the boundary of scientific method. He has made a generalization that is not justified on the basis of the facts of psychology of religion. His characterization, therefore, must be regarded as untrue and fallacious.

e. The 'Super-Ego' Cannot Be Regarded as the Seat of Morality Within the Personality.

Freud's identification of morality with the 'super-ego' is not tenable. The 'super-ego' functions, for the most part, 'unconsciously.' It is built up of prohibitions and restrictions which are not, for the most part, consciously chosen.

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It does most of its work without the concern of the 'ego.' There is no mention made of conscious volition or conscious choice. The true moralists, such as Jesus, have taught that one's moral character was determined by his choices, and by his decisions.

> There is nothing from without a man, that entering into him can defile him; but the things which come out of him, those are they which defile him.[9]

From the standpoint of the psychology of religion, the moral seat of the personality is to be found in the 'ego' function, to use the terminology of Freud. It is the conscious 'ego' in its attempt at realization of ideal ends which is the center of the moral life of the individual.[10] The 'super-ego' functions as the 'unconscious-conscience.' There is no moral choice involved in its work. Moral decisions arise out of the 'ego.' Thus, the 'super-ego' cannot be regarded as the seat of morality within the personality.

f. Data Obtained from Abnormal Cases.

Freud has found his data for his theories concerning religious beliefs and practices through his contact with neurotic and disturbed patients. He has taken the religious beliefs of patients and has tried to analyze them along with other statements given by patients. The data for his psycholog-

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9 Mark 7:15.
10 Cf., Everett, MV, 6-9.

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ical interpretations of religion come for the most part from disturbed patients. In Chapter One we considered how he developed and elaborated his theory concerning the influence of the 'father-imago' in the religious life of Dr. Schreber.[11] Dr. Schreber's beliefs about God were different in his disturbed periods than they were when he was serving as a judge in court. Freud has sought to give a psychological analysis of his belief about God that appeared in his disturbed period, but he did not attempt a psychological analysis of his belief in God that was entertained during his normal life. To be sure, a psychologist of religion will welcome the data that appears in disturbed periods. Many factors within the personality appear in these periods which are relevant to the belief entertained in the normal life. The information that disturbed periods yield must be included as data. But to base one's conception almost solely on such data, or to overlook the data of normal, 'conscious' life, is to be untrue to the method of psychology of religion which seeks to ascertain all relevant facts. Freud's conclusions concerning the psychological analysis of religious beliefs, thus, must be taken as valid only for the cases with which he has dealt. He has failed to consider the data of religious experience as it has been lived by the more noted religious characters of history, and

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11 Page 89f.

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11 Page 897.

hence, his work in the field of psychology of religion must be viewed accordingly.

g. Failure to Appreciate 'Immanent Reason' in Social Laws.

Freud is pessimistic in his social outlook. He feels that society demands too big a price from the individual in the way of restrictions. He condemns social laws and restrictions for the privations that they place on individuals. He even goes so far as to suggest that

> we should be much happier if we were to give it (civilization) up and go back to primitive conditions.[12]

Freud has failed to see the 'immanent reason' which has brought about social codes. As Jung states:

> It should, indeed, never be forgotten--and the Freudian School needs this reminder--that morality was not brought down upon tables of stone from Sinai and forced upon the people.[13]

Social codes have evolved through centuries of experience in which individuals living together have sought to work out harmonious social relationships. If the 'immanent reason' within social codes be ascertained, they no longer seem to be foreign impositions. Through the understanding of social codes, one gains a similar type of freedom that is gained through the understanding of inner impulses. A return to earlier, primi-

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12 "'Civilized' Sexual Morality and Modern Nervousness," CP, II, 77. See Chapter Three, Sections C and D.

13 AP, 379.

tive conditions is not only impossible in the world in which we live, but such a return is merely an escape, a 'regression' from a situation which, from the standpoint of mental and social health, should be faced. Jung advances a pertinent criticism of Freud concerning this issue.

> Every reduction, every digression from the course that has been laid down for the development of civilization does nothing more than turn the human being into a crippled animal; it never makes a so-called natural man of him... We do not help the patient by freeing him from the demands made by civilization; we can only help him by inducing him to take an active part in the strenuous task of carrying on the development of civilization.[14]

Jung is sound in his view that we cannot help human beings by aiding them in escaping the demands of civilization. The true solution is found in the task of developing civilization to a higher point where social friction will be progressively eliminated. In the meantime, our task is one of making known the 'immanent reason' within the social codes which we have already achieved. Freud's social outlook is gloomy and pessimistic. Even though he is a psychologist, he has failed in appreciating the motives that have given rise to man's social structure.

2. From the Standpoint of Philosophy of Religion.

a. Origin Does Not Determine Validity of Beliefs.

Freud's main argument for the rejection of religion which he advances from the psycho-analytic point of view is

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14 Ibid., 224.

that belief in God is but the 'projection' of the childhood 'father-imago' outward onto the external world. He regards the belief as entirely subjective in origin and as enduring by virtue of the subjective needs for support and protection. He argues that since religious beliefs find their origin in 'projection' of childhood attitudes that religious beliefs are illusory.

In criticising this view, it must be pointed out that the origin of or the functioning of 'mental mechanisms' in connection with religious beliefs does not determine their validity. Psychology, which aims to trace and describe the mental processes in experience, cannot pass judgment upon the objective validity of beliefs. The validity of a belief is determined by its correspondence with the object to which it refers--or if the objective reality to which it refers cannot be grasped as in the case of Kant's 'ding-an-sich,' the belief must be tested on the basis of its own inherent consistency and its coherence with experience taken as a whole.[15] The testing of beliefs belongs in the field of the sciences that deal specifically with the objects concerned. In the case of belief in God, the task of validation falls within the realm of the philosophy of religion.

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15 Brightman, ITP, 58-63.

To state that the belief in God involves 'projection' constitutes no ground for rejection of the belief. All beliefs and knowledge involve 'projection' of images and concepts which have been built up by past experience and reflection and which are referred to their specific objects. The error in 'projection' arises only when subjective images and concepts are referred to wrong objects.

> It is not the positive element in the projection that is erroneous, but the reference of that element to a wrong object. The attribution of personality to trees is a false reference; but the content of personality is true when referred to man himself... The error of projection is its falsity of reference.[16]

The belief in God cannot be rejected merely on the grounds that it involves a 'projection' of subjective imagery. The belief in God can only be rejected when it be shown that there is no object in the world of reality which one may call God. The question of the existence of God falls within the realm of the philosophy of religion.

b. Freud Not Qualified as a Philosopher of Religion.

Since Freud has rejected the validity of religious beliefs, he has spoken within the province of the philosophy of religion. In order that we may appraise his rejection, we must know with what authority he speaks.

In the first place, it must be noted that Freud has had no training in philosophy. His academic training was in

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16 Valentine, MPVCE, 13.

physiology and medicine, and his professional experience has been in the field of psycho-therapy. He himself states that he has purposefully avoided philosophy:

> Even when I have moved away from observation, I have carefully avoided any contact with philosophy proper. This avoidance has been greatly facilitated by constitutional incapacity. I was always open to the ideas of G. T. Fechner and have followed that thinker upon many important points. The large extent to which psycho-analysis coincides with the philosophy of Schopenhauer--not only did he assert the dominance of the emotions and the supreme importance of sexuality, but he was even aware of the mechanism of repression--is not to be traced to my acquaintance with his teaching. Nietzsche, another philosopher whose guesses and intuitions often agree in the most astonishing way with the laborious findings of psycho-analysis, was, for a long time, avoided by me on that very account; I was less concerned with the question of priority than with keeping my mind unembarrassed.[17]

From one who claims to be a lover of knowledge and a seeker after truth, such statements as these are unusual. The writings, opinions, ideas, hypotheses advanced by others contribute greatly in helping one arrive at sound views. One cannot expect to speak with authority in the field of philosophy if he does not acquaint himself with the best thinking that has been advanced in the field. Philosophy, like science, advances by building on the contributions made by previous investigators. Freud states that in recent years he has allowed free rein to his inclination to speculation:

> In the works of my later years (Beyond the Pleasure

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17 AAS, 294.

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[17] AAS, 294.

> Principle, Group Psychology and The Analysis of the Ego) I have given free rein to the inclination to speculation which I kept down for so long.[18]

Civilization and Its Discontents and The Future of An Illusion have also appeared during his later years. It is to be contended that one cannot allow free rein to speculation in philosophy any more than he can in science. Philosophy is more than speculative opinion. Advance in the field of philosophy comes about in a similar way as advance in fields of science. One cannot gain anything by avoiding contact with philosophy. Freud's failure to acquaint himself with philosophy and the freedom of speculation he allows, discredits him as an authority in philosophy.

In the second place, as we have already intimated in the closing part of our last chapter, we must conclude that Freud is not qualified to speak with authority on religion. He does not claim to be religious and he denies the experience of any specific religious feelings.[19] He claims that one is not able to speak with authority about psycho-analysis unless he has gone through an analytic experience. He states that

> This technique is even today not to be learnt from books, and it is certainly not to be discovered independently.[20]

The analytic experience takes one through deep experiences which cannot be adequately verbalized and transmitted to

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18 Ibid., 290.
19 DUK, 6; "A Religious Experience," Inter.Journal of Psycho-Analysis, X, 2.

others. One can only know psycho-analysis through an analysis. In the same way, the philosopher of religion may assert that one cannot really know the nature of religion unless he has first had some experience which he regards as religious. Looking at religion from the outside is like looking at psycho-analysis from the outside. Both must be known through inner, personal experiences. At least the experiences must be had in the beginning; rational knowledge may be later achieved through reflective thinking concerning the experiences. Thus, Freud looks at religion from the outside. He does not speak from personal experience. Inasmuch as he disqualifies anyone from speaking with authority concerning psycho-analysis who has not had an analytic experience, he himself must be disqualified from speaking with authority concerning the nature and truth of religious beliefs. He not only claims that he has no religious 'feelings' but he has failed to make a sufficient study of religious experience as it has been lived in history by the more noted religious characters. He lacks the necessary data of the psychology and philosophy of religion, and, hence, his conclusions within these fields cannot be taken authoritatively. As Jung says, "Freud is unable to understand religious experience."[21]

This criticism of Freud is far-reaching in its scope. It includes within it many other psychiatrists and doctors

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20 "Observations on 'Wild' Psycho-Analysis," CP, II, 303.
21 MMSS, 135.

others. One can only know psycho-analysis through an analysis. In the same way, the philosopher of religion may assert that one cannot really know the nature of religion unless he has first had some experience which be regards as religious. Looking at religion from the outside is like looking at psycho-analysis from the outside. Both must be known through inner, personal experiences. At least the experiences must be had in the beginning; rational knowledge may be later achieved through reflective thinking concerning the experiences. Thus, Freud looks at religion from the outside. He does not speak from personal experience. Inasmuch as he disqualifies anyone from speaking with authority concerning psycho-analysis who has not had an analytic experience, he himself must be disqualified from speaking with authority concerning the nature and truth of religious beliefs. He not only claims that he has no religious 'feelings' but he has failed to make a sufficient study of religious experience as it has been lived in history by the more noted religious characters. He lacks the necessary data of the psychology and philosophy of religion, and, hence, his conclusions within these fields cannot be taken authoritatively. As Jung says, "Freud is unable to understand religious experience."[21]

This criticism of Freud is far-reaching in its scope. It includes within it many other psychiatrists and doctors

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20 "Observations on 'Wild' Psycho-Analysis," CP, II, 303.
21 MDRS, 195.

who know religion from the outside as it functions in disturbed patients. Their ideas of religion are not an outgrowth of personal experience of religion within their own lives. Many of those who are trained in medicine have a philosophy which prevents such experience. To use Freud's own terminology, one might say that they have built up a 'resistance' against religious beliefs and religious experiences. They speak with authority on nervous and mental disturbances, but they cannot be accepted as authorities on religious beliefs.

The criticism that Freud is not qualified to speak with authority on religion is far-reaching as regards his own view of religion. His view of religion must be held in the same light as a critic's attitude toward psycho-analysis who has not had analytic experience and who has not acquainted himself with the literature on the subject. His opinions of religion may be noted; his work in the field of the function of religion in the lives of disturbed patients is worthy of consideration by the psychologist of religion; but to regard his statements concerning the validity and the inner nature of religious beliefs and experiences as authoritative is a mistake. He may speak with authority concerning 'unconscious' impulses and concerning psycho-therapy, but he does not speak with authority on religion.

c. His Metaphysics Not Consistent With His Psychology.

We have noted how Freud was trained in physiology and

medicine in the last half of the last century, and how the dominant philosophy entertained in that period was materialistic. The physiologists and neurologists were staunch believers in the materialistic philosophy. They even sought to explain human nature and mind in terms of physical processes of the organism.

We have noted how Freud went beyond the physiological explanation of human nature. He found that neurotic symptoms were to be cured by psychological rather than physiological means. He founded psycho-analysis upon a belief in the psyche and in psychic causation. He even went so far as to state that

> Psycho-analysis must divorce itself from every anatomical, chemical or physiological supposition which is alien to it. It must work through purely psychological therapeutic concepts.[22]

Neurotic symptoms became explained in terms of psychical motives and in terms of images which were thought to exist in the deeper layers of the psyche. Psycho-analytic therapeutic procedure operated on the assumption that cure was to be gained through a 'conscious' recalling of these hidden images. Psycho-analysis, thus, divorced itself from anatomical and physiological suppositions and founded itself on "purely psychological therapeutic concepts."

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22 GIP, 6.

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22 Op. c.

While Freud made the transition in the field of psychology, he did not make the larger transition in the field of philosophy. His philosophy remained materialistic. Freud has founded his science upon the belief in the reality of psychic life and psychic processes, and yet he persists in thinking of metaphysical reality as inorganic, inanimate matter.[23] He has not thought through the metaphysical presuppositions on which his psychology rests. If he were to think it through to its logical conclusions, he would arrive at a metaphysics similar to that of Schopenhauer advanced in his The World as Will and Idea which describes reality in terms of 'will' and 'idea'[24] or he would arrive at a metaphysics similar to that advanced by Prof. Alfred North Whitehead in his Process and Reality which makes 'prehensions' or 'feelings' a primary concept[25] and which conceives of reality in terms of entities knit together by feeling-bonds, which Freud could characterize in his terminology as 'libidinal-bonds.' Freud, however, has not thought through the metaphysical implications of his psychology. His materialistic philosophy is a vestigial remnant of his nineteenth century training. He has not brought his metaphysics up to date with his psychology.

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23 BPP, 21.
24 Weber & Perry, HOP, 448.
25 Part III.

d. Reason and Religion not Incompatible.

Freud's contention that reason will displace religious beliefs, that education will undermine 'the religious Weltanschauung,' that religion and reason are incompatible, is based upon ignorance of the best modern thinking in the field of religion.[26] Protestantism holds that individuals may think for themselves and may found their religious life on their own experiences and their own reflective thought. It is true that Catholicism does prohibit rational inquiry of religion on the part of the laymen, but even Catholic theologians, who claim to be authorities on theology, base their authority partly on the fact that they have given themselves to more learning.

Freud has stated that religious belief in God is not demonstrable. He states that it cannot be proved, and also admits that it cannot be disproved. He has called the belief illusory. He is not justified, however, in calling this belief illusory. A belief may be called illusory only when it is known to be false. He admits that the belief in God cannot be disproven. Sound scientific thinking would demand that under the conditions he must at least keep an open mind on the question. The possibility of the existence of God must always be entertained until there is sufficient evidence to disprove

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26 Cf. Knudson, DOG, 67-86.

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86 Cf. Knudson, pp. 87-88.

it. Freud has gone beyond the bounds of critical and scientific thought in pronouncing the belief in God illusory.

Although the evidence at hand does not prove the existence of God, it may be pointed out that belief in God may be inferred by the use of reason on the basis of the evidence that is at hand. Freud has affirmed the existence of psychical reality, of consciousness. If he try to account for the rise of psychical reality, he will be logically driven to assume more than a materialistic metaphysics. Materialistic metaphysics cannot account for the phenomena of consciousness. A metaphysical reality must be inferred that does justice to this fact which is the most empirical of all facts. Many different metaphysical systems may be inferred rationally on the basis of the data of experience. Belief in God is an hypothesis that may be rationally inferred and entertained. It may be regarded as one hypothesis among various possible hypotheses. "Religion calls God the only hypothesis that will inclusively interpret the facts of experience."[27] Belief in God, therefore, is not incompatible with the function of reason. Freud is not justified in setting the one against the other.

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27 Brightman, ITP, 329.

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87 Brightman, ITP, 329.

3. Personal Factors Involved.

a. Judaistic Heritage.

It is one of Freud's psycho-analytic conclusions that one's own personal experience and one's own emotional background exercises marked influence on what he believes.

> My belief is that everyone is under the sway of preferences deeply rooted within, into the hands of which he unwittingly plays as he pursues his speculation.[28]

Freud's own experience of being born and raised a Jew is a personal fact that cannot be overlooked in appraising his view of religion. We have already noted how his Jewish mother undermined his spontaneous belief in immortality when he was a boy but six years of age.[29] Many of his views of religion follow Judaistic lines. His identification of religion and morality, his view of religion as an obsessional neurosis, his view of God as a patriarchal deity follow Judaistic teachings and Judaistic religious life. In Judaism, the law of the state was the law of God; Judaistic religion has many rites of purification and penance; in Judaism, Jahve is conceived of in terms of a stern judge. In attempting to undermine these ideas and attitudes, he is doing what Jesus attempted to do in his day. Jesus found that the fulfillment of the needs of men were more important than adherence to static social

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28 BPP, 77.
29 See Chapter Five, 185f.

laws.[30] He did not want to identify the religious life with the static laws of Judaism. He found the seat of religion in the inner life of love. He reduced the ten commandments to a "new commandment give I unto you that ye love one another."[31] Jesus, too, criticised the purification rites of the Pharisees. It was more important that the inner life be clean than that rites and ceremonies of purification be carried out.[32] Further, it is to be noted that Jesus sought to modify the attitude towards God from that of a stern deity to a loving, forgiving Father.[33] Freud has called this same process a modification of the 'super-ego' which he regards as one of the main ends of psycho-analytic therapy.[34] In these points, we find that Freud is suggesting similar changes that Jesus, himself born and trained a Jew, suggested many centuries ago. The point here is that Freud is criticising in many instances religious beliefs and practices that Jesus and His followers have themselves criticised and outgrown. From the standpoint of the Christian tradition, thus, Freud's attack on religion is, in many points, an attack on outmoded forms and beliefs of religion, forms that are characteristic of Judaism, but not of Christianity.

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30 Mark 2:27.
31 John 13:34.
32 Matt. 15:11, 18; Luke 11:34-40.
33 Luke 15.
34 DUK, 132.

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30 Mark 2:27.
31 John 13:34.
32 Matt. 15:11, 16; Luke 11:34-40.
33 Luke 15.
34 Ibid., 152.

b. Semitic Conflict.

Another personal factor which is very revealing concerning Freud's attitude toward religion is to be found in his attitude towards himself as a Jew and his feelings concerning Anti-Semitic prejudices. The social conflict between Christians and Jews was felt from his early childhood onward. When he was a boy in school, he found that he was forced to take his place among "the Jews."[35] An experience which crystalized his feelings against the Christians came when he was twelve years of age. The experience is so significant and illuminating that his description of it deserves to be quoted in full:

> Ich mochte zehn oder zwölf Jahre gewesen sein, als mein Vater begann, mich auf seine Spaziergänge mitzunehmen und mir in Gesprächen seine Ansichten über die Dinge dieser Welt zu eröffnen. So erzählte er mir einmal, um mir zu zeigen, in wie viel bessere Zeiten ich gekommen sei als er: Als ich ein junger Mensch war, bin ich in deinem Geburtsort am Samstag in der Strasse spaziren gegangen, schön gekleidet, mit einer neuen Pelzmütze auf dem Kopf. Da kommt ein Christ daher, haut mir mit einem Schlag die Mütze in den Koth und ruft dabei: Jud, herunter vom Trottoir! "Und was hast du gethan?" Ich bein auf den Fahrweg gegangen und habe die Mütze aufgehoben, war die gelassene Antwort. Das schien mir nicht heldenhaft von dem grossen starken Mann, der mich Kleinen an der Hand führte. Ich stellte dieser Situation, die mich nicht befriedigte, eine andere gegenüber, die meinem Empfinden besser entsprach, die Szene, in welcher Hannibal's Vater, Hasdrubal, seinen Knaben vor dem Hausaltar schwören lässt, an den Römern Rache zu nehmen. Seitdem hatte Hannibal einen Platz in meinen Phantasien.[36]

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35 IOD, 195.
36 DT, 135.

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35 Ibd., 136.

This event was so significant in his life that he came to identify himself with the Semitic Hannibal whose father made him swear eternal vengeance against Rome. Thereafter, Hannibal had an important place in his ambitions and phantasies. Freud came to conceive of himself as one whose great mission in life was that of dealing a death blow to Rome.

> Als dann im Obergymnasium das erste Verständnis für die Konsequenzen der Abstammung aus landesfremder Rasse erwuchs, und die antisemitischen Regungen unter den Kameraden mahnten Stellung zu nehmen, da hob sich die Gestalt des semitischen Feldherrn noch höher in meinen Augen. Hannibal und Rom symbolisierten dem Jüngling den Gegensatz zwischen der Zähigkeit des Judenthums und der Organisation der katholischen Kirche. Die Bedeutung, welche die antisemitische Bewegung seither für unser Gemüthsleben gewonnen hat, verhalf dann den Gedanken und Empfindungen jener frühen Zeit zur Fixirung. So ist der Wunsch, nach Rom zu kommen, für das Traumlebem zum Deckmantel und Symbol für mehrere andere heissersehnte Wünsche geworden...an deren Erfüllung zeitweilig vom Schicksal ebenso wenig begünstigt scheint wie der Lebenswunsch Hannibal's in Rom einzuziehen.[37]

Rome symbolized for him all that was involved in the struggle between Jews and Christians. Recent anti-Semitic movements, such as found in Germany today, have only served to strenthen and fire this early passion to carry out his vengeance against Rome.

In casting back upon Freud's criticism of religion, we now note that many of his remarks against religion apply to

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37 Ibid., 134.

Roman Catholicism. The accusation of dogmatism,[38] of taboos against free enquiry into the truth of religious beliefs,[39] of the founding of religion upon revelation and tradition,[40] of the method of implanting religious ideas in children before they are able to understand them,[41] of religion as an ecclesiastical system or organization,[42] all of these accusations fall into a single piece when viewed in the light of his hostility to Rome and the Catholic Church.

One gains the impression in considering Freud's view of religion that he is not approaching his subject with an open mind. He presents reasons for the rejection of religious beliefs, but one detects behind these reasons sinister motives. He starts out with a hostile attitude towards religion, and then seeks to bring forth as many reasons as possible to justify his attitude.[43] He has not considered both sides with equal consideration. He has a case to prove, and the reasons he advances are but tools for the realization of his purpose. Back of his reasons is to be seen Freud as Hannibal, seeking to carry out eternal hostility to Rome.

c. Schism with Jung.

Fritz Wittels who has written a biography of Freud

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38 ZEI, 38.
39 Ibid., 44.
40 Ibid., 41
41 Ibid., 77.
42 DT, 134; MAI, V.
43 See Knudson, DOG, 24.

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38 VPI, 38. 43 See Rumbaon, DOC, 24.
39 Ibid., 44.
40 Ibid., 41
41 Ibid., 77.
42 DT, 1944; MAI, V.

suggests that the break between Jung and Freud has caused Freud to emphasize those elements in his teaching which Jung rejects. Wittels states that Totem und Tabu was written immediately after Jung left Freud and that in it "Freud wreaked a scientific vengeance upon Jung."[44] Jung differed from Freud on his pansexualism, on his over-emphasis upon infantile urges, and on his low evaluation of the moral and religious life of man.[45] These constituted in the main his reasons for leaving Freud. In Totem und Tabu, we have noted how Freud laid especial stress on the 'Oedipus-complex' as the origin of religion and morality. The doctrine that he expressed in his early work has been carried out in his later writings on morality and religion.

It is evident that Freud has tended to lay especial stress on those of his teachings which Jung had rejected. His continued emphasis upon sexual factors and his hostility toward religion may be understood, in part, by this schism which occurred between him and this his most illustrious disciple.

We do not rest our criticism of Freud's view of religion on personal factors. We have tried to meet Freud on the ground of reason and fact. We have taken his arguments at face value and have subjected them to criticism in the light of the psychology and philosophy of religion. We found, for

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44 SF, 191.
45 Jung, MMSS, 137-142.

the most part, that his views were one-sided, that they were not based upon a consideration of all data relevant to religious beliefs and experience. Nevertheless, the personal factors that we have considered help us to understand the motives back of Freud's arguments against religion. Freud admits that his writings in philosophy and religion are speculative,[46] and he also admits that 'unconscious' and personal factors enter into one's speculation.[47] We contend that his speculations on religious beliefs have been influenced by personal factors, the influence of which he may or may not fully realize. From the standpoint of the truth of religious beliefs, personal factors must be discounted. The truths of religious beliefs are universal; they must be true for all people; religious truths are not to be rejected on the grounds of prejudices entertained by a single individual.

B. Contributions.

The contributions that Freud has to offer arise from his work as a psycho-analyst. Psycho-analysis is a technique for investigating the deeper aspects of "soul" life. It, in itself, does not rest upon any particular metaphysical outlook. It is a scientific technique for the discovery of knowledge within a particular field. It can say nothing in the way of

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46 AAS, 290.
47 BPP, 77.

speaking with authority about reality as a whole. Freud admits that his attitude toward religion is not a necessary part of psycho-analysis.[48] He admits that there are many psycho-analysts who do not share his attitude. From the standpoint of psycho-analysis, he has no words of criticism to offer against them.[49] Since the religious life has always emphasized the importance of the inner life of man and since psycho-analysis presents itself as a technique for the gaining of greater knowledge about this inner life, it may be seen that psycho-analysis, with its technique and its conclusions, may be of value to those interested in the knowledge and cultivation of the "soul" life.

The values that are to be gained from psycho-analysis fall, mainly, within the realm of the psychology of religion and in the practical branch of that field known as pastoral psychology. We shall set forth, first, the theoretical contributions that psycho-analysis has to offer to the psychology of religion, and then the more practical contributions that the science of psycho-analysis has to offer the pastor in his work of ministering to the inner problems of his people.

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48 FOI, 59.
49 Ibid.

1. To Psychology of Religion.

a. Analysis of Affective Factors in Religious Beliefs and Practices.

Psycho-analysis may aid the psychology of religion by uncovering and revealing affective factors associated with religious beliefs which have previously been unrecognized and unappreciated. Psycho-analysis has already performed a great work for psychology of religion by helping to understand the complex psychological phenomena of conversion. The sudden emergence of feelings and images into consciousness at the time of conversion was previously unintelligible from the standpoint of tracing the psychological events to their sources. The phenomena were attributed to divine action, which placed the phenomena out of the range of scientific investigation. Psycho-analysis had helped in presenting a connected link of events preceding such experiences and has helped psychology of religion in its task of describing the mental processes involved in religious experiences.

> Psycho-analysis comes to the assistance of religious psychology which is in its infancy. Even today, it has given us the solutions for a mass of myths, religious hallucinations, inspirations, prohibitions, bizarre new formations, ceremonials, ancient enigmas like automatic glossalalia, etc. And it will accomplish still much more. [50]

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50 Pfister, PM, 413.

It is also of value in leading to a fuller understanding of effective factors associated with religious symbolism. Many religious symbols have persisted down through the centuries without their full significance being appreciated by worshippers. Why certain symbols should appeal to people, why they accept symbols often without conscious appreciation, is a question that psycho-analysis can help in answering. Theodor Reik has utilized the technique and findings of psycho-analysis to great advantage in analyzing certain types of primitive rituals.[51] Religious practices which had previously been not fully understood become more intelligible through interpretation in the light of the findings of psycho-analysis. While Protestant churches employ fewer symbols, the Catholic and the High Episcopalian worship services are more symbolic and ritualistic. In these services are to be found symbols which are not always fully appreciated by the worshippers. Psycho-analysis, as a technique for uncovering the unrecognized significance of emotions, ideas, and images, may greatly aid in gaining a fuller appreciation of these symbols.

Psycho-analysis may, thus, aid the psychology of religion in its task of discovering and describing the mental

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51 Throughout RPS.

factors involved in religious experiences and beliefs.

> We may state that psycho-analysis enables us to comprehend thousands of phenomena which had been inexplicable before Freud's day because we had no access to the secret chambers and inner laboratories of psychic life. 52

b. Importance of Family Situation.

With its many researches into the influence of the family life upon personality growth and development, psychoanalysis has revealed the part that family situations play in influencing one's religious outlook. Freud has especially shown how the son's relation to his father is an important factor in forming the religious outlook of that individual. Many of the instances of rebellion against religion may be traced to an individual's rebelliousness against his own father. If an identification with the father is achieved, the son is very likely to be favorable toward religious beliefs. If there has been incessant conflict with the father, and if the son has refused to accept the authority which the father may wish to exercise over him, the son may rebel against his father and against all that the older generations and social heritage stands for. From the standpoint of psychological factors involved in religious loyalties, Freud thus, is able to contribute a knowledge of the part that early

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52 Pfister, PSE, 166.

family situations have to play in the formation of the religious attitudes of individuals. The psychologist of religion, however, will consider this part only a part and will seek to relate it to other factors involved in the development of the religious life of the individual.

c. Analysis of Sense of Guilt.

The psychology of religion finds as one of its main problems the analysis of the sense of sin and guilt. Psychoanalysts, in their attempt to understand guilt conflicts in neurotic patients, have faced the problem objectively. Psychoanalysts have revealed that the sense of guilt may not always arise from an overt act committed against some other person. They have shown that the sense of guilt may arise from within the individual on the basis of mere intention. They have shown that the excluding of the painful sense of guilt from 'conscious' recognition does not in any way reduce the strength of the sense of guilt. The guilt feelings continually haunt the individual and demand their price. Freud has given an analysis of guilt feelings on a psychological level. His analysis of the sense of guilt in terms of 'introverted aggressive impulses' helps the psychologist of religion in understanding the ascetic self-punishment practices of disturbed mystics and saints. The influence of guilt feelings in motivating rites of purification and penance ceremonials is

clearly described by Freud in his work on the similarity of religious rituals and obsessional neuroses. The tracing of guilt feelings to son-father relationships gives one something tangible to work on in specific cases where guilt feelings manifest themselves. The concept of the 'super-ego,' while it is insufficient from the standpoint of explaining the moral life of the individual, is a concept that is useful in helping to trace guilt feelings as they arise within the personality. Freud, thus, may greatly aid the psychology of religion through his investigations of the problem of guilt.

d. The Nature of the Religious Subject.

Psychology of Religion and philosophy of religion must have their theories about the nature of the religious subject. Especially is this true for psychology of religion, for the psychologist of religion finds it his main purpose to describe and analyze religious experiences in terms of mental processes. Psycho-analysts may aid the psychologist of religion to the formulation of his theory of the religious subject and in his concepts of mental processes by providing knowledge concerning the dimly conscious and so-called 'unconscious' processes that so vitally exercise and influence on the 'conscious' self.[53] The sense of the supernatural or conversion experiences can only be described and analyzed by the psychologist

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53 Jung, PU, 199.

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85 Thus, Pu, 129.

of religion by appealing to concepts with which psycho-analysts deal.[54] The psychologist of religion must be aware of the basic motives and urges of man; he must be aware of the influence of past experience, particularly childhood experience, upon beliefs and practices; he must be aware of so-called 'mental mechanisms' that play such an important part in religious phenomena.[55] The psychologist of religion can better succeed in his task by availing himself of the many researches made by psycho-analysts with reference to the nature and influence of so-called 'unconscious' processes.

Henri Bergson stated that he looked for the most important advance in the general field of knowledge to be gained in the realm of investigation of the so-called 'unconscious' nature of man:

> To explore the most sacred depths of the unconscious, to labor in what I have just called the sub-soil of consciousness, that will be the principal task of psychology in the century which is just opening. I do not doubt but that wonderful discoveries await it there, as important perhaps as have been in the discoveries of the physical and natural sciences. That at least is the promise which I make for it, that is the wish that I have for it.[56]

The psychologist of religion will profit by every advance made in this area of its field. Psycho-analysis claims to be a 'psychology of the depths'[57] and seeks to provide

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54 Brown, "Religion and Psychology," in Needham, SRR, 307.
55 Pfister, PM, 413.
56 "The Birth of the Dream," in The Independent, Oct. 30, 1913, 65.
57 Freud, NILP, 15.

a technique for making known this realm of which Bergson speaks, and insofar as the psychology of religion must formulate its theory about the deeper nature of the religious subject, psycho-analysis may be regarded as a valuable technique which it may use.

2. To Pastoral Psychology.

a. Insight into One's Own Personality.

Psycho-analysis may aid the pastor, first of all, in giving him insight into his own inner nature. The greatest pastor of all time spoke concerning the representatives of religion of his day in words like these:

> They be blind leaders of the blind. And if the blind lead the blind, both shall fall into the ditch.[58]

Psycho-analysts teach that no analyst can go further in his treatment of patients than his own personality allows.[59] A pastor can lead his people no further than he himself has gone in inner growth and development. Psycho-analysis may aid the pastor in gaining insight into his inner self, in freeing him from early habits and wishes, in setting his personality free to grow and develop. He will be able to free his people from their early habits and tendencies only as he has discovered within himself the means whereby such

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58 Matt. 15:14.
59 "The Future of Psycho-Analytic Technique," CP,II, 289.

freedom may be gained. His personality may be, to use psycho-analytic terms,[60] a mirror for those with whom he is working. His parishioners may see themselves as their true selves through him and gain their freedom thereby as in the case of the man who was possessed of devils who was freed from them when he looked upon Jesus.[61]

After having a knowledge into his own nature, the pastor will be better able to understand and interpret the experience of his parishioners. Motives which are 'unconscious' in their functioning may be made 'conscious.' Experiences that seem unintelligible may be seen to have definite meanings. Parishioners may be made free from inner compulsions when they learn of the nature of the compelling forces. Psycho-analysis may aid the pastor in these respects, for it places within him an understanding of the deeper factors involved in experience.

b. Religious Education.

The pastor may be aided in his task of religious education by use of the findings which psycho-analysis has advanced concerning the influence of parent-child relationships upon the development of religious beliefs. The religious educator may be made aware of the importance of the 'father-imago' in the belief of the individual about God. The religious educator

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60 Ibid.
61 Matt. 9:32

may start with the 'father-imago.' He must first determine what the individual's 'father-imago' is. He must sift out the more undesirable aspects of the individual's attitude towards his father. Then taking this purified 'father-imago' as his model, he may proceed to enlarge, expand, and develop the individual's idea about God. He starts with an image that is tangible and that is laden with rich emotions and uses this as a foundation for a fuller, intellectually sound idea of God.

c. Treatment of Guilt Feelings.

The need for redemption from sin has played a leading role in the Christian religion. Redemption from sin is, in psychological terminology, freedom from guilt tensions. The pastor may well afford to avail himself of the many investigations and findings of psycho-analysts concerning the problem of guilt feelings. While psycho-analysts have not used the religious terminology in expressing their findings, their basic concepts may be used by the minister and may be expanded to include religious interpretations. Too often, the pastor has been himself guilty of increasing guilt feelings in attempting to bring conviction of sin. His primary purpose should not be to increase guilt feelings, but to lead people to change their ways of living, especially if such ways are harmful to themselves and to others. With the aid of psycho-analytic knowledge, the pastor may be able to better perform

his task of freeing his parishioners from heavy burdens of guilt. The concept of the 'super-ego,' while it is limited to the psychological level, is a useful concept with which to start in trying to unravel guilt feelings. Freud's conclusion that 'aggressive impulses' are, in the last analysis, the motivating factors behind guilt feelings, is a conclusion which may lead the pastor to know in what area of the personality the root of the difficulty is to be found. The pastor may well afford to make himself acquainted with the work that Freud and other analysts have done on this important problem.

d. Correct Unhealthy Views and Practices.

Psycho-analytic knowledge will help the pastor in correcting mentally harmful aspect of religious beliefs and practices. Dr. John W. Suters, Jr., who is a member of the Board of Governors of the Council for Clinical Training of Theological Students, in his address before that body in September of 1935, made the following statement which all ministers could well afford to read:

> Many physicians turn against religion, not because they are materialistically or mechanistically trained, but because they have had to care for the sick personalities whose illness religion, or pseudo-religion, has fostered.[62]

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62 Hiltner, "Summarized Report of the Sixth Annual Conference of the Council for the Clinical Training of Theological Students," 6.

Psycho-analytic knowledge of human nature and of healthy emotional living would prevent a pastor from making such a grevious error of bringing about rather than relieving inner psychic conflicts.

e. Insight into Family Conflicts.

Psycho-analytic knowledge will aid the minister in understanding conflicts within the family. Psycho-analysys have specialized in the study of motives which make for conflict in family life. An understanding of these motives by the minister, and through him, by the parents and by other members of the family would alleviate much of the strife and tension which disrupts the harmony and happiness of family life. Such knowledge would not only apply to parent-child relationships but would apply also to conflicts within the marital relationship itself. The Christian minister finds it part of his task to perform marriages. Psycho-analytic knowledge would greatly aid the pastor in following through with this aspect of his work. The pastor may, with an understanding of the problems involved, prevent a dissolution of the marital bond, a bond which he has performed and a bond which the Christian Church regards as sacred.

f. Recognition of Cases that Need Psychiatric Attention.

An individual is usually aware of physical illness. He often suffers pain which drives him to a doctor. In cases of

mental illness, however, the individual is often the last one to be conscious of his illness. The pastor, if he makes himself acquainted with psycho-analytic knowledge, may detect cases which are serious or which are becoming progressively serious. He will minister to such individuals by putting them in contact with a trained psychiatrist who has the time and who is competent to deal with their inner disorders. The pastor should not take it upon himself to treat such cases. He has, as a rule, neither the training nor the time. His mission is fulfilled in detecting cases that are serious enough to warrant psychiatric attention. Psycho-analytic knowledge would provide him with information that would help him in recognizing such cases.

g. Preventive Mental Hygiene.

The minister's place in our present day in the general field of psychic disorders will best be found in the work of prevention. His greatest contribution will be made along the lines of mental hygiene rather than along the lines of psychiatric treatment.

> There is probably no professional worker who is in a position to do more effective service in the prevention of mental disorder and the achievement of mental health than the competent minister of religion.[63]

In a program of preventive mental hygiene, the minister may serve the following important functions: first, he may

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63 Boisen, "The Distinctive Task of the Minister of Religion in the Re-creation of Character," Ibid.,5.

disseminate knowledge concerning the causes of nervousness and mental breakdown, concerning attitudes, feelings, and habits that are detrimental to the health and development of personality. Secondly, he may present goals, ideals, and a philosophy of life that will give balance, unity, and security to the people with whom he is working. Thirdly, he may interpret crises experiences of his parishioners with a view to helping them maintain their inner stability. Fourthly, the minister, by detecting individuals who have begun to develop mental symptoms or who have already developed mental symptoms, may provide proper treatment for the individual, either through insight that he is able to give or through putting the individual in touch with some specialist, thus preventing further development of mental disorder. Fifthly, the minister, through the medium of the church, may help individuals socialize their problems and conflicts through contact with others who have similar problems.

In his program of preventive mental hygiene, the minister may be aided by psycho-analytic treatment and literature.

> The contribution of the psycho-analytic movement to prevention is to become an important one. It will make itself felt not so much directly, through the treatment of individual patients, as indirectly and gradually through the stimulus which these searching studies into the nature and history of the human motives must exert on parents and educators.[64]

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64 Putnam, AP, 275.

Through contact with psycho-analysts and psycho-analytic literature, the minister may gain valuable information concerning the causes of mental symptoms and breakdown, concerning healthy and morbid attitudes, and concerning wholesome ways of facing personality conflicts, information that will help him perform his function in maintaining the mental health of individuals in his parish and community.

h. Increased Capacity for Religious Experience.

The religious life does not thrive in a disordered mind.

> If we are to know reality as a whole; know its character and quality, know its inherent and essential nature, then it is only by an act of the self as a whole that such knowledge can be attained. The more perfect the personality becomes in its unitary fullness, the more adequate will be the mutual response between it and reality.[65]

There is a lack of "unitary fullness" in the personality of the mental patient, and hence he finds little "mutual response" between himself and reality. One who is suffering from inner conflicts finds it difficult to worship with all his heart, mind and soul. Insofar as psycho-analytic treatment and insight tends to remove the distracting factors within the personality and tends to restore the unity of the personality, it may be looked upon as an aid to be used in increasing the capacity of the individual for more complete religious experience.

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65 Valentine, WMG, 48.

William James, In his Varieties of Religious Experience, advanced the view that one's capacity for religious experience was more of less dependent upon his ability to have contact with what he called the 'subconscious' mind.

> The 'more' with which in religious experience we feel ourselves connected is on its higher side the subconscious continuation of our conscious life..... Invasions from subconscious regions take on objective appearances... Here the prophets of all different religions come with their visions, voices, raptures, and other openings.[66]

William James suggests that the experience of the 'Other,' or the 'External,' which is characteristic of experiences interpreted as religious, is, from the standpoint of psychology, a contact of the conscious self with its larger 'subconscious' environment. Since psycho-analysis aims to study this 'subconscious' environment and since it aims to bring about a greater unity between the self and its 'subsconscious' environment, psycho-analysis may be of value in aiding one to increase his capacity for religious experience.

Psycho-analysis, as a 'science of the depths,' has many values to offer religious leaders and those interested in the cultivation of the religious life. Oskar Pfister has found so many points of similarity between the findings of psycho-analysis and the teaching of Jesus that he has come to call Jesus "the first psycho-analyst."[67] The Director, Dr. H.

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66 512,513
67 SAP, 328

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66 Jas, 513
67 Pfi, 328

Flanders Dunbar, and the Assistant Director, Dr. Edwin B. Lewis, of the Council for Clinical Training of Theological Students are both psycho-analysts. They find no inherent conflict between psycho-analysis and religion. We close our formal discussion with the personal testimony of William Brown who is Wilde Reader of Mental Philosophy at Oxford University. Dr. Brown is one who is acquainted with religious life not only as it has been lived in history, but with religious life as he himself has experienced it. He has been analyzed and is himself a recognized analyst. He is well qualified to speak with authority on the relationship between psycho-analysis and religion.

> After an analysis (for scientific purposes) by a leading psycho-analyst extending over ninety-two hours, my religious convictions were stronger than before, not weaker. The analysis had indeed a purifying effect upon my religious feelings, freeing them from much that was merely infantile and supported by sentimental associations or historical accidents. But the ultimate result has been that I have become more convinced than ever that religion is the most important thing in life and that it is essential to mental health. In many patients whom I have analyzed, I have found a similar result. Although mere emotionalism and religiosity is diminished, the essentially religious outlook on life remains unimpaired.[67]

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67 Brown, "Religion and Psychology,' in Needham, SRR,311.

CONCLUSIONS

1. Freud contends that religious attitudes and beliefs are rooted in childhood attitudes entertained towards one's parents, particularly towards one's father.

2. That childhood attitudes towards one's parents play an important role in the formulation of one's religious beliefs is true from the standpoint of the psychology of religion; but religious beliefs are not to be rejected on this account, for the validity of beliefs are not to be determined by their origins.

3. Freud's view of morality is faulty in that he identifies the moral life of an individual with 'unconscious' and social compulsions.

4. Freud is a social pessimist; his pessimism is due, in the main, to a failure to see the 'immanent reason' in social laws and mores.

5. Freud has made a contribution to the psychology of religion in his analysis of guilt feelings; his analysis discloses that guilt feelings are motivated by 'aggressive impulses' which have been turned inwards onto the self in punishment of the self for its violation of inner standards and restraints.

6. Freud entertains no belief in immortality; his denial may be traced, in part, to an early lesson received from his Jewish mother.

7. Freud is a materialist in his metaphysics; he has failed to bring his metaphysics up-to-date with his psychology.

8. Freud is not qualified either in training or experience to speak with authority on questions concerning the validity of religious beliefs.

9. Freud's hostile attitude towards religion may be accounted for, in a large measure, by personal factors; anti-Semitic prejudice has led him to think of himself as the Semitic Hannibal who had "sworn eternal vengeance against Rome," Rome signifying, for Freud, the strongholds of organized Christianity; his schism with Carl Jung over questions concerning the sexual, moral, and religious nature of man has led him to emphasize the more anti-religious aspects of his own views.

10. There is no inherent conflict between religious beliefs and psycho-analysis as a 'science of the depths.'

11. Psycho-analysis may aid the psychologist of religion in his attempt to describe and analyse the mental processes involved in religious experiences and may aid the pastor in giving him greater insight into his own inner nature and in helping him better to understand and serve his parishioners.

SUMMARY

In investigating Freud's view of religion, we have pursued three ends. First, we have attempted to discover what his views are concerning the major religious beliefs; second, we have attempted to criticise his views; and third, we have attempted to determine the contributions that psycho-analysis as a science has to offer religious leaders.

With regard to his view of man, we found that Freud advanced the concept of the psyche with its 'conscious' and 'unconscious' aspects after breaking away from the neurological, physiological view of man in which he had received his academic and medical training. The evidence which brought about this change was found in the study of post-hypnotic phenomena and in the study of neurotic patients. Freud advanced the method of free-association which he found useful in bringing to consciousness the contents of the deeper 'unconscious' aspect of the psyche. His view of man centers about three basic concepts, namely, the 'id' which, in the main, corresponds to 'unconscious' processes which are not easily accessible to the 'conscious' mind; the 'ego' which corresponds with what is ordinarily called 'the self'; and the 'super-ego' which corresponds to what is commonly called 'the conscience,' the 'super-ego' differing mainly from the latter in that it performs most of its work 'unconsciously.' As a psychologist, Freud is a

SUMMARY

determinist. In therapy, he attempts to elevate the level of determinism from 'unconscious' to 'conscious' control. Freud lays undue stress upon sexual instincts which are conceived of in a biological sense.

Freud contends that the belief in God is rooted in childhood images of the parents, especially of the father, that the childhood attitudes towards the father are carried over into adult life in fulfillment of the needs for protection and for moral support. Freud regards belief in God as illusory, since there is no evidence for God to be found in the world of nature, and since the belief is based on subjective wishes and needs. Because the belief in God is rooted in the childhood images of his parents and because it persists by virtue of its fulfillment of subjective needs, Freud rejects belief in God. His rejection is not justified inasmuch as the origin of a belief does not determine its validity and inasmuch as it is better to keep an open mind on beliefs which offer neither proof or disproof but which are of value in satisfying subjective needs.

Freud identifies morality with 'super-ego' and social compulsions. This account of morality does not do justice to the science of ethics which finds the seat of the moral life of an individual in his chosen values and ends. Freud finds a conflict between the inner needs and desires of individuals and the demands of society. He is a social pessimist. He fails to see that social laws and mores have evolved out of centuries of generations as they have attempted to solve the

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problems of social living.

Freud has made a great contribution not only to the understanding of neuroses but to the psychology of religion in his analysis of the sense of guilt. The sense of guilt is seen to arise from a tension between the self or 'ego' and the 'super-ego' which represents the function of conscience, both in its 'unconscious' as well as 'conscious' aspects. The imagery of the 'super-ego' is modelled after persons in authority, particularly the father; its power being derived from 'aggressive impulses' which it turns inwards onto the 'ego.' One may refuse to face his guilt, but, according to Freud, the guilt feelings are not extinguished. 'Repressed' guilt manifests itself in devious and circuitous ways which may give rise to neurotic symptoms of compulsion and to tendencies of self-punishment. Guilt feelings are released by tracing them to their original sources. Freud, like Jesus, regards guilt feelings as detrimental to the health, happiness, and efficiency of the individual. One of the chief ends of psycho-analytic therapy is that of releasing guilt tensions and of modifying 'super-egos' that are severe and irrational. The pastor may gain a greater understanding of guilt laden people whom he finds in his parish through a study of the work that Freud and other psycho-analysts have made on this problem.

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Freud entertains no belief in immortality. His denial of immortality may be traced, in part, to an early lesson received from his Jewish mother. Freud believes that death brings with it a return to the inanimate and that death is but the final achievement of an instinct within all living organisms which aims for the reinstatement of earlier conditions. This tendency within organisms is called the 'death instinct.' His view of 'death instincts' has many points in common with Schopenhauer's philosophy and with the doctrine of Nirvana found in Buddhism.

Freud argues that 'the religious Weltanschauung' should be replaced by 'the scientific Weltanschauung.' The antithesis that he finds between science and reason on the one hand and religion on the other is untenable. Belief in God may be an hypothesis entertained as rationally as any other hypothesis. Freud is not trained in philosophy and hence cannot speak with authority on philosophic matters. Especially is this true with relation to questions concerning the validity of religious beliefs, questions which fall within the realm of the philosophy of religion.

As a 'science of the depths,' religion has nothing to fear from psycho-analysis. Freud's hostile attitude toward religion is not a part of psycho-analytic theory. His hostility toward religion has in part grown out of deep-seated

feelings on Semitic prejudices, and also out of the schism that occurred between him and Jung. He admits that his views on religion are not shared by many of his psycho-analytic colleagues, and he holds that psycho-analysis as a science is impartial in its implications for philosophy and religion. Since psycho-analysis is a technique for the discovery of knowledge concerning the innermost nature of man, psycho-analytic knowledge and training may be of value to the minister in giving him deeper insight into his own inner nature and in rendering him a more understanding pastor among the people who are intrusted to his care.

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AUTOBIOGRAPHY

On January 27, 1910, I was born in Howell, Michigan. My father, the Rev. J. S. Deabler, is a minister in the Evangelical Church. Both father and mother are of German heritage. There are seven children in the family, five boys and two girls, two brothers being older than myself.

After graduating from Reed City High School, Reed City, Michigan, I entered North Central College, Naperville, Illinois, from which I graduated in 1931 with the A. B. degree. The year 1931-32 was spent in study at the Evangelical Theological Seminary, Naperville, Illinois. The following two years were spent in study at Boston University School of Theology from which the S.T.B. degree was received in 1934. The years 1934-36 have been spent in graduate study in the Graduate School of Boston University. During the year 1934-35, I studied under the Edmund M. Beebe Fellowship. In both undergraduate and graduate study, the major field has been psychology and the minor field, philosophy.

Two years, 1930-31 and 1931-32, were served as Assistant in Psychology at North Central College, the latter year being served also as Coach of Men's Debate. The summers of 1931 and 1932 were spent in traveling as field secretary of North Central College.

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On September 15, 1933, I was married to Miss Olava

Gingrich, A. B., in Reed City, Michigan.

The summers of 1933 and 1934 were spent in clinical training at state psychiatric hospitals, at Rhode Island Hospital for Mental Diseases, Howard, Rhode Island, and at Worcester State Hospital, Worcester, Massachusetts, respectively. The summer of 1935 was spent in youth counseling work at the Goodwill Inn, Morgan Memorial, Boston.

My spare moments have been spent in pre-occupations in trying to unite the findings of modern psychology with the religious outlook upon life. This dissertation, in part, is an attempt to relate one branch of psychology, namely, psychoanalysis, with religion.

Herdis L. Deabler.

at state psychiatric hospitals, at Yazoo Val-
ley Mental Hospital, Rolla, Missouri, and at
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work at the Goodwill Inn, Morgan Memorial, Boston.

Six months have been spent in pre-occupations in
trying to write the findings of modern psychology with the
religious outlook upon life. This dissertation, in part, is
an attempt to relate one branch of psychology, namely, psycho-
analysis, with religion.

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